



**SOUTH ASIAN JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL  
SCIENCES**

**(Vol. 01, Issue 02)**

**June-December 2020**



**In collaboration with**

**University of Sialkot Pakistan**

**Editor In-Chief**

Dr. Saeed ul Hasan Chishti

**Managing Editor**

Dr. Hassan Waseem

**Associate Editor**

Mr. Mohsin Shahid

**Assistant Editors**

Ms. Maria Hamayun

Mr. Dawood Tariq

**Disclaimer**

The contents of this 'Journal' are the personal views of writers and do not represent the official policy of the SAJCSS, Editors and the University of Sialkot.

## Contents

---

Political Insights of Mawlana Mawdudi, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, and Javed Ghamidi and their Relevance amid Current Political Crisis: A Comparative Study

**Dr Tauseef Ahmad Parray** **04**

---

Emergence of Bengali Nationalist Opposition to West Pakistan, 1947-1954: An Appraisal

**Muhammad Nisar** **21**

---

China's Public Diplomacy towards Pakistan in Post CPEC Era

**Maryam Zohra** **31**

---

Politics of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan; A Comparative Study of Jamat-e-Islami and Pakistan-Tehreek-e-Insaaf

**Mohsin Shahid** **37**

---

Impact of Power Asymmetry on India-Pakistan Conflict Resolution: Critical Appraisal of India's policies under Modi's Tenure

**Saif Ullah Malik** **49**

---

Rise of China: A Transition in The World Order

**Alina Malik, Dr Saima A Kayani & Fatima Riffat** **57**

---

Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Efforts: Lessons Learnt

**Dr. Summar Iqbal Babar & Syed Fraz Hussain Naqvi** **69**

---

## **Political Insights of Mawlana Mawdudi, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, and Javed Ghamidi and their Relevance amid Current Political Crisis: A Comparative Study**

**Dr Tauseef Ahmad Parray\***

### **Abstract**

*Two major events, rather phenomena, of the 21<sup>st</sup> century—the Arab Spring and the ISIS—triggered the interest of academicians and political pundits and journalists giving rise to an ever growing debate/ discussion on the political thought of Islam or what is commonly labeled as ‘political Islam’. Thinkers, experts, policy makers, academicians all alike from among Muslims and non-Muslims, especially the Western world, have been gravely engaged in this thought-process unveiling and exploring new dimensions, theories, assumptions, pertaining the political ideas of Islam and their viability in the modern-day world. In this context, this paper highlights the approaches of Mawlana Syed Abu’l Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979), Rachid al-Ghannouchi (b. 1941), and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1951) on ‘Islam and politics’, which is described here as the “Theodemocratic, reconciliatory counter narrative”. The major objective of this paper is to present their thoughts, in chronological order, followed by a comparative critical evaluation to get some insights about their thinking and approach as well as to put forth their ‘collective’ vision as a remedial measure for current ‘Islam–politics’ issue/ narrative.*

**Key Words: Political Islam; Islamism; Democracy; Theo-democracy; Mawlana Mawdudi**

### **Introduction**

In the post-9/11 scenario, a number of dramatic events and changes took place in the political landscape which had a direct effect both on ‘Islam’ (as a religion, ideology, and worldview), Muslim world and on the Muslims living in the non-Muslim countries. This resulted, through a number of academic attempts, in advancing an apparent but superficial ‘divide’ between ‘Islam’/ Islamic civilization and the West/ Western culture and society (the binary of Us vs Them). Islam began to be branded, after 9/11, as a ‘violent’ and ‘terrorist’ religion, and its adherents—the Muslims—as jihadists/ terrorists and many other such insulting terms and labels. Moreover, there has been a prodigious demand for information

about Islam, and things Islamic, which, in turn, gave an impetus, in the ensuing years, to an issue (among a multiple of issues and discourses) referred as “Islamism”.<sup>1</sup> Islamism is a term which is now commonly, collectively, and alternatively, used for Islamic ‘fundamentalism/ extremism/ conservatism/ radicalism’ and ‘political Islam’, etc., which are “often used”, as Maidul Islam (*Presidency University, Kolkata, India*) puts it, by “Scholars and commentators ... as interchangeable concepts”. Although some scholars have used other “semantic substitutions like ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’ instead of ‘fundamentalism’”, but those terms and usages, he further states, “have not successfully overcome the image of Islam within a section of mainstream media and academia as an ‘anti-modern’ religious tradition”. Gaining more momentum and weightage with the emergence of two major events—uprisings in the Arab world, commonly known as ‘Arab Spring’ and surge of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—the discourse has been described and discussed variedly.<sup>2</sup>

These two events specifically, after the events of 9/11, turned the discourse of ‘Islam and politics’ into ‘Political Islam’, of varied degrees, and its proponents, known as Islamists, are categorized “into three distinct groups in terms of operational strategies and attendant tactical questions related to the modes of capturing political power: (a) Parliamentary Islamists (b) Militant Islamists and (c) Extremist Islamists”.<sup>3</sup> Tracing its roots mainly in the writings of intellectuals/ thinkers like Mawlana Mawdudi, Hassan al Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Ayatollah Khomeini, etc., this discourse has gained new tenors and tendencies during these two decades of 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Moreover, it is pertinent to mention here, to speak in the terminology of Peter Mandaville (*George Mason University, USA*) that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Islam is frequently “represented as a ‘comprehensive’ way of life that pervades all sectors of human activity and experience among its adherents”,<sup>4</sup> and among other discourses that have gained momentum in recent years is ‘Political Islam’. John L. Esposito (*Georgetown University, USA*) puts it very succinctly as: “For several decades, in much of the Muslim world, Islam has been reasserted into personal and public life. This phenomenon has variously been described as the Islamic resurgence, Islamic revivalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamism, and political Islam”.<sup>5</sup>

For Mandaville, “political Islam, far from being a monolithic phenomenon, varies considerably from country to country depending on its position in relation to society, the state, and the broader political environment”, and the fact is that there is “an extensive academic literature focused on explaining the factors that cause Islamism,

accounting for changes in strategy on the part of Islamist actors, distinguishing between different types of Islamist movements, and even trying to provide basic definitions for concepts such as ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’”.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, Shahram Akberzadeh (*University of Melbourne, Australia*), in his *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*,<sup>7</sup> describes ‘Political Islam’, by tracing its origins “in the perceived failure of the secular ideologies of nationalism and socialism to deliver on their promises of anti-imperialist prosperity”, as “a modern phenomenon that seeks to use religion to shape the political system”, and he labels Sayyid Qutb, Maulana Mawdudi, and Ayatollah Khomeini as the “great thinkers of political Islam”. Defining Political Islam, for Akberzadeh too, represents a “challenge”, and thus “Political Islam”, for him, “is best understood as a dynamic social phenomenon—not a static ideology”; its origins are “uncontested”, but its evolution an advancement “along divergent paths suggests that scholarship on Islamism needs to retain conceptual agility and intellectual rigour”, which is necessary in making sense of its various manifestations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>8</sup>

Within this setting and ambiance, this paper highlights, and contextualizes, the approaches of Mawlana Syed Abu’l Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979), Rachid al-Ghannouchi (b. 1941), and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1951) on ‘Islam and politics’, which is described here as the “Theodemocratic, reconciliatory counter narrative”. The objective of this paper to discuss their thoughts, in chronological order, followed by a comparative assessment to get some insights about their thinking and approach as well as to put forth their ‘collective’ vision as a remedial measure for current ‘Islam–politics’ issue/ narrative, but before moving to the main discussion, it is necessary to throw some light on ‘Islamism’ and ‘Political Islam’.

It is noteworthy to mention here that this paper builds on, and is a highly modified and enlarged version of, my three write-ups published in the *Greater Kashmir* (GK: [www.greaterkashmir.com](http://www.greaterkashmir.com))—daily English newspaper from Srinagar (J&K) with ‘largest circulation’ and ‘the most widely read’ newspaper in J&K.<sup>9</sup> This write-up was written by this author as a rejoinder to Mr Mahmood Ur Rashid (a senior journalist and weekly columnist with *GK*) who had highlighted the presence of, and the “crISIS” brought by, “ISIS in Kashmir”.<sup>10</sup> In his column, he had warned of the severe consequences (to be) brought by these crisis, and suggested that “to deal with ISIS” needs to be seriously discussed because “Symbolism is not going to do it”, therefore, “politics based on some substance is needed”; and, thus, recommended three options: (i) to take some insights from “Syed Mawdudi’s emphasis on transparent, democratic, and non-violent

politics”, especially through his concept of ‘theo-democracy’; (ii) to highlight and contextualize “Rashid Ghannoushi’s reconciliatory national politics”, which focuses on democratization, pluralism and power-sharing; and (iii) to give serious consideration to the post-Islamist “Counter Narrative” advocated by Javed Ahmed Ghamidi.<sup>11</sup>

Before providing an assessment and evaluation of the thoughts and insights of Mawdudi, Ghannouchi, and Ghamidi on ‘Islam and politics’ in general and on Islam-democracy discourse in particular, it is fitting to describe the meaning and connotation of ‘Islamism and ‘Political Islam’.

### **Defining ‘Islamism’ and ‘Political Islam’**

“Islamism” is a contested discourse which has diverse definitions and connotations. It is troubled and fraught with complexity and obscurity. Invoked with caution and caveats frequently, Islamism refers to the “contemporary [Islamic] movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the Muslim community, excavating and interpreting them for application to the present-day social and political world”.<sup>12</sup> A recent ‘complex’ phenomenon, Islamism refers to those Muslim groups and thinkers who “seek to recuperate the scriptural foundations of the Islamic community, excavating and reinterpreting them for application to the contemporary social and political world”.<sup>13</sup> Islamism is defined as an “early twentieth-century construct, a specific Muslim religio-political response to an otherwise secular modernity”; and a “specific ideology adhered to by a distinct collection of non-state actors seeking the geographical revival of Islam in the post-imperial age”.<sup>14</sup> Islamism, for Mandaville, “refers to a particular kind of Muslim politics—one that seeks to create a political order defined in terms of Islam (usually a shari’ah-based state)”.<sup>15</sup>

‘Political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’, like many other terms/ phrases, are used interchangeably in the academic discourses. For example, throughout his *The Future of Political Islam*, Graham Fuller uses, repetitively, ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’ as interchangeable terms and states that Islamism is not an ideology, but “*a religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims*” (italics in original).<sup>16</sup> In his view, “an Islamist is one who believes that *Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society ... and [one] who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion*” (italics in original).<sup>17</sup> The term ‘Islamism’, for Mandaville, refers to “forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal system derive directly from the shari’ah”.<sup>18</sup>

Islamism is not at all ‘monolithic’; it covers and encompasses a broad spectrum (of varying and fluctuating) perspectives across movements. Islamism is “a variety of political movements, principles, and philosophies” drawing general inspiration from Islam but constructing “different agendas and programs” which are “quite contradictory”.<sup>19</sup> For Bassam Tibi, *Islamism*: is a “global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, aimed at remaking the world” based on God’s Sovereignty (*hakimiyyah*); is a “political ideology” which is an outcome of the current form of political Islam; forms “the ideological foundation of political Islam” and the “phenomenon of religious fundamentalism”; is “not a delinquency, but stands as a political phenomenon within Islam as a social reality”; and is “an Islamic variety of religious fundamentalism” whose “emergence relates to a structural phenomenon in world politics and is not simply terrorism”.<sup>20</sup>

The terms like political Islam, Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, and other allied terms, are used interchangeably in most of the writings on this subject is unquestionable.<sup>21</sup> It is also undeniable that Islamism’s description and portrayal as “fundamentalism” is still the most commonly used English term referring to the “religio-political movements, Muslims or otherwise”.<sup>22</sup> Thus, Islamism, a “modern phenomenon”, is an “instrument of political mobilization” and change, which is diverse and not “monolithic” discourse.<sup>23</sup> Given that Islamism continues to evolve, advance, and progress according to the circumstances and events, it is not appropriate to think of Islamism “as a fixed ideology to be accepted or rejected as a whole”.<sup>24</sup> Tibi also expresses his opinions on the interchangeable use of these terms stating that this use is highly “debated”, because

*Fundamentalism* is an analytical term and the rejection of it is misleading. ... Scholars who use the term “*Islamism*” as an alternative to *fundamentalism* are unknowingly contributing to the stereotyping of Islam by implicitly restricting the general phenomenon of the politicization of religion to it. In contrast ... “*Islamism*” is an element of the phenomenon of political religion known as a variety of religious fundamentalism. This phenomenon is not limited to Islam; it is also present in other religions. However, *jihadism* as the military dimension of this phenomenon is specific to Islamism as an interpretation of Islam. This compels the inquiry of Islamism to be included in the field of security studies. ... This new thinking broadens the scope and deepens the insights of the analysis. It enables the scholar to deal with the problem of religion and extremism, particularly through the new pattern of irregular warfare. It must be remembered that *jihadism* is not only an ideology of religious extremism, but also a new concept of warfare and the quest for a new

world order represented by movements based in transnational religion with global networks (*italics added*).<sup>25</sup>

For Bokhari and Senzai, ‘Political Islam’ refers to all the Islamic political manifestations, from the classical era to the present times, and ‘Islamism’ refers to a 20<sup>th</sup> century ideology that emerged in response to the Western secular nation-state system.<sup>26</sup> In the terminology of Anders Strindberg and Mats Wörn, Islamism refers to a “multidimensional paradox” which is not only “an identity and ideology”, but is “simultaneously process and objective, tactic and strategy, reality and ideal”—with diverse and divided “modalities”.<sup>27</sup>

In the same vein, Peter R. Demant (Professor of History at *Universidade de São Paulo*, Brazil) adds that Islamism, with “Islamic fundamentalism” as its popular substitute term, denotes “the radical religious movement of ‘political Islam’”, which is not a “unified movement” but “differs from country to country and from one period to the next”.<sup>28</sup> Demant further adds that Islamism is “a politicized, anti-Western, and anti-modern reading” of Islam, “an ideology and a social movement” which takes Islam “from religion to ideology”; and as an ideology, Islamism is a “*reaction against modernity produced by modernity*” which uses “*modern means, and irreversibly partaking of modernity*” (*italics in original*).<sup>29</sup> Likewise, for Matthew Cleary and Rebecca Glazier, “Islamism emerged”, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, “as a potent ideological force” that has challenged and still challenges the “nationalist elites for power”, leaving the “academics struggling to explain why, in an era characterized by ever-increasing secularism, such an ideology has attracted the support of so many Muslims.... [Thus,] Islamism’s enduring appeal and mobilization” suggests, in clear terms, that “contemporary society may confront this alternative vision of modernity for quite some time to come”.<sup>30</sup>

Thus, “Islamism” has been defined, described and debated as well as contested, construed and constructed variedly and has been fraught and overloaded with difficulty and complexity. There are various ways, in which scholars have, and are trying to, address this. Numerous works (many of them referred in above sections) on this issue and its multi-fold aspects have been published.

### **Syed Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi (1903-79) and his ‘Theo-democracy’**

A prominent and influential South Asian Muslim thinker-activist and founder of *Jama‘at-i-Islami*, Mawdudi was an Islamic ideologue, politician, journalist, prolific writer, most prominent revivalist thinker and one of the prominent Muslim polyglots of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>31</sup> A major contributor to the promotion of Islam as ‘*Din wa Dawla*’ (religion and state), he dispensed his potential and potency unwaveringly into

writings—which give strong manifestation to the themes basic to present day ‘Islamic resurgence’—speeches, and religious and political activities.<sup>32</sup> His ample academic productivity spans a wide a range of areas/ fields—tradition, law, philosophy, history, politics, economics, sociology and theology.

Speaking in global Muslim context, it will not be an overemphasis to assert that he has been read, and his ideology is being followed by a large populace; and he has been described as “one of the most influential and important Islamic thinkers of the modern world, whose brand of political Islam has won wide-spread acceptance” in the whole Muslim world, from South (East) Asia to Middle East<sup>33</sup>; or in the terminology of Joshua T. White and Niloufer Siddiqui Mawdudi’s “political and religious vision of Islam and the Islamic state have gained widespread currency” across the Muslim world, and his “expansive influence is due in large part to his dual role as a scholar and an advocate”.<sup>34</sup> His writings, mainly on ‘Islam and politics’—or what is now-a-days termed as ‘Political Islam’<sup>35</sup>—has been examined and explored, critically or otherwise, in numerous works from last many decades.<sup>36</sup> In January 2015, Nadeem F. Paracha (a cultural critic and a senior columnist with the *Dawn* newspaper) described that “Mawdudi is to ‘Political Islam’ what Karl Marx was to communism”, who “found his calling in the project of interpreting Islam’s holy texts in a political light, and emerging with a complex theory that we now call Political Islam (aka ‘Islamism’)”.<sup>37</sup>

Mawlana Mawdudi was a major protagonist of Islam as ‘*Din wa Dawla*’ (religion and state) and resolutely rejected their separation. In his numerous works, he expounded his views on religion and its application and applicability in society, economy, and polity and deliberated on Islamic system of governance and its affinity with democracy—nevertheless within the bounds and limitations set by Islamic law. Rejecting religion-state separation, he proposed “theo-democracy” as the basis of the ‘Islamic state’. In this context, an assessment of his views on Islam and politics, theo-democracy, democratic *Khilafah*, etc.—the basis of his envisioned ‘Islamic state’—is provided below.

For Mawdudi, the “political system of Islam” is, and should be, “based on three principles, viz., *Tawheed* (Unity of God), *Risalat* (Prophethood) and *Khilafat* (Caliphate)”. In his estimation and assessment, it is challenging “to appreciate the different aspects of Islamic policy without fully understanding these three principles”.<sup>38</sup> Though in his earlier writings, he criticized (from political philosophy standpoint) Western democracy and its philosophy by declaring Islam as “the very antithesis of secular Western democracy”, but he never rejected it wholly, as becomes evident from his various later writings.<sup>39</sup> Relatively, he asserted that it should be

outlined within the limits and boundaries of *Tawhid* on the grounds that if democracy was understood as a limited form of popular sovereignty—to be restricted and directed by God’s law—then there is no incompatibility between the two. That is to say, for him, Islam constitutes its own form of democracy when conceived as a limited form of popular sovereignty directed by the Islamic Law (*Shari’ah*). Describing and pronouncing this alternate view by interpreting the concept of *Khilafah* (Vicegerency) as a basis for this interpretation, he used the term *Theo-democracy* (*Ilahi Jumhuri Hukumat*: a divine democratic government) for it.<sup>40</sup> He also maintains that Islamic polity is neither theocracy nor democracy, but contains elements of both of these systems;<sup>41</sup> and thus, rightfully, contends: “If I were permitted to coin a new term, I would describe this system of government as a ‘*theo-democracy*’, that is to say a *divine democratic government* [*Ilahi Jumhuri Hukumat*], because under it the Muslims have been given [granted] a *limited popular sovereignty* under the suzerainty [or paramount sovereignty] of God. ... *In this sense, the Islamic polity is [a real] democracy*” (italics mine).<sup>42</sup>

Mawdudi designated the ‘Islamic polity’ with the term ‘theo-democracy’ in order to distinguish it both from a theocracy, or a clergy-run state, and Western secular democracy. John L. Esposito, Dr Israr Ahmad, Munawar Haque, and many other Muslim and non-Muslim scholars endorse this viewpoint.<sup>43</sup>

Formulating and elucidating his views in light of the fundamental Islamic concepts, Mawdudi interpreted the concept of vicegerency of man (*Khilafah*)—one of the fundamental concepts of Islamic political philosophy—for his interpretation of democracy in Islam. Describing the real significance and implication of *Khilafah*, he argues that the authority of caliphate is bestowed on the entire group of people, the community as a whole, which is ready to fulfill the conditions of representation after subscribing to the principle of *Tawhid* and *Risalah*: “*This is the point where democracy begins in Islam*” (italics mine).<sup>44</sup> Thus, it has been rightly emphasized that Mawdudi’s “perception of ‘caliph’ not only becomes a foundation for concepts of human responsibility and of opposition to systems of domination, but also provides a basis for distinguishing between democracy in Western and in Islamic terms”.<sup>45</sup>

It is on the basis of concept of sovereignty, law, and authority/ sovereignty of the people that Mawdudi differentiates between Islamic and Western democracy. The major contradictions between the two, for him, are on these grounds: principle of Sovereignty of God (*hakimiyyah*) and Popular *Khilafah* in Islamic system *vs* Popular Sovereignty in western conception; observing and obeying the laws (*Shari’ah*) given by God through His Book (Qur’an) to the Prophet *vs* the laws made by the people; subservience to

the Divine Law within the limits prescribed by *Shari'ah* vs absolute authority.

Mawdudi's concept of theo-democracy has received severe criticism from various corners amid its wide circulation and much appreciation. For example, Adams stated that Mawdudi's "*theo-democracy*" cannot escape from the fault of tyranny, because "While sovereignty may belong to God, God does not Himself intervene directly in the life of the Islamic state to give orders, decide policies, or render divisions". There must be, he stressed, "human agency to do those things on His behalf and in His name"; therefore, "If the fault of theocratic governments lies in the fact that some human agency attains unrestricted power", then "how the Islamic theo-democracy that Mawdudi proposed would escape this fault" is questionable. How (and how much) 'Islamic' is Mawdudi's Theo-democracy? Afsaruddin raises this question in her analysis and asserts that theo-democracy is "a-historical and unfaithful to, and even distorting of, the variegated pre-modern Islamic political tradition which evolved over time". Jackson echoes same stance when he declares the concept of theo-democracy as "a contradiction in terms", arguing that Mawdudi's claim that his Islamic society would be a 'theo-democracy' "seems to beg the question: where is the democracy?" Hartung, in his *A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam*, remarks: "In order to distinguish his envisioned political system and, at the same time, to further dissociate himself from Western concepts of democracy, Mawdudi coined the neologism 'theo-democracy' (*ilahi jumhuri hukumat*)".<sup>46</sup>

### **Tunisian Rachid al-Ghannouchi's Reconciliatory Approach**

Born in 1941, Rachid al-Ghannouchi is the leader of Tunisian Renaissance Party (*Hizb an-Nahdah*) and one of the significant and influential political leaders and thinkers of contemporary Muslim world. Recognized as a prominent voice of political pluralism, democracy, human rights, power-sharing Islam, etc., his thinking and ideology has been conditioned and transformed by several influences, which range from Islamic traditions to his experiences of life under an authoritarian government, and from his exile in the West to re-establishing/ consolidating his party as well as nurturing himself into an 'Activist-Thinker'.<sup>47</sup> His overall thinking, its methodology and approach, his ideology and its articulation reflect that occurrence of change and transformation is conditioned by sociopolitical settings and scenarios, situations and states.

Azam Tamimi described him as a "Democrat within Islamism" and M. Dawood Sofi labels him as the "Key Muslim Thinker of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century".<sup>48</sup> Esposito and Voll included, and featured, him among the nine (9) influential intellectuals whom they describe as the *Makers of*

*Contemporary Islam*;<sup>49</sup> he also features as a prominent contemporary thinker-activist in Esposito and Emad Shahin's *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*.<sup>50</sup> His thinking and ideological worldview reflects a masterly understanding of Western and Islamic philosophies and a genuine concern for reconciling the basic tenets of Islam with modernity and modern issues/ challenges—especially Islam and political pluralism; Islam and democracy; Islam and human rights; power-sharing Islam; and Islam and West.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Ghannouchi has emerged as one of the dominant entities who forcefully articulates Islam-democracy compatibility; one who is an active contributor in advocating the trend of democratization; and one who is justly designated as “one of the leading Muslim figures heavily engaged in blending Islam with democracy”.<sup>51</sup>

Acknowledging democracy as a positive contribution and accomplishment of the West,<sup>52</sup> Ghannouchi believes that democracy is a set of mechanisms that guarantees the sovereignty of the people and provides safety valves against corruption and the hegemonic monopoly of power.<sup>53</sup> In his *Al-Hurriyya al-Amma (Civil Liberties in Islamic State)* he writes: “Democracy is an authority practiced [by the people—from ancient times to the present era] through a set of constitutional techniques that may differ in their particulars in any system but agree in terms of equity, selection, separation of authorities, political pluralism, freedom of expression, freedom of gathering, setting up of associations, acknowledgement for the majority to decide and rule, and for the minority to oppose for the sake of reciprocation. This ends up in allowing the citizen a set of social securities”.<sup>54</sup>

Ghannouchi finds, like other Muslim proponents of Islam-democracy compatibility thesis, the traditional Islamic socio-political tenets and principles, including *Ijtihad* (independent interpretive reasoning), *Ijma* (consensus), *Ba'yah* (oath of allegiance), and *Shura* (consultation)—the notions which govern the relationship between the political authority and the people—in full consonance with Western democracy.<sup>55</sup> He agrees with the view that the system of democracy, as it has developed over the centuries, is a direct consequence of a particular western experience. He, thus, perceives democracy not merely as a method of government but as a philosophy as well. To him, Muslims do not have any problem with universally accepted democratic institution, but with those secular and nationalistic values which are behind the conception of democracy as a philosophy. Islamic democracy, for him, is distinguished from other systems by its ethical and moral content as derived from the *Shari'ah*, which is absent in its western version.<sup>56</sup>

Striving and endeavoring to find a historical link between Islam and Western democracy and its development, Ghannouchi maintains that (liberal) democratic notions and values were derived from medieval Europe, and it is undeniable fact that during this phase Europe was momentarily influenced by the Islamic civilization in many facets. Democracy offers, he asserts, the means to implement the Islamic ideal today, and thus rightly argues that “Islam, which enjoins the recourse to Shura (consultation) ... finds in democracy the appropriate instruments (elections, parliamentary system, separation of powers, etc.) to implement the Shura”<sup>57</sup>—which is, in itself, “a statement acknowledging the deputized community’s right to participate in ruling matters.”<sup>58</sup> Similarly, *Ijma’* (consensus), for him, provides the basis for participatory (democratic) government in Islam. He believes that democracy in the Muslim world as in the West can take many forms; and for him a “multiparty system of government” is more akin to Islamic system of government.<sup>59</sup>

Ghannouchi emphasizes that the democratic values of political pluralism and tolerance are perfectly compatible with Islam; that Islamic system accommodates majority rule, free election, multi-party system (religious or secular alike), freedom of expression, equality of all citizens, rights of women and gender equality. He categorically rejects theocracy or “the rule of mullahs [clergy]”, arguing that in Islam, government “embodies a civilian authority whose political behavior is answerable to public opinion”.<sup>60</sup> He, therefore, asserts: “If by democracy is meant the liberal model of government prevailing in the West, a system under which the people freely choose their representatives and leaders, and in which there is an alternation of power, as well as all freedoms and human rights for the public, then the *Muslims will find nothing in their religion [or in its sacred texts] to oppose democracy*” and democratic notions and values (italics mine).<sup>61</sup>

He also believes that if moderate “Islamists are given a chance to comprehend the values of Western modernity, such as democracy and human rights, they will search within Islam for a place for these values where they will implant them, nurse them, and cherish them”, because they do not contradict with the Islamic ideas and ideals.<sup>62</sup> Advocating an Islamic system that features majority rule, free elections, a free press, etc., he rejects the Islamist’ labeling democracy with foreign intervention and non-belief; he says that it is a set of mechanisms to guarantee freedom of thought and assembly and peaceful competition for governmental authority through ballot boxes.<sup>63</sup> “The Islamization of democracy”, for him, “is the closest thing” to implement the Islamic concept of Shura (consultation): “Those who reject this thought have not produced anything different than the one-party system of rule”.<sup>64</sup>

He also advocates, through his writings and in practice, on the legality of participating in non-Muslim regimes. He points to a Muslim's duty to advance whatever Muslim goals are within his power to advance. Uriya Shavit has aptly described it in these words: "Independence, development, compatriot solidarity, public and individual political freedoms, human rights, [and] political pluralism", and similar other notions need to be promoted and implemented.<sup>65</sup> Ghannouchi also believes in the concepts/theories of political pluralism and power-sharing, and is of the belief that "civilizational products and achievements are universal".<sup>66</sup> In his recent work on Ghannouchi, Dr M. Dawood Sofi has beautifully summarized his stand on Islam-democracy compatibility in these words: "his [Ghannouchi's] style and approach regarding Islam-Democracy compatibility or incompatibility is quite different from that of other Muslim thinkers, particularly when viewed in the context of his emphasis and acceptance of Western form of multi-party system".<sup>67</sup>

Put together, all these analysis, observations and elucidations lead us to state that for Ghannouchi several Islamic practices and traditions, like *Shura*, *Ijma'*, and *Ijtihad*, are in complete concord and congruence with democracy and democratic values. Moreover, it is "one of the best tools" guaranteeing not only the sovereignty of the people, but also helps in ending "corruption and hegemonic monopoly of power in the Muslim world".<sup>68</sup> Thus, the 'transformations' of Ghannouchi from a 'Democrat within Islamism' to a 'Muslim Democrat' brings to the sharper light to adopt a 'narrative' that is realistic and thus direly needed by the Muslims, globally. For Tamimi, Ghannouchi is "a firm believer [of the idea] that Divine Revelation for Muslims is the ultimate frame of reference", and thus he "sees in Western modernity positive aspects that are not only of great benefit but may also be indispensable for a modern Islamic revival". It is, thus, within this paradigm that Ghannouchi remains a very central and significant Islamic thinker "whose contribution to Islamic political thought will undoubtedly be remembered by future generations and reflected upon by posterity just as he himself used to reflect upon the contributions of great men such as [Khayr al-Din] al-Tunisi, [Jamal al-Din al-] Afghani, [(Allama) Muhammad] Iqbal, and [Malek] Bennabi".<sup>69</sup>

### **Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1951) and his 'Counter-Narrative'**

Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1951, Lahore) is 'a leading religious figure in the public and private media', a well-known Islamic scholar, exegete, and educator. After studying Philosophy and English Literature (at *Government College Lahore*), he learnt Islamic disciplines 'from various scholars throughout his early years'. He was associated with, and joined Mawlana Mawdudi's *Jamaat-e-Islami*; was influenced by the works of Imam Hamiduddin Farahi, and from 1973 studied under the tutelage of

Amin Ahsan Islahi. His works are an extension of Farahi-Islahi school of thought and an ‘ultimate manifestation of *Dabistan-e-Shibli*’, which he is propagating, among others, through *Al-Mawrid* (Lahore)—A Foundation for Islamic Research and Education, with its branches in Pakistan and in USA as well.

Described by Mumtaz Ahmad as “one of the most prominent non-traditionalist Islamic scholars today in Pakistan”, Ghamidi has “attracted international attention for his pioneering role”.<sup>70</sup> Labeled as a “(neo-Islamic) liberal”/ “reformist thinker”, “modernist Islamic thinker from Pakistan”, an ultra “‘modernist’ and ‘reformist’ among his contemporaries, he is “challenging some generally prevalent interpretations in what is the most sensitive of all subjects for most Muslims”.<sup>71</sup> His vision, and especially his thoughts vis-à-vis Islam and democracy, has been described by Husnul Amin as a representation of “Post-Islamist Intellectual” trend in current scenario.<sup>72</sup> Yasmeen, in contrast to Amin’s stand, analyses the views of Ghamidi with reference to the question of democracy in Muslim societies, arguing that Ghamidi openly supports the “idea of democracy in Islam” as an appropriate system of government, which for him, goes beyond “procedural aspects and encompasses notions of rights and responsibilities of the state and its citizens”.<sup>73</sup>

Ghamidi represents a “liberal or neo-traditionalist response” in contrast to the intellectual trends and tenors of Traditionalists and Islamists<sup>74</sup> and follows a “text-based approach rather than an historical or sociological one” in interpreting Islam and things Islamic.<sup>75</sup> For him, ‘Islam’s political vision is based purely on a democratic principle (in the modern sense) and not a theo-democratic one’, because the noble Qur’an (especially through Q. 42: 38) neither proposes monarchy nor dictatorship, but advocates “democracy as the way to run the affairs of the state”.<sup>76</sup>

He translates Q. 42: 38 (*Amruhum Shura Baynahum*) as “*And their system is based on their consultation*”/ “*the affairs of the Muslims are run on the basis of their consultation*”; offers a linguistic analysis of this verse; and bases his entire argument within this framework in his different writings, including *Mizan/ Meezan* and *Burhan*—his two major (pioneering) works—and in his exegesis ‘*Al-Bayan*’.<sup>77</sup> In this verse, the word ‘*Amr*’ is translated by him as “system” or ‘directive’—implying the directives which emanate from political authority as well as the state system—and argues that “monarchy and dictatorship have often been accepted forms of government” in Muslim history, but it is wrong to proclaim that “democracy is a concept alien to Islam”.<sup>78</sup>

The “style and pattern of the words” in *Q. 42: 38*, for him, “demands that even the head of a state” should be appointed and elected through mutual consultation of the believers and should conduct its affairs in all cases on the basis of a consensus or majority opinion of the believers.<sup>79</sup> Though he detached himself from Mawdudi’s thought/ organization, he endorses (and quotes) Mawdudi’s interpretation from his *Tafhim al-Qur’an*<sup>80</sup> of this verse, and stresses, like most modern exegetes of different schools of thought, that in *Q. 3: 159* (*Wa Shawirhum fil Amr*: “and consult them in the affair of the state” even the Prophet (pbuh) has been directed to consult others.

Thus, upholding of democratic principles like *Shura* is, no doubt, emphasized by sacred texts but, for him, it does not suggest, indicate or hint towards any specific form of government. The ‘form of government’ is a time-space matter and depends on socio-cultural contexts. To him, democracy should be the principal means and primary end of all social and political struggles.<sup>81</sup> In his *Meezan* (literally ‘Balance/ Scale’) he mentions that in compliance with the Qur’anic injunction on *Shura*, “the Sunnah decreed by the Prophet (sws [pbuh]) is based on two principles: First, Muslims shall be consulted in the affairs of state through their leaders in whom they profess confidence. Second, among the various parties or groups present in an Islamic State, only that party shall assume its political authority, which enjoys the confidence of the majority”. From these two principles, it is evident that “the real essence of democracy definitely exists in an Islamic Political System”.<sup>82</sup>

The Islamic form of government, he further argues, is an *aristocracy* in the sense that the individuals forming the government are elected on the basis of their piety and political insight and, on the other hand, it is a *democracy* in the sense that they are elected so that to run their state affairs on the basis of consultation among them (*italics mine*).<sup>83</sup> He echoes similar views in his ‘Is Democracy Compatible with Islam?’ by concluding that “Islam teaches us the principle of democracy” and with reference to *Shura* in the Qur’an argues that it “affirms a key democratic principle”.<sup>84</sup>

Furthermore, for Ghamidi, democracy is not a system or form of government that was founded by a Jew or a Christian or by the West, but it is a system developed by humans and thus belongs to humanity—and humanity cannot, and should not, be measured on any religious or ideological scale. The democracy, known to the world today, is basically a system of government formed by people’s choice that has evolved after struggling for centuries. Therefore, it is not problematic to accept democracy or democratic values as the Qur’an has itself described this method in *Q. 42: 38*. He also justifies this by adding an interesting point that when it comes to (Western) science and technology, then Muslims

accept it and even make use of it, without any qualms; however, when it comes to any political concepts, philosophy, etc., Muslims point out its flaws and faults, so he suggests that it is the responsibility of the Muslims to identify such shortcomings and fallacies of democracy, resolve them, and make democracy more viable by eliminating its deficiencies.<sup>85</sup>

Ghamidi's idea of 'Islamic democracy', thus, goes beyond "procedural aspects" as it embraces "notions of rights and responsibilities of the state and its citizens", and his explanation and understanding suggests that "the text itself appropriates new space for accommodation of western democracy"; and, thus, aptly concludes that "the form of government envisaged by Islam is *neither a theocracy nor a monarchy. It is more akin to democracy...*" (italics mine).<sup>86</sup>

### **In Lieu of Conclusion: A Brief Comparative Critical Assessment**

The above sections provide an assessment and evaluation of the views, insights and statements of three significant thinkers of Pakistan and Tunisia, namely Mawdudi, Ghannouchi, and Ghamidi, on Islam-politics debate with a specific focus on Islam-democracy relationship. From this discussion, it becomes evident that all of them have construed and projected 'Islamic polity' and its resemblance with democracy and democratic notions on the basis of their understanding/ interpretation of 'Islam' and Islamic texts and on the grounds of their projection of things Islamic, including political system. Their projection and prognosis, understanding and explanation, reveals that there is indeed influence of the socio-political and intellectual scenario on what they propose and advocate. 'Islam', as espoused by Muslims, is a divinely revealed religion, based on the Sacred Text (the noble Qur'an)—which is so dynamic that it is relevant for all times and places. One, thus, clearly observes similarity in their thought as far as their understanding and envisioning of 'Islamic political system' for Muslims/ Muslim societies (or for their specific societies) is concerned. They have envisioned it, and have proposed it, within their own socio-political and cultural and intellectual settings and thus may or may not be applicable in all settings and situations; and hence, destined both to admiration and condemnation. The footing and foundation for their elucidations—and for their proposed systems—are same; there are variations and differences in their understanding and interpretation only. Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that the Islamic primary sources do not prescribe a specific system (form or model) of government and governance, but only provide guidelines and guiding principles, so the model may vary, and is dependent on, space time constrains. A brief comparison between Mawdudi and Ghamidi on 'Political Islam' has been made by Ammar Anwer in *The Express Tribune* (December 20, 2020), in which he mentions that Ghamidi, like Mawlana

Wahiduddin Khan of India (b. 1925), has “provided a sort of antidote to Mawdudi’s Political Islam”.<sup>87</sup>

From the above discussion, another noteworthy point that needs to be highlighted is that applying non-Islamic terms to Islamic concepts and institutions is, speaking in the lexis of Muhammad Asad, “extremely misleading”, because Islamic ideology and worldview has, in comparison to Western (or any other) ideology, “a social orientation peculiar to itself ... and can be successfully interpreted only within its own context and in its own terminology”. Therefore, use of terms/ concepts like ‘democracy’, ‘theocracy’, ‘parliamentary government’, ‘liberalism’, ‘socialism’, etc., and by a Western means that they use them “within the context of Western historical experience”.<sup>88</sup> Therefore, the terminology used for Islam-democracy (in) compatibility by the thinkers under study needs a ‘contextualist’ understanding and reading. Within this ambiance, one thus finds certain imperfections in the terminology coined by Mawlana Mawdudi (especially ‘*Theo-democracy*’). Firstly, when Mawdudi is critiquing the ‘philosophical’ foundations of western democracy or when he is objecting to, and rejecting, the ‘absolute sovereignty’, then his use of the term ‘democracy’ with prefix ‘*theo*’ becomes questionable. What naturally comes to mind is: Why not a new (original or novel) term? Why not to describe the ‘Islamic political system’, or by that way his ‘envisioned Islamic state’, with a full-fledged Islamic name? Conceivably, it is in this context that Zeenat Kausar<sup>89</sup> has used/ added the terms ‘*Allahcracy*’, ‘*Shariacracy*’, ‘*Khilafacracy*’, and ‘*Shuracracy*’, etc., for depicting and illustrating Islamic polity, which is both as an extension, and as a critique, of Mawdudi’s ‘*Theo-democracy*’. Secondly, the terms/ phrases and terminology utilized by Mawdudi for describing the Islamic political order was not conclusive or definitive/ final; it was used for the sake of comparison and contrast. Had it been final, then he would not have used such varied terms/ phrases like “*theo-democracy*”, “*democratic Khilafah*”, and “*Islamic democracy*”, which are, in essence, contradictory and differing terms and phrases. Thirdly, many of Mawdudi’s contemporaries, such as (Allama) Muhammad Iqbal and Abul Kalam Azad, used terms/ phrases like ‘*Spiritual Democracy*’<sup>90</sup> and ‘*Islamic Democracy*’,<sup>91</sup> respectively, for describing the alternative to ‘*Western democracy*’ (I have explored this theme in my previous writings, especially in *Mediating Islam and Modernity: Sir Sayyid, Iqbal, and Azad*, 2019). So, Mawdudi too coined a term that was, in his estimate and estimation, a suitable term for describing both the congruence and conflict of ‘*Islamic polity*’ with the (western) ‘*democracy*’. Hence, it is fair to deduce that it is not the terminology but relatively the anticipated system/ structure which needs and demands to be focused on.

Similarly, from Ghannouchi's understanding of Islam, from his vision of 'Islamic democracy', and from his views, insights and interpretations, it is not unfair to assert that it is neither out of context nor a result of 'Westoxification' (Persian '*Gharbzadegi*'). Rather, it is collectively the socio-political milieu, intellectual transformation, his experience and expertise, and his understanding and his familiarity of having lived under diverse politico-cultural settings, which forms the prop and pillar of Ghannouchi's 'reconciliatory' thinking and approach. Likewise, his reinterpreting of concepts like *Shura*, *Ijma*, *Ijtihad*, pluralism, and power-sharing, their similarity and relationship with Western democratic ideals and notions is the result of his 'reconciliatory approach'—underlined and underscored with more stress and objectivity in the post-Arab Spring era. Moreover, his respect, recognition and reception of belief like 'civilizational products and achievements are universal', and his approach of 'Islam *and/ in the West*' in contrast to 'Islam *vs. West*' are the major building blocks of his theorization of reconciliation. Similarly, Ghannouchi's acceptance of democracy as a part of intellectual legacy of humans and humanity—which is above and beyond any barriers and the binaries—is also noteworthy. On this point, he shares his thinking and philosophy with Ghamidi.

Furthermore, in contrast to Mawdudi's '*Islamist*' vision and in comparison to Ghannouchi's '*moderate Islamist*'/ 'Muslim Democrat' vision, Ghamidi represents a '*Post-Islamist*' intellectual trend in Islam-politics discourse in general and on Islam-democracy discourse in particular. Ghamidi's conceptual/ intellectual positioning is characterized as non-traditionalist/ liberal/ reformist and his understanding and interpretation—which is more criticized and less appreciated—distinctly depicts that even text-based interpretation can help in creating and constructing new paradigm and framework for reconciling Islam-modernity discourse (and its allied themes) in its broader perspective. Such an approach advocates that 'the text itself appropriates new space for accommodation of western democracy'.

Last, and in no way least, it is safe to propose that none of the three scholars discussed in this study—Mawdudi, Ghannouchi, and Ghamidi—have either completely discarded or rejected democracy (or another related western concept/ system), or have asserted or proclaimed for its 'wholesale' acceptance and adoption—all of them have adopted, in their own ways, a convincing, reasonable and 'reconciliatory' approach. Thus, reading them jointly, impartially and neutrally, will indeed provide us many insights on building a 'theo-democratic, reconciliatory counter narrative' to the 'political crisis' faced by Muslims, globally—and this is precisely the main and major objective of this study.

## **Emergence of Bengali Nationalist Opposition to West Pakistan, 1947-1954: An Appraisal**

**Muhammad Nisar\***

### **Abstract**

*In diverse democratic nation-states, national cohesion and integration warrants due representation and tangible accommodation of all the ethnic and sub-national groups in national polity and decision-making. When it is other way around it usually weakened the state, loosened the process of national cohesion and integration, culminating into chaos and further political polarization. In this state of affair the marginalized group opt to oppose the ruling elite through all available options for preserving their distinct identity and securing deserving status. Unfortunately, from the very beginning the approach adopted by the ruling elite of Pakistan to tackle with the regional and ethno-lingual issues (particularly East Pakistan) sown the seeds of unending political friction and confrontation. As political and constitutional process unfolded, the level of inherent contradictions and divergences between the ruling elite and Bengali political elite multiplied. Thus, poor handling of sensitive matters regarding national integration by the ruling authorities of Pakistan placed Bengali political elite in such a situation where they started opposing West Pakistan/Centre by tooth and nail. In this regard till 1954, a robust kind of Bengali persistent opposition emerged which severely shook the very foundations of nascent State of Pakistan.*

**Key Words: Nation-states, Integration, National polity, Sub-national Groups**

### **Introduction**

The first seven years in the history of Pakistan are marked by political turmoil, social fragmentation, economic fragility and emergence of regionalism and provincialism which unleashed the emergence of unprecedented tensions between a centralized state and the ethno-linguistic provinces. This trend was rapidly developed in East Bengal when ruling elite

<sup>1</sup> snubbed popular Bengali reservations and their some legitimate demands while determining its status vis-à-vis Centre. As a result Bengali<sup>2</sup> political elite started opposing to every step taken by the Central or Provincial government to relegate their standpoint for Bengali language,

provincial autonomy, and constitutional and political matters. The Bengali opposition movement was a combination of multiple factors which left far reaching repercussions on upcoming politics of East Pakistan. The present research is an assessment about phenomenal growth of Bengali opposition vis-à-vis West Pakistan/Centre during first 7 years after the creation. Thus, study of the origin, evolution and rise of Bengali persistent opposition along with its various dimensions and impact on the relations between the two wings is focused in this research. It commence with the examination of the inherent contradictory approaches adopted by ruling elite of Pakistan and Bengali political elite. An attempt is made to discuss language issue, constitutional matters and provincial autonomy along with their effects, which were the main themes of political theatre in East Bengal during initial seven years.

### **Tracing the Ruptures**

The creation of Pakistan was a unique experiment- creating a state, composed of two separate wings having overwhelming differences except religion. Its integration, consolidation, national unity and harmony between the two geographically separated wings, posed gigantic challenge to its leadership. Bengali political elite was much aware of the existing contrast between the two wings. That contrast attracted publicity, by antagonistic and contradictory approaches adopted by the ruling elite of Pakistan and political elite. It clearly reflects in the words of Abul Mansur Ahmad:

These two wings differ in all matters, except two things, namely, that they have a common religion, barring a section of the people in East Pakistan, and that we achieved our independence by a common struggle. There are only two points which are common to both the wings of Pakistan. With the exception of these two things, all other factors, viz., the language, the tradition, the culture, the costume, the custom, the dictionary, the calendar, the standard time, particularly everything is different. There is, in fact, nothing common in the two wings, particularly in respect of those factors which are the sine qua non to form a nation...in reality it is not one country and we are going to form one state out of two countries.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, creating a common identity for two geographically separated wings was a sensitive matter for a politically nascent, economically fragile and socially fragmented state. The Islamic fervour germinated during the last stage of Pakistan Movement, had suddenly been disappeared. This created cleavage between secular and conservative political forces and caused emergence of tangible regional and subnational identities.

After the creation of Pakistan, politically conscious Bengalis seemed to be deeply associated with their language, culture and social matters. They were more concerned with their ethno-linguistic identities rather than the Islamic identity of Pakistan. According to Ziring, “the Bengali love affair with their language involves a passionate ritual that produces emotional experiences seldom found in their part of the world”.<sup>4</sup> They were expecting that the creation of Pakistan would be a new dawn for their social, economic and political satisfaction. According to a Bengali nationalist politician, Pakistan came into existence “on the voluntary association of the two wings” therefore, the people of East Bengal “voted for Pakistan for fear of the domination of the majority community of the then India: they voted on account of fear of exploitation and domination in the economic field”.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the prime objective of Bengali Muslims was to protect their legitimate interests within Pakistan.<sup>6</sup>

They always stressed to have a parliamentary democratic system to represent and protect their legitimate interest in a better way. For Bengali intelligentsia, in addition to Islam they should be “bound to the Centre by tangible means like better living conditions and better employment opportunities in their province”.<sup>7</sup> To the Contrary, the ruling authorities mainly focused on religion as binding force, than the “regions” and existing “realities”.<sup>8</sup> Enriched by Persian and Arabic words and script, Urdu language was considered the yardstick for national integration. This exclusive approach of identity creation advocated “the narrower (poorer) view, thereby antagonizing the emerging social forces in (East) Bengal”.<sup>9</sup> Ziring opined that cultural homogeneity in East Bengal demonstrated the “intention of Bengalis to form a nation based on peculiar culture and historic heritage”.<sup>10</sup> A political scientist characterized the perpetual dichotomy between the two wings with West Pakistan as “governmental” and East Bengal as “Political” entity.<sup>11</sup>

### **Fault Lines: Policies of Muslim League**

After the creation of Pakistan, landed and aristocratic elite started dominating Muslim League (ML). Within a limited time hubris of ML leadership emerged unparalleled. Above all, the party was being considered as a sacred cow and the sole custodian of Pakistan. At the very inception, this mentality of the League’s leadership, “put the Bengalis an unfortunate situation”.<sup>12</sup> They started comparing the party with the State. In 1950, PM Liaquat Ali Khan addressing to the ML council meeting stated:

I have always said, rather it has always my firm belief, and that the existence of the League, not only the existence of the League, but its strength is equal to the existence and strength of Pakistan. So far as I am

concerned, I had decided at the very beginning, and I reaffirm it today, that I have always considered myself the prime minister of the League. I never regarded myself as the prime minister chosen by the member of the Constituent Assembly.<sup>13</sup>

Infuriated over Bengali demands, at one stage Prime Minister (PM) Liaquat Ali Khan commented about Suhrawardy that “India has let loose this dog on us”.<sup>14</sup> He also criticized Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bashani and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and declared their political activities as nefarious to national integration.<sup>15</sup> Owing to this approach the provincial loyalties started superseding the religious ideology and national outlook of the country.

As Suhrawardy tried to eliminate the communal outlook of ML, he confronted bitter arguments with its leaders.<sup>16</sup> Subsequently, East Pakistan Muslim League (EPML) was reorganized: Hashim-Suhrawardy group was replaced with conservative landowning elite who were supported by Central ML.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, Suhrawardy was accused of attempting to reunite both (East and West) Bengal, therefore, was banned to enter in East Bengal.<sup>18</sup> In 1949, he was barred to attend Constituent Assembly (CA) session, pretending that he was no more citizen of Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> This approach of barring popular Bengali leadership from decision making process who contributed a lot in the crucial phase of Pakistan Movement proved injurious for the national cohesion and integration in the long-run.

Suhrawardy group was considered by Bengali public as their real representatives. The move of changing leadership caused conflict and factionalism within East Pakistan Muslim League.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the dissident faction was side-lined, and membership was restricted.<sup>21</sup> The barring policy was castigated by Bengali leaders and proved counterproductive. As Abul Mansur Ahmed called it, “not only a political blunders, but also a moral and political offense”.<sup>22</sup> It is argued that ML had been operating on such lines that it “made too many enemies in East Bengal”. Its policies added to Bengali perception that they were being ruled by the civil servants.<sup>23</sup> That was how ML failed to win first by-election held in Tangal, in 1949, which demonstrated Bengali reactionary opposition against ML.<sup>24</sup>

In June 1949, the dissenters from EPML created Awami Muslim League (AML) as a “regionalist opposition group”.<sup>25</sup> In the opinion of Bhuyian, the creation of AML was the outcome of “frustration caused by the closed-door policy of Muslim League”.<sup>26</sup> The aim behind the creation of AML was to “challenge the authority of ML in East Bengal”. Later on the word ‘Muslim’ was dropped to represent all the communities in East Bengal. AL

succeeded greatly in attracting the masses in East Bengal but failed to be recognized in West Pakistan. It exploited the language issue as a test case for its politics and demonstrated itself as a sole custodian of East Bengal's interest.<sup>27</sup> Precisely, within a short time, policies adopted by ML proved ruinous and suicidal to its utter annihilation in East Bengal.

### **Issue of Lingua Franca**

At the time of independence Urdu was spoken and understood almost by 7% population of Pakistan. For Bengalis Urdu was difficult to understand which further complicated the simple issues at various levels. Even the money order forms that printed in Urdu were found difficult to be filled.<sup>28</sup> The ruling authorities had already decided to make Urdu as the *Lingua Franca* of the country. In November 1947, All Pakistan Educational Conference was held in Karachi in which Bengali delegates out-rightly rejected the proposal for making Urdu as the only national language of Pakistan.<sup>29</sup>

After achieving independence, Bengali leadership wanted recognition of their peculiar socio-political, cultural and linguistic identities. Bengali language was the largest spoken language of more than 55% of Pakistan's population. Therefore, at the very first session of CA a Bengali Hindu member moved a motion to make Bengali as a state language of Pakistan. He pleaded that "Bengali is a provincial language ...and the majority of the people of the state .... Therefore, the state language of the state should be the language which is used by the majority of the people of the state, and for that, sir, I consider that Bengali language is a *lingua franca* of our State".<sup>30</sup> Moreover, he raised the problems caused by the language barrier and argued that Bengali should have an "honoured place and treated as the language of the state".<sup>31</sup> Motion was endorsed by another Bengali member stating that "Bengali must find a place as one of the media in which the members can address Assembly".<sup>32</sup>

As a sensitive matter it needed to be tackled with utmost care, but it appeared as a highly suspicious matter to the ruling authorities of Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> Needlessly, PM Liaquat Ali Khan out-rightly rejected the move and characterised it as an effort to "create misunderstanding between different parts of Pakistan". He unequivocally declared that the purpose behind the creation of Pakistan was the demand of "hundred million Muslims in this subcontinent and the language of the hundred million Muslims is Urdu and, therefore, Pakistan is a Muslim state and it must have its *lingua franca* the language of the Muslim nation". While declining the motion, PM sarcastically stated that "as long as the English was the State Language, it was never pressed for Bengalis". He added that it was "necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can

only be Urdu and no other language”. PM strongly condemned the move and referred its objectives as creating “a rift between the people of Pakistan.... and to take away from the Muslims that unifying force that brings them together”.<sup>34</sup>

Bhupendra Kumar Dutta stated that the PM words “will have unfortunate repercussion...in certain sections in Pakistan”. He complained that “It (Urdu) is the language of the upper few of the western Pakistan. This opposition proves a determined effort on the part of the upper few of western Pakistan at dominating the State of Pakistan”. He therefore, demanded that the Bengalis are in “disadvantage in every manner” thereby the capital should be in the majority province.<sup>35</sup> Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah jumped into the matter and revealed the growing Bengali feelings that they were “being neglected and treated merely as a ‘colony’ of Western Pakistan”. She proposed that at least once a year a meeting of CA should be held in East Bengal.<sup>36</sup> Her proposal confronted her to PM who stated that “women never realize the difficulties” and declared it a wrong idea.<sup>37</sup>

The PM’s reaction to Dutta’s proposal was widely published in East Bengal. It was a crucial stage because there was a due visit of Jinnah to East Bengal. Therefore, the opportunity was cashed by the anti-Pakistani elements in creating hysteria among Bengalis.<sup>38</sup> It was argued that the Urdu question was a cash grant in the hands of opposition against the government.<sup>39</sup>

The confrontation over language left very far reaching repercussions on the overall power structure and political discourse in East Pakistan. ML leadership’s stance was perceived by Bengali political elite as an attack on their ethnicity and culture.<sup>40</sup> This led to emergence of Bengali perception that their cultural outlook was being considered as unmatched with Islamic characteristics.<sup>41</sup> That is how Bengali opposition leaders set the tone for the politics of “us versus them” (Bengali versus West Pakistani).<sup>42</sup>

With this background, the language issue emerged as the main subject of political theatre in East Bengal. In February 1948, students of Dacca University demanded declaration of Bengali as one of the state languages. They protested violently and confronted with the police culminating into death of three students.<sup>43</sup> The casualties exasperated the students’ political bodies, who started propagating anti-government activities within the academic institutions. At the site of firing a *Shaheed Minar* was built for the commemorating and propagating anti-West Pakistan feelings among the students and intelligentsia.<sup>44</sup> Not only the opposition but the Leagues members also condemned the incident. Ironically, the governor

of East Bengal labelled the language issue as a conspiracy of multiple characteristics including Hindus, Communist and Muslim dissidents.<sup>45</sup>

On 20<sup>th</sup> March 1948, Jinnah visited East Pakistan. Now language issue had emerged as a boiling question. During his stay in East Bengal, on various occasions, Jinnah unequivocally declared that Urdu would be the only National Language of Pakistan. While addressing to the Convocation of Dhaka University, he made it clear:

It's State language must obviously be Urdu, a language that has been nurtured by a hundred million Muslims of this subcontinent, a language understood through the length and breadth of Pakistan and, above all, a language which, more than any other provincial language, embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the language used in other Islamic countries. It is not without significance that Urdu has been driven out of the Indian Dominion and that even the official use of the Urdu script has been disallowed.<sup>46</sup>

It is opined that the purpose of Jinnah's explicit assertion was to counter the language movement.<sup>47</sup> In response, State Language Committee of Action (SLCA) was formed to raise voice in more vibrant manner.<sup>48</sup> To endorse the demands more effectively, East Bengal Muslim Student League was established.<sup>49</sup> This unfolding situation suited well to political opponents who were seeking opportunity to "create split among the Muslims" by inciting "hatred against non-Bengali Muslims".<sup>50</sup> It was revealed that the "students were being exploited to create a situation" in favour of opposition.<sup>51</sup> Language controversy sponsored "the idea of creating East Bengal as a state with the power to secede". It was observed that the "idea of separate East Bengal state is taking hold of the young mind of Bengali Students" and their "silly demands" would lead to anarchic state.<sup>52</sup> Jinnah was proposed to replace non-Muslim heads of the institutions with Muslims.<sup>53</sup> He also received a memorandum from SLCA: to oppose any act that would lead "to change their mother tongue". They claimed Bengali as a language of majority enriched with Persian and Arabic vocabulary.<sup>54</sup> The memorandum condemned and characterized the oppressive measures of the provincial government as tantamount to the colonial rule.<sup>55</sup>

The declaration of Urdu as national language was comprehended by Bengali intelligentsia as being subjugated by West Pakistanis.<sup>56</sup> Jinnah admitted that "East Bengal feel isolated from the rest of Pakistan".<sup>57</sup> He pointed out the emerging provincialism as "one of the curses" which impedes national integration and warned that soon it "becomes a vicious circle". Jinnah appealed that "if you want to build up yourself into a nation, for God's sake give up this provincialism".<sup>58</sup> Liaquat Ali Khan also

recognised emerging Provincialism and condemned it by stating “we must kill this provincialism for all times. As long as we keep this demon alive your state will remain weak and you cannot afford a weak State”.<sup>59</sup> Basically, Khan strongly believed that being driven by the Hindu agendas, Bengalis’ demands contradicting to the ideology of Pakistan. He made it clear that the religious ideology would not be undermined on the demands of Hindu leaders who wanted that Pakistan should go beyond religious identities.<sup>60</sup> After Jinnah’s demise, pro-language political activism helped in significantly moulding the Bengali opposition into coherent and unified force.<sup>61</sup> Now practical difficulties at the national level started superseding by emerging provincialism.

Within a limited time span, the language issue attracted members of the provincial assembly, students, Bengali intelligentsia and civil servants. East Bengal Student League emerged as the frontrunner of language movement.<sup>62</sup> When Urdu speaking students boycotted the strikes and the agitational means ethnic clashes erupted.<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, Bengali press endorsed the language question. Even the newspapers owned by ML members supported the language cause.<sup>64</sup> Thus declaration of Urdu isolated Bengalis and “crystallized Bengali nationalism”.<sup>65</sup>

The ruling elite conceived Bengali as a “Hindu Language” and hesitated to accept it as one of the state Languages of Pakistan.<sup>66</sup> Fazlur Rahman, the education minister presented the idea of Islamizing the Bengali language by introducing Arabic script. It was a bitter pill for pro-active Bengalis to swallow, which culminated into demonstrations in the rank and file of East Bengal.<sup>67</sup> Bengalis considered the decision as an attempt “to halt the growth of Bengali as a vibrant language”.<sup>68</sup>

The national anthem having overwhelmingly Persian words was composed in 1948. It was highly difficult for Bengalis, even for the educated elite to understand it. Therefore, during public and private function, Bengali people sang the national anthem in Bengali written by Nazir Ahmed i.e. “*Pakistan Zindabad ...purabo Banglar Shayamolimai* (in the green of East Bengal)”.<sup>69</sup> These tendencies added to the language movement and “helped foster a kind of linguistic nationalism”.<sup>70</sup> It also created a kind of “dissension and disharmony in the civil service of East Bengal”.<sup>71</sup> Some of the government officials supported the movement whole heartedly. They strongly believed that “no nation has tolerated any attempt to insult its mother tongue”.<sup>72</sup> In 1955, during a visit to East Pakistan, PM Muhammad Ali had to face difficult situation as he tried to address in Urdu. He was criticized and made responsible for the exploitation of East Bengal.<sup>73</sup>

The language issue served as the main subject of confrontation between Bengali opposition and the ruling elite. As far as the issue was alive, it undermined the political and constitutional development and contributed to misunderstanding and shaping Bengali opposition on separatist lines. However, Bengali was accepted as one of the state language in the first constitution of Pakistan promulgated on 23 March 1956. Thus, it took almost nine years to give Bengali language its deserving status. This delay greatly contributed to damaging the relations between the two wings of Pakistan.

### **Conclusion**

During first seven years Muslim League (the sole force behind the creation of Pakistan) failed to learn lesson and to get benefits from its own history of political struggle. Thus, in initial years parliamentary politics set ground for tug of war for power, and confrontation between ruling elite of Pakistan and Bengali nationalist political forces. The arrogant ruling elite ruled the country in such a way that it was their inherent right beyond any criticism and opposition. They overlooked some genuine grievances and legitimate demands along with peculiar cultural and social matters of Bengalis. In this regard religious ideology and Urdu language was unnecessarily overemphasized when its came to national integration and identity creation. Out of this monolithic approach adopted by the ruling elite, the genie of staunch Bengali opposition movement—blended-with-separatist-resistance to West Pakistan came out to surface and could never be put back in the bottle. The ruling elite always reluctant to consider dark-skinned Bengalis as potential and equal citizen of Pakistan. This maltreatment gave birth to a strong Bengali separatist opposition movement set forth on the aspirations of Bengali political elite.

The ruling elite of Pakistan was strongly convinced and focused that a strong Centre and common religion would be adequate for national integration. Contrary to, politically conscious and democratic minded Bengali leadership focused and operated on such lines which could end economic disparity and ensure provincial autonomy. In this case Bengali language issue precipitated the emerging conflicts and set the confrontational and agitational political course in East Pakistan. Nationalist forces like AL and NAP exploited the poor isolated and frustrated Bengalis in launching opposition movement on radical lines. The language issue greatly affected the constitutional and political developments and added to misunderstanding and trust-deficit between the two wings. The emergence of Bengali opposition as a potential threat to national integration was the product of various factors connected with the internal political development of Pakistan during early 1950s. Thus, after the creation of Pakistan in August 1947, within seven years ML was

wiped out from East Pakistan which set the political course for mutual confrontation and antagonism that left deep imprints on the upcoming relations between the two wings of Pakistan.

## **China's Public Diplomacy towards Pakistan in Post CPEC Era**

**Maryam Zohra\***

### **Abstract**

*China believes in soft power and works for promoting Public Diplomacy. China is one of those countries whose foreign policy is based on peaceful co-existence. Under Belt and Road Initiative, China started a game changing project "China Pakistan Economic Corridor" in which economy of Pakistan is hoped to get better but sometimes people to people interaction may pose threat to human security. This paper is focused on the dissection of Public Diplomacy as China's foreign policy tool and analyzes that how it can be used to regulate relations. The purpose of this study is to highlight the significance of Public diplomacy, especially for Pakistan, which is least focused in academics that is indeed an important topic in International Relations.*

**Keywords: Public Diplomacy, Soft Power, Peaceful Coexistence, Cultural Politics**

### **Introduction**

Diplomacy always prefers negotiation and is considered as an anti-war phenomenon. There are two types of diplomacy. First is Traditional Diplomacy which focuses on the engagement of international actors with one another to achieve their goals. Second is Public Diplomacy which involves an interaction with foreign public.<sup>1</sup> Public Diplomacy is an art of public to public interactions among different states. Unfortunately, there is no consensus of experts on the definition of Public Diplomacy. But according to Bruce Gregory <sup>2</sup> "Public diplomacy describes the means by which states, associations of states, and non-state actors understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance their interests and values."

The term "Public Diplomacy" was first coined by Edmund Gullion in 1965 which was readily accepted by United States (U.S.). As the U.S. was direly in need of an alternative term for propaganda and psychological warfare, this term showed the soft image of the U.S. For example, Diplomats in the

State Department started enjoying their status. Secondly under United States Information Agency (USIA), USA had an easy approach to International Opinion.<sup>3</sup>

The main purpose of public diplomacy is to achieve the goals of one's foreign policy by engaging common masses and by analyzing that how Foreign Nationals perceive them. Although this is an informal form of diplomacy in which many actors are involved like former diplomats, retired bureaucrats, exchange students, members from media industry and overseas. They play their role to promote a positive image of their state towards foreign public opinion. Sometimes states also hire their own people to influence other's audience to have a support for their goals. These hired people are among the most influential persons of a society. Through Public Diplomacy, the purpose of nation branding is approached but sometimes it can be an idea that is desired to be promoted. Public Diplomacy is not always nurtured directly to the foreign audience. For the purpose to project Public Diplomacy following tools are considered important. <sup>4</sup>

- 1) Listening
- 2) Advocacy
- 3) Cultural Diplomacy
- 4) Exchange Diplomacy
- 5) International Branding
- 6) Psychological Warfare

Theoretically, Public Diplomacy is the concept of Constructivist school of thought and is criticized by realist school of thought, while many rationalists acknowledge the significance of Public Diplomacy.<sup>5</sup> It highlights new ideas in the foreign policy analysis of state and work as a norm setting system in Foreign Policy. It is depicted as an important topic in International Relations. By the advent of Public Diplomacy, the politics among nations has been shifting towards Peace. In the realm of Globalized world, the concept of PD is also shifting due to the emergence of multiple actors (NGO's, MNC's etc.) and technological advancements.

### **China's Public Diplomacy**

Foreign policy of China is the determinant of state's behavior towards other states. Foreign policy of China always focus on Public Diplomacy and soft power. Majority of their leaders focused on maintaining a soft power. China always maintained a low profile foreign policy to avoid regional disputes and conflicts with other states. According to Deng, *"the nation should watch dispassionately, guard against peaceful evolution*

*inspired by the west and keep a low profile foreign policy.*"<sup>6</sup> China believes in building harmonious and peaceful relations with other states. The model of China's foreign policy is based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence; Panj Sheela (Five principles). China since its birth wanted to preserve its values and culture. Basically, these five principles were adopted from India's Nehru who also wanted to end these anxieties he was facing after a long time of colonialism. These 5 mantras of China's constitution are:

- 1) Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
- 2) Mutual non-Aggression
- 3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs
- 4) Equality and mutual benefit
- 5) Peaceful co-existence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries<sup>7</sup>

In International politics, the lens of idealism exists but the realist school of thought can't be denied. As per the believes of Kenneth Waltz and H. J. Morgenthau, global political arena is lacking the central government and the nature of states is greedy and power hungry. States always try to serve their own interests.<sup>8</sup> Economy is the coin of today's world politics that's why China is focusing on its market. Simultaneously Chinas Foreign policy is far different from its real politics for example; at one hand China reflects the mantra of peaceful co-existence but at the same time China is having border conflicts with neighboring states especially its forceful intervention in the governmental authority of Hong Kong and Taiwan. According to SIPRI's year book, in 2008 China's defense budget was \$30 billion but after 2 years, it became almost \$170 billion.<sup>9</sup> Chinese Model of real politics is maximizing its military setup which is not a parameter of being peacefully co-existing state.

To understand China's foreign policy, China political history and Public Diplomacy can be divided into 3 eras.

### **Mid-1930's**

During the civil war in China, communist party of China invited many journalists from the U.S. The sole purpose of these invitations was to analyze the different events happening during civil war. This series of journalists' invitation continued till 1940. Those journalists presented report about Chinese civil war in Chinese language which was later translated by Chinese into 4 other languages. i.e. English, Japanese, French and Spanish to inform foreign audience about the Chinese civil

war. In this particular timeframe, language played a vital role in understanding other's view and Chinese used this tool to influence.

### **Cold War Era**

During the Cold War, Public Diplomacy was intended to break Chinese international isolation. China started Ping Pong Diplomacy. In this type of diplomacy, a Ping Pong competition was held in which China invited USA's team Ping Pong and tried to change their image in the world.<sup>10</sup> During that time period, China was having faith in "Friendship first and then Competition." That's why China started Panda Diplomacy where 23 Pandas were gifted to different countries. In 1972, two Pandas were gifted to USA's first lady upon the visit of President Nixon.<sup>11</sup> During that decade China adopted "open door policy" upon which Business and tourism was prioritized. It proved effective with Chinese and along with this modernization of China started.

### **Post-Cold War Era**

In this phase, the episode of Tiananmen Square (1989) occurred that destroyed the image of China internationally. Some Chinese protested against the policies of states like the right to speech. it was a peaceful protest which was responded by open firing by government.<sup>12</sup> That event projected a negative image of China. To improve their image China hired U.S. agencies to repair the image. Since then, China is successfully engaging world with its soft power.

### **Goals of China's Public Diplomacy**

China's foreign policy shows that China wants to fulfill some goals through public diplomacy which are as under:-

1. China wants to show the world that it works hard to provide its people a better future.
2. Chinese want to be seen as stable, trustworthy and responsible economic partner.
3. Chinese are responsible member of international community and willing to contribute towards world peace.
4. China wants to be respected as an ancient culture with long history.

### **Factors to Ensure Successful Public Diplomacy**

China's government is obsessed with soft power. China use Economy as main tool for increasing foreign engagements. Chinese economy is rising as they have shifted their economy from planned economy to Market

economy. China realized the importance of Public Diplomacy in 2000's. Political leaders started talking about soft power. They wanted to promote individuality (we are Chinese), that their culture is different and had a unique identity. Politically, they provide civil rights to their citizens, education and social reform.

As China believes in co-existence it wants to snub the U.S. hegemony. The U.S. has dominant role in the United Nation. China wants to make sure to play active role in the UN. China desires to develop dialogue among nations and civilizations rather than conflicts. They are regarding Silk Road as "Joint Cultural road" and providing financial aid for the preservation of historical sites. China's moto is "Prosperity through Co-operation." To serve this, they initiated "Belt and Road Initiative" to whom "China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)" is playing a significant role.

Under Public Diplomacy, China engage audience at both levels, i.e. Domestic and International audience and give them a sense of acknowledgement of be Chinese, unique and different. Mechanism for the promotion of public diplomacy is observed at all levels.<sup>13</sup> For example, 1) listening to the international opinion regarding China especially official statements. 2) They conduct surveys and polls to know the sentiments of public about China. 3) Organize different activities to promote their culture abroad. 4) Respect the culture of others as they don't celebrate Pig year in Muslim countries. 5) Students on exchange programs and space for tourism. 6) Huge network of embassies and consular offices in foreign countries. 7) System of investments. 8) Specialized diplomats who have knowledge about geography, culture and had experience in the respected country. 9) Confucius institutes all over the world. 10) Digitalization and modern means of communication.

### **CPEC's Changing Landscape**

China initiated a game changing project "China Pakistan Economic Corridor" under the Belt and Road Initiative. The main purpose of such projects is to connect main port of Gwadar for economic benefits. China is practicing its "string of pearls policy" according to which China wants to approach all of the geo strategic important ports of the world for its trade. Short routes will help to boost their import and export of products easily from one part of the world to other. In Pakistan, there are hopes related to CPEC's contribution to Pakistan's economy. CPEC is projected to be a game changer for Pakistan. In the context of Pakistan, as it is perceived as win-win situation for the economy of Pakistan may be turned into a China's twice win. Pakistan may get preyed by the "debt trap Policy" of Xi JinPing.<sup>14</sup>

China is a sleeping giant. Napoleon once warned. *“Let her sleep for when she wakes, she will shake the world. With the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century China is truly awake and the giant mashed his rivals one by one in the terms of economic power.”*<sup>15</sup> History always makes us realize about lessons learnt from it. Some of lessons may apply on China and Pakistan’s relationship.

1. Public diplomacy and policy are interlinked.
2. Sometimes credibility should be given to the others.
3. Public Diplomacy is not self-centered concept.
4. Public Diplomacy is an art to whom everyone should be artist.
5. Public Diplomacy is ought to be credible which seems difficult in a bureaucratic setup.

As in the dimension of economics and politics, China and Pakistan’s relation is beyond limits. China is giving aid to Pakistan for infrastructure and energy projects to support its economy.<sup>16</sup> Under Track II Diplomacy which is also known as Citizen Diplomacy, they are influencing Pakistan’s culture. On exchange program 19000 Pakistani students are getting education in china.<sup>17</sup> A lot of Chinese students are in Pakistan for education mainly focusing on Languages. For example, an impressive ratio of Chinese students are getting courses from National University of Modern Languages (NUML) and Islamic International University, Islamabad. China gave importance to their own language that’s why many Pakistani universities are offering Chinese language courses. Confucius institutes are build. In Confucius institute NUML, there were 13 students in 1970 when it was started but in 2017 there were 460 enrollments.<sup>18</sup> There is research institute for China and Pakistan as named “Pakistan China Institute (PCI).” China is engaging Pakistan’s public in an effective way.

## **Conclusion**

China is successful in nation branding. Such events like fake marriages episode are considered on the smaller level and have less impact on the Foreign Policy of States. But issue of human rights violation in Uyghur can lead towards the distortion of positive image of China in the international community especially in the Muslim World. Such reactions sometimes lead towards the worsening of good relations. Public Diplomacy is not a determinant of single paradigm. There are diverse ways to project successful Public Diplomacy in the other country. Issues like fake marriage scam or killing of labors at working sites can be addressed by cooperation. Meanwhile the laws, values and mores ought to be respected.

## **Politics of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan; A Comparative Study of Jamat-e-Islami and Pakistan-Tehreek-e-Insaaf**

**Mohsin Shahid\***

### **Abstract**

*Jamat-e-Islami pursues for political rhetoric of anti-Americanism owing to a grand narrative of Muslim Ummah. Its organizational structure and ideological foundations are based upon the universality of Islamization in Muslim and non-Muslim states. With the emergence of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf, (PTI) the dimensions of anti-Americanism in Pakistan will; delink their normative attachment from a universal concept of Ummah on the one hand and indigenization of anti-Americanism will get roots on the other hand. By this end, the changing behavior of decision-making elite, and its resort to delink itself from stigmatized past of being 'fort of Islam' will leverage PTI as a force complacent to usher a new form of anti-Americanism to pursue national interest.*

**Keywords: Jamat e Islami, Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf, FATA, Drone Strikes**

### **Introduction**

Anti-Americanism is important to understand in Pakistan due to its regional importance in South Asia. The case study of Jamat-i-Islami and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf presents a different outline to better understand the new political and ideological dynamics in Pakistani society. At the same time, it is imperative to comprehend how anti-Americanism is manifested in a transitional democracy, changing demography, and complicating socio-economic society.

In the post 9/11 context, western media presents two parallel themes of anti-Americanism; one is cultural and second is American strategic interests. Madiha Afzal argues that Anti-Americanism is typically considered to stem from two different sources: what America is (its culture, and its internal political and economic structure), and what America does (its foreign policy).<sup>1</sup> In the guise of American strategic interests, scholarly work has enshrined two main factors; WOT and American drone program in Pakistan that has led to anti-Americanism. This paper brings more structured, instrumental and ideologically

embedded factors of anti-Americanism that have framed JI and PTI to formulate their political agenda for public support.

Anti-Americanism can be categorized into five main categories; cultural, economic, ideological, geostrategic and political. Cultural level is based on the threat perception by a particular segment of Pakistani society that thinks that American culture has depleted the Pakistani society by replacing it with local traditions. By economy, anti-Americanism is based on American aid that is coming into Pakistan and serving only a particular segment of the corporate elite. Ideologically based anti-Americanism is primarily rooted in the historical context of Islam and West. The geostrategic category is concerned with military aid and strategic alliances in the past and more recently on WOT. Political anti-Americanism in Pakistan is based on the experiences of the political leadership of Pakistan that has either visited America or interacted American leadership on different occasions.

By making Jamat-i-Islami and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Ensaaf as a case study to underline the perception of anti-Americanism in Pakistan, this paper will explain structures, political ideologies, electoral campaigns and their impact in post 9/11 context. To assist the above-mentioned points, I will take help from the developments taking place during bilateral relationship, e.g., drone program, Osama Bin Laden killing, Salalla check post incident, Ramond Davis case and Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill.

### **Theoretical Underpinning of Anti-Americanism**

Anti-Americanism can be defined as a response to American culture, government, and its policies in the world. It is a worldview of the rest of the world about America which contextualizes a systematic opposition to hegemonic discourses of American foreign policy. Anti-American sentiments are not confined to one ideology or state. Its sphere expands as much as American interests worldwide. Hamid Kizilbash defines anti-Americanism in Pakistan more narrowly as “feelings of disapproval, hostility, or condemnation among the Pakistani people against the American government and its policies” (Kizilbash 1988, 60).

This ‘ideologically constructed’ or ‘contextually formulated’ view primarily emanates from frequent interaction between the U.S. and the world. In Pakistan, there have been very few symptoms of anti-Americanism up to 1970s. Except for a few left-wing parties and student organizations like National Student Force, government machinery was primarily pro U.S. Anti-Americanism grew twofold among the PPP workers during the execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto<sup>2</sup> But even the religious

parties kept silent under General Zia Ul Haq's regime during the Afghan war period.

Lisa Blaydes and Drew Linzer's work on anti-Americanism in the Islamic world discusses three key sources of anti-Americanism. The first is a cultural anti-Americanism that is devised in opposition to societal norms pursued by American Creed worldwide. Joseph Nye calls it 'soft power' of America. A Euro-barometer poll in 2004 found that a majority of Europeans believes that Washington has hindered efforts to fight global poverty, protect the environment, and keeping the peace. Such attitudes undercut soft power, reducing the ability of the United States to achieve its goals.<sup>3</sup>

The global presence of America is bound to invite a globally present anti-Americanism. As Fouad Ajami writes in Foreign Policy Magazine in 2009 that "everywhere there is an obligatory anti-Americanism, a cover and an apology for the spell the United States casts over distant peoples and places.<sup>4</sup> It includes opposition to dictators, pro-American ruling elites and Western-influenced classes in Muslim countries. It is a competition between liberal and conservative political segments that often generates anti-American sentiments. When the struggle for political control between these two groups escalates, elites of both types have incentives to ramp up anti-American appeals to boost mass support.<sup>5</sup>

#### **Four Key Determinants of Anti-Americanism**

(i) **Anti-Americanism as a reaction to post-9/11 U.S. policy behavior towards Pakistan**

Scholars like Richard Crockatt discusses the role of September 11 in the light of the rise of political Islam and America's role in political instability in Muslim countries. He argues that the United States remains insulated from global reactions to its post-9/11 actions. He further argues that Anti-Americanism is one consequence of the growth of America's civilizational consciousness.<sup>6</sup> However, other scholars like Fauad Ajami decline the role of 9/11 as a spark to global anti-Americanism. Fouad Ajami argues that between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, Americans were told they were loved and uncontested on foreign shores.

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan, especially in the context of post 9/11, is determined by the beginning of War against Terrorism. It includes various acts of cross-border terrorism, drone strikes, Osama bin Laden incident, the Raymond Davis affair and the Salala incident. The war on terror also marked a major shift in modus operandi of anti-American forces from cultural opposition to terrorist acts.

(ii) **Anti-Americanism as a Reactionary Impulse**

U.S. policies towards the Islamic world in the post-9/11 period are perceived to be another determinant to anti-Americanism. It is because many scholars see the strength of pan-Islamic sympathies that stimulate mutual resentment towards the United States. The form of sentiment can be understood in the pretext of political Islam. As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. It requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive.<sup>7</sup> Pakistan is perceived by many scholars as deeply connected to the Islamic World in its opposition to the United States given its creation as an Islamic state.

(iii) **Anti-Americanism and Notion of Unipolarity**

The United States, as a political, economic and cultural hegemon, has been subjected to anti-Americanism worldwide. This perception prevails in those opposing ideologies that have their system of political, economic and cultural excellence, i.e., Islam and Chinese Civilization. The prime example of this hatred is an interview by Osama Bin Laden to ABC TV in 1998 in which he said, "We believe the worst thieves in the world today, and the worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We do not have to differentiate between military and civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets".

Due to the exploration of mass media and communication revolution, anti-American themes also circulate parallel and worldwide. The access to internet and change in the mode of media from print and electronic to social media has paved the way for anti-American forces to substantiate their agendas through media campaigns. For example, the use of Twitter in Pakistan has also been increasing, and it now penetrates over one percent of the Pakistani population at over 200 million users<sup>8</sup> that shows that social media trends can be manipulated at will by the social media users.

(iv) **Anti-Americanism and Domestic Elitism**

This category is relevant to those states where their political structures are authoritative and dominated by class interests. Muslim countries are an applicable case study in this regard. The ruling elites in Muslim states have often been manipulating the domestic sentiments against America; partly because of their nature of subordinating relationship and economic and military aid. Ross and Ross encompass this category as a top-down phenomenon where the flow of ideas comes from elite class to the middle

and lower middle class. For secular leaders, who historically positioned themselves as anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, anti-American attitudes reflect a perception of America as encroaching on the independence and sovereignty of countries in the Muslim world.<sup>9</sup>

### **Pak-US Relations in Historical Perspective**

The relations between America and Pakistan can be divided into 4 phases; Pre Afghan War Phase, Afghan War phase, Post Afghan War phase and Post 9/11 Phase. In the first phase 'Pre Afghan War,' both states enjoyed cordial relations by the worldwide rivalry between Capitalist and Communist blocks. Pakistan choose America (Capitalist Block) by signing the pacts like SETO and SENTO. The second phase 'Afghan War' is primarily linked with cooperation by choice where Pakistan rendered its service to American cause of battling USSR in Afghanistan. Third Phase 'Post-Afghan War' is crippled with the victory of Capitalist block and relegation and de-prioritization of Pakistan by America culminating to international sanctions due to Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons. The fourth phase 'post 9/11' is compulsive and assertive where Pakistan was insisted on becoming a part of global American War on Terror.

The seeds of anti-Americanism lie in last two phases; the first phase is inextricably linked with state with least effect on society whereas the second phase is related to society with less effect on the state. Since the research proposes an understanding of anti-Americanism in the post 9/11 context, it is also tantamount to explore the genesis of anti-Americanism in other phases as well so that we might be able to comprehend the contemporary nature of Pak-US relations.

### **Jamat-e-Islami: Championing the Cause of Anti-Americanism**

Among the religious, political parties, JI has been the proponent of anti-Americanism even before 9/11. JI is the most structured organized and democratic political party in Pakistan. Its ideological foundations are enshrined with the basic principles of Islam. The guiding principles of the party are Allah, Rasool (prophet) and Quran. Thoroughly dependent on ideological constructs of political Islam, JI has capitalized anti-American sentiments for political gains.

#### **(i) Drone Strikes and JI's Anti-American Campaign**

Although JI is a national party, its stronghold has been shrinking from urban centers, i.e., Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore to merely in KPK and FATA area. Since KPK in general and FATA areas, in particular, have been attacked by the U.S. drone strikes the party takes a clear position on the

drones. In an interview to Waqt TV Channel in July 2011, Syed Munawar Hasan said, "Pakistan should end its cooperation, and logistic support to the U.S. If American aid is entirely closed than Pakistan will be completely freed from the U.S."<sup>10</sup>

JI did not take part in 2008 General Election, but it remained relevant in the security landscape of Pakistan. After party's platform, Defense Pakistan Council (DPC) was the most prominent platform for JI to demonstrate against the U.S. and the government at the same time. It is pertinent to note that DPC was also represented by Hameed Gul, former Director General of ISI. A Gallup survey in July 2012 showed JI Ameer getting minus 18 points among the leader popularity map leaving only Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman of JUI-F behind with minus 38 points. In a TV interview with Wajahat Saeed Khan on Aaj News, JI Ameer said, "JI is not getting public support because it is not given proper coverage by the mainstream media in Pakistan."<sup>11</sup>

(ii) **Raymond Davis Case and Cultivation of American Hatred**

After Ramond Davis saga in Lahore, the JI president for KPK, Professor Muhammad Ibrahim demanded to hang Ramond Davis. While addressing a press conference after JI's provincial council meeting, Ibrahim said, "If the rulers succumbed to the US pressure, Egypt and the Tunisia-like situation would erupt in the country."<sup>12</sup> Addressing the sit-in, JI Ameer Syed Munawar Hassan told the protesters, "JI movement "Go America Go" is the need of the hour because America is the enemy of Pakistan and Islam. Our leaders are coward and belong to American stooges.

JI staged countrywide protests against the release of Ramond Davis. On 18 March 2011, JI protesters along with PTI, Pakistan Muslim League (Q), Jamatud Dawa (JD), Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT) and Insaf Students Federation (ISF) organized a massive rally in Lahore. Syed Munawar Hassan told the protestors, "Provincial and federal governments are working for the Americans. They do not serve the interests of Pakistani citizens."<sup>13</sup> Unexpectedly, JI Ameer did not mention military or ISI who were also involved in the release.

(iii) **Abbottabad Raid and JI's Political Construct**

The party has been staging "Go America Go" rallies in different cities of Pakistan occasionally. Abbottabad raid by the U.S. was strongly condemned by JI when the party said that the United States had violated the sovereignty of key ally Pakistan. In an interview with 'Radio Free Europe,' professor Muhammad Ibrahim Khan said, "This is the responsibility of the army, ISI, and the government to respond to all such

questions. And if they don't respond to the questions, their silence is criminal and must be condemned".<sup>14</sup> This public rhetoric could not be taken on the floor of the house in the parliament because JI had boycotted the 2008 General Election.

### **Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI): The Catalyst in Anti-Americanism**

PTI has emerged as one of the largest parties in the political landscape of Pakistan. Though the party was formed in 1996 it could not win the fame except Imran Khan's seat in National Assembly which he won from his hometown, Mianwali, during the general election of 2002. As per the constitution of the party, PTI would restore dignity, self-respect, and honor of the people of Pakistan that have been compromised through decades.<sup>15</sup>

The party's ideology also pledges to save Pakistan from those who "mortgage our children's future by making compromises under the guise of the much-abused supreme national interest." The constitution of the party also highlights the formation of an egalitarian society and fulfill the political demands of growing middle class. Thus, the organizational structure and leadership level in the beginning also reflected that party would represent the middle class that had been unrepresented the larger context of political landscape.

### **Drone Strike and PTI's Instrumental Anti-American Moment**

U.S. Drone strikes have been a point of concern among Pakistani people. Imran Khan knew this public pulse for which he decided to start protesting against the drones. In October 2012, Imran Khan led a motorcade toward North Waziristan along with thousands of people to strike against the drone strikes. The rally was also represented by 'U.S. war activists' who had joined Khan for demonstration<sup>16</sup>. On 23 April 2011, PTI workers staged a sit-in at Hayatabad Chowk, Peshawar. The KPK chapter of the party arranged the sit-in against the increasing numbers of drone strikes in FATA area. It was the first major public mobilization against U.S. drone strikes. The Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), JUI-Sami, Pakistan People's Party-Sherpao, Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid, and Pakistan Tehrik-e-Istiqlal announced support to the protest rally.<sup>17</sup>

This event provided Imran Khan with a platform to direct his criticism in two directions; one against the U.S. drone strikes and second against the ruling elite that had compromised with America against the sovereignty of Pakistan. While talking to media at PTI Central Secretariat in

Islamabad, Imran Khan said, "drone hits were like nurseries of suicide bombers"<sup>18</sup>, as in such acts of aggression entire families were being massacred on the pretext of elimination of terrorists. He said the "incumbent PPP-led regime, which claimed to be democratic, had been adopting a dual policy on drone attacks, i.e., condemning these strikes for public consumption on one hand while on the other allowing the aggressor to continue hitting Pakistani people"<sup>19</sup> with drones.

### **Raymond Davis Incident and Sentimentalism**

Ramond Davis saga brought another dimension into the anti-American sentiments of PTI. Right after the incident the party staged countrywide protests albeit no representation in the parliament. Addressing the party workers in front of Karachi press club, PTI Secretary General, Arif Alvi told the protesters that the party would always stand with the families of the victims killed by Davis and bring him to the justice. The party also staged a protest in front of Islamabad Press Club where the protestors shouted slogans to hang Ramond Davis.<sup>20</sup> Imran Khan addressed the protesters at Abpara Chowk, Islamabad, where he was joined by JI leader Mian Muhammad Aslam. In another gathering in Lahore on 15 February 2011<sup>21</sup>, Imran Khan warned the government not to send Ramond Davis back to the U.S.

### **Abbottabad Raid and Anti-American Paranoia**

As PTI's manifesto believes in the sovereignty of Pakistan and free to act against the western pressure, OBL incident proved another moot point for Imran Khan to get into the national politics. In an interview with 'The Telegraph' reporter in Pakistan, Peter Osborne, Imran Khan told that Pakistan was 'humiliated' and Osama's death was a 'cold blood murder.'<sup>22</sup> He further stated that Pakistan was humiliated abroad because it is perceived abroad that the government was playing a double game, that they were hiding him.<sup>23</sup> In another interview to Barkha Dutt on NDTV, a current Indian affairs channel, Imran Khan said, "the way Osama was killed, he has become a martyr to certain segments in Pakistan. He is more of inspiration".

After the Chief Executive Committee meeting of PTI, it was decided that the party would stage a sit-in on 21 and 22 May 2011 against the Abbottabad operation. PTI demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister and the president on security failure.<sup>24</sup> During the meeting, the party leadership also vows to block NATO supply from Karachi. With mounting pressure, the government of PPP decides to form a commission in June 2011.

## **Salala Check Post and PTI Politicking**

The incident was not less than waging war against Pakistan. Pakistani officials termed the attack as "utter irresponsibility on the part of ISAF (Afghanistan based International Security Assistance Force) which will not go unanswered.<sup>25</sup> PTI, Islamabad chapter, staged a protest against the incident<sup>26</sup> during which Fauzia Kasuri, President of Women Wing of PTI, termed the attack as a complete violation of International Law. Another campaign by the multimedia team of PTI was started with the name of "E-Rally and E-Protest<sup>27</sup>. The campaign used the modern media means especially, social media, to aware the public about violation of Pakistan's sovereignty.

Imran Khan also condemned the attack during a public gathering in Shuja Abad, Punjab. He said, "I told seven years ago that the war on terror does not belong to Pakistan. Now the time has come for the government to withdraw from the war."<sup>28</sup> Pakistani government announced to close the NATO supply route via Pakistan to Afghanistan. However, in the coming months, Pakistani parliament unanimously decided to open the NATO supply route<sup>29</sup> with certain terms and conditions.

## **Anti-American Politics of American Aid**

In an interview to Stuart Jeffries of 'The Guardian,' Imran Khan told that "America is destroying Pakistan by aid as it also adds in corruption in Pakistan.<sup>30</sup> He further said that he would prefer death over aid for his country. During a conference in New York in 2008, held by 'The Century Foundation' on the topic "Post-Bhutto Pakistan," Imran Khan said, "we never managed to become a nation because of aid our elite takes. We have a massive debt now. Aid has been a curse on Pakistan. The only thing I want from U.S. is not to back anyone but democratic process."

Although Pakistani decision-making elite has been pushing for pro-American discourse, the emerging political party like PTI has challenged this position. While studying the modus operandi of PTI to instrumentalize anti-Americanism as a political slogan, a new aspect is elucidated. This new character is based on the community targeted by PTI; the Pashtuns of KPK. According to Christopher Jafferlot, "PTI sets out to transcend the regional logics of Pakistani politics by attracting middle-class voters throughout the country."<sup>31</sup> Interestingly, Jafferlot call 'anti-Americanism' a national issue which denotes that this sentiment will remain alive as a tool of political mobilization by a moderate party like PTI.

Post-2013 General Election period is also full of voices from PTI against drone strikes and discriminatory policies of the U.S. against Pakistan. Right after the general elections, PTI member of the parliament, Dr. Shreen Mazari put up a resolution to use force against the drone strikes. However, it infuriated the newly elected government of PML-N. One of the cabinet ministers of PML-N Khurram Dastagir said, "We also want to stop drone attacks, but not through the use of military force because it can have serious and dangerous consequences."<sup>32</sup>

### **Declining Vote Bank of Religious Parties in Pakistan**

Religious parties, including JI, have been losing political ground since 2008 election. MMA the largest alliance of religious, political parties in 2002 election was merely reduced to 6 seats in 2008 as compared to 56 seats in 2002 election.<sup>33</sup> JI left the MMA alliance and boycotted the election. In 2012, efforts were made to revive the agreement, but JI refused to join. 2013 general election proved even more traumatic for the religious parties. Out of total 442 seats in the National Assembly religious parties like JUI-F and JI managed only 13 and 4 seats respectively<sup>34</sup>. It shows that representation of religious, political parties in national assembly is only 5%.

For JI, 2013 election was the first instance after 1988 when the party contested the election out of an alliance. Out of 297 provincial seats in Punjab, JI party could attain only 1 seat from PP-271 Bahawalpur-IV. In Sindh and Balochistan assemblies JI could not get even a single seat despite its stronghold in Karachi. KPK was the only province where JI won 7 seats. The decrease in some seats seems alarming when we compare the turnout. Although JI boycotted 2008 election 2013 General Election have more turnout (55%) as compared to 2008 (44%).

In 2013 General Election, JI attained one million votes but could get only three seats in the National Assembly. At the provincial level, JI vote bank also looks dwarfed in front of traditional political parties. In Balochistan, JI could get only 3627 votes. In KPK, JI got 404895 votes whereas in Punjab and Sindh the party's total number of votes were 489772 and 131141 respectively.

### **The Question of Anti Americanism in Democratic Transformation in Pakistan**

Contrary to American approach toward the democratization of societies, democratic process in Pakistan has proved more vicious for the American interests. The more the democratic trends improved in Pakistan, the more we see anti-American sentiment. It is because of the rise of the middle

class that wants national interest to be defined within the national or regional interests. Notwithstanding, the vibrant media and growing civil society have also proved additional factors in inviting the anti-American sentiments in Pakistan.

In the case of anti-American sentiments, religion has played a leading role in defining public discourse in Pakistan. However, the decrease in the number of votes for religious parties does not mean a decline in anti-Americanism. This decrease is tantamount to reduce the public level impact of anti-Americanism in Pakistan but it will increase the policy level impact. Religious parties can still gather larger crowds in urban centers of Pakistan.

Ameer JI, Rawalpindi, Shams Ur Rehman Swati, in a personal interview told that JI could not get votes on anti-Americanism because elections in a developing country like Pakistan are contested on the pledges of development. Electoral politics in Pakistan revolves around electable politicians. Swati says that JI has no space for electable politicians because it is against the guiding principles of the party. In Punjab and Sindh, the voter is not free to vote because he is trapped by local administrative structures, i.e., Thana, Kachari and Patwari systems.

In case of PTI, public discourse is not religious but traditional. There are very few leaders in PTI who can be considered as hardcore Islamists. Imran Khan's support in Pakistan exists in middle class especially youth and women.<sup>35</sup> It brings about another understanding, contrary to elite-driven anti-Americanism that Anti-Americanism is becoming a middle-class phenomenon. Consequently, anti-American sentiments may shift from religious to nationalist perspective. This change will increase the number of people getting anti-American in Pakistan.

## **Conclusion**

Post 9/11 political awareness in Pakistan is primarily based on sensitivity about national sovereignty and Pakistan's status among the nations. Both the dimensions have been a failure regarding national interest as Pakistan's territorial sovereignty not only violated several times, but Pakistan was presented among the lowest countries regarding social indicators. This sense of intimidation and backwardness is again an element of politicization through which ruling elite successfully externalize the internally created problems.

This externalization of domestically created problems is a matter of political maneuvering as Madiha Afzal<sup>36</sup> argues that anti-Americanism is an easy tool to encourage people to rally around and a natural appeal for

votes. Despite various political actors having differing views on political issues, anti-Americanism is a common thread in their public messages. Another fundamental argument about on domestic manipulation of anti-American sentiment is a competition between liberals and fundamentalists. Anti-American countries are those in which Muslim populations are less religious overall<sup>37</sup>, consequently generating a debate on secular or religious society.

Anti-Americanism is present in Pakistan from one form to another. Apart from its religious manifestation, anti-Americanism is a socio-political phenomenon. Those societies, where it's hard to extricate religious ethos from the socio-political landscape, are often tagged as religiously motivated anti-American societies. It is not a surprise for a scholar of anti-Americanism when a moderate party like PTI gets into an anti-American political campaign. Although, anti-Americanism does not play a decisive role in the electoral process of Pakistan religiously-motivated political manifestation is a matter of concern among many U.S. scholars.

## **Impact of Power Asymmetry on India-Pakistan Conflict Resolution: Critical Appraisal of India's policies under Modi's Tenure**

**Saif Ullah Malik\***

### **Abstract**

*Election of the nationalist BJP government brought hawkish politicians to the fore of decision making. Buoyed by close strategic partnership with the U.S and increasing power parity vis-à-vis Pakistan, Narendra Modi took an exceptionally hardliner approach towards Pakistan and pursued policies which further exacerbated the conflict between the two states. From shunning dialogue process to ordering air strikes and revocation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, Modi's policies have made conflict resolution a forlorn conclusion and pushed the region into unprecedented turmoil. This study addresses the following research question; what is the impact of power asymmetry on conflict resolution between Pakistan and India?*

**Keywords: Hindutva, Saffron Tide, Power Asymmetry, Surgical Strikes**

### **Introduction**

“We can choose our friends, but not our neighbours”- Manmohan Singh.

India and Pakistan, the two nuclear armed South Asian rivals, have been engaged in an enduring rivalry ever since their independence from the British. Their tumultuous seventy years relations, which have seen four military conflicts, are characterized by mutual distrust and suspicion of each other.<sup>1</sup> Kashmir conflict, which lies at the heart of the dispute and has escalated to the level of full-fledged military confrontation three times, is the longest unresolved dispute in United Nations Security Council.<sup>2</sup> There have been scattered attempts in the past at peace building, but the dialogue process has hit a rough patch ever since terrorist attacks in Mumbai derailed the peace process.<sup>3</sup> Post 2008, India has emerged as a major regional and global power. Its untapped consumer market of a billion people offered lucrative economic prospects to the West; whereas its status as the world's largest democracy and important geo-strategic location made it a natural partner to United States.<sup>4</sup>

## Theoretical Framework

John Burton's Basic Human Needs (BHN) theory postulates the suppression of basic needs of humans to be the core explanatory variable behind protracted social conflicts.<sup>5</sup> These basic human needs are invariable, universal, non-negotiable and not in scarcity.<sup>6</sup> Burton was influenced by Abraham Maslow's 'A Theory of Human Motivation' in which Maslow spoke of humans as 'perpetually wanting animals' and listed at-least five basic needs namely psychological, safety, love, esteem and self-actualization (hierarchical, bottom to top) which they desire.<sup>7</sup> However, instead of realization of needs in a hierarchical fashion, Burton proposed that basic human needs were to be satisfied simultaneously. He took up sociologist Paul Sites' list of needs; consistency of response; stimulation; security; recognition; justice; meaning; rationality and control, adding one of his own, 'role defence', to it.<sup>8</sup>

A critic of traditional political philosophy which places power at the centre of all political transactions and international system which considers states to be the primary actors, Burton sought to provide an alternative practice to classical conflict settlement theory based on 'power-based diplomatic negotiations' and, ultimately, came up with an analytical problem solving workshop (preceded by controlled communication workshops).<sup>9</sup> This workshop was a facilitated process, whereby the facilitators, were to help the parties involved in a conflict to identify the core issues at the roots of the conflict (read basic needs), analyse the costs associated with prolonging the conflict, realize that the needs were not scarce and their pursuit was not a zero sum gain.<sup>10</sup> Burton differentiated the process of facilitation from mediation and traditional settlement process. Whereas a compromise or negotiation was possible for 'disputes', human needs were non-negotiable and therefore demanded resolution, not management.<sup>11</sup>

BHN theory, however, had a problem. It jumped from micro level (individual) to macro level (states, elites who exercise power) and spoke of nothing in between (structures that existed between individuals and elites).<sup>12</sup> This issue was mitigated by collaboration of BHN theory with Edward Azar's Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) theory. In PSC theory Azar spoke of features manifested by protracted social conflicts such as economic and technological underdevelopment, unintegrated social and political systems and distributive injustice.<sup>13</sup> He said that the root cause of protracted social conflict was denial of needs such as security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity and effective participation which were a compelling need of society and necessary for development.<sup>14</sup> BHN theory, which focused on individuals, thus went on becoming a more comprehensive one, postulating about collective groups.<sup>15</sup>

Burton's radical conception of power, thus, is; that it is inherently given (inside an individual in the form of an unquenchable thirst to satisfy ontological basic needs) and; monolithic (either it is there, or suppressed).<sup>16</sup> In contrast, power in the realist paradigm is not given but constructed (in the form of structures, institutions, policies etc.) and variable instead of being monolithic (in various forms such as economic power, military power, soft power etc.).<sup>17</sup> Except the power to pursue the basic human needs, other forms of power for Burton are 'illusory' once the parties are at the table; to quote Kevin Avruch,

"Asymmetries of power are absorbed and disappear, in a sense, into the dynamics and process of a well-run [BHN theory] problem-solving workshop."<sup>18</sup>

Herein lies the dilemma of BHN theory; to address the problem of power asymmetry between adversaries. As Avruch points out, the possibility that the two parties have decided to engage in such a workshop is based on the premise that they have both reached a scenario of 'mutually hurting stalemate'- condition I.W. Zartman speaks of for negotiations to be held.<sup>19</sup> This situation lacks in case of asymmetric parties to a conflict and if such a condition has to be fulfilled for negotiations, that would ipso facto promote conflict rather than abating it. Why then, would a party from a position of strength, want to engage in such an exercise if it has not reached a condition of mutually hurting stalemate? The theory, has no answer to this question. Furthermore, theory has restricted the definition of power to that of an inbuilt urge felt by individuals to satisfy their basic needs and the 'facilitators' in the problem-solving workshop are to help the participants reach such a conclusion. But *until* the participants agree for engaging in any such venture, the other facets of power are very much in play. It would then seem prudent to discuss those dimensions of power.

Robert Dahl defines power as the ability of an actor to influence another actor into taking a direction that it would not have taken otherwise.<sup>20</sup> But this definition is incomplete in encompassing other *dimensions* of power. One dimension would be power as a *possession* which is based on Hobbesian school of thought. Hobbs talks about power in terms of possessions, resources and potentials.<sup>21</sup> Commonly it refers to economic and military capabilities but attributes like geography, natural resources, population, national character and morale, and diplomacy are also considered elements of national power.<sup>22</sup> Another dimension of power is *relational* to which Lockean school of thought subscribes.<sup>23</sup> Power exists in tandem with the existence of the other party; if there is no other actor, there is no power to be exercised on.<sup>24</sup> Yet another dimension of power refers to the 'hard' and 'soft' attributes of power.<sup>25</sup> It is on these lines that power asymmetry between Pakistan and India has been considered.<sup>26</sup>

Elsewhere, effects of power asymmetry have either been discussed in organizational context (employees vs management)<sup>27</sup>, or conflicts involving ethnic or religious minorities.<sup>28</sup> Of particular significance to discuss here, owing to its relevance, is C.R Mitchell's work on role of asymmetric structures on conflict resolution.<sup>29</sup> Mitchell writes that protracted intranational conflicts are deep rooted and arise from needs such as security, identity and recognition; a reference to ethnolinguistic communities or ethnonationalities.<sup>30</sup> In such intranational conflicts, one actor is adamant on changing the status quo (minority ethnic group) while the other insists on retaining it (the state). Mitchell then applies Pruitt and Rubin's 'dual concern' interpersonal model to illustrate the asymmetric structure between the actors based on their behavioural states and its impact on conflict resolution. Pruitt and Rubin's model however, is to explain and predict the behaviour of one actor in a conflict.

These behaviour states are; inaction; contending; problem solving and yielding and are determined by two variables; level of concern of actor for its own goals and level of concern for other actor's goals and welfare.<sup>31</sup> For instance, if an actor is equally concerned about its own goals as well as goals and welfare of the other actor, its behaviour would be categorized as 'problem-solving'. On the contrary, if the actor is not interested in attainment of its goals, along with a matching indifference about the other actor's goals, behavioural state would be 'inaction'.

If we were to extend concept of Mitchell and apply the dual concern model to; both the actors (instead of a single one) in an interstate (instead of an intranational) dyadic conflict, some of the following scenarios (among several) would emerge,

Cases 1 and 3 are symmetric in their structures (both actors depict the same behavioural state). Case 2, depicts asymmetry due to different behavioural states by both actors. Actor 1, has high concern for its own goals as well as for those of actor 2, which makes its behavioural state 'problem solving'. However, actor 2, though with high concerns for its own priorities, has little regard for those of actor 1. This asymmetric condition, can portray the nature of conflict between a powerful actor (actor 2) and a weaker actor (actor 1) which initially shows high regard for actor 2's concerns (appeasement perhaps?) so that resolution of conflict can be materialized as the current status quo hurts its interests. It also shows how, disinclination on part of one actor to accord importance to goals or values of the other actor can disillusion the latter and force it to recalibrate its policies. The resultant outcome, as illustrated in case 3, is that the initially motivated actor who opted for problem solving, is now in a spiralling escalation race with the other actor.

This model, though demonstrating impact of asymmetric structure in protracted social conflicts, is quite simplistic in nature and still does not adequately address the question as to how power, as a variable, effects the process of conflict resolution. Does power make the actor who wields it disinclined for dialogue? Does the actor resort to highhanded, unilateral tactics without fear of consequences conflict escalation might bear? Or instead starts believing that such tactics would resolve the conflict? BHN theory negates this latter perception; India's refusal to address Pakistan's basic needs (security and recognition of Kashmir issue) and the resultant protracted nature of conflict testifies that. However, as stated earlier, the theory falls woefully short of explaining the earlier two questions relating the influence of power; the very influence that, as it would be demonstrated later on, is hindering the fulfilment of conditions envisaged under theory's framework for conflict resolution.

This study hypothesizes that India's power asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan, has hampered conflict resolution. It aims to support this hypothesis by analysing how India's recent (last five years) policies and consequent actions, influenced by power asymmetry, have made the conflict more intractable and protracted.

### **Case Study**

How India perceives its conflicts with Pakistan at the moment is influenced by how international community, particularly U.S, perceives those conflicts along with relativistic images of Pakistan and India. Prior to Bush administration, U.S largely dealt with Pakistan and India in tandem but later on, President Bush in a significant departure from earlier policies, decided to de-hyphenate U.S relations with both states. De-hyphenation called for an objective assessment of each country's value to U.S interests to be the primary basis for interstate relations, rather than the fear that how relations with one state would sabotage relations with the other.<sup>32</sup> There were a number of reasons behind the shift in U.S strategic policy; (1) India's rising stature as the world's largest democracy with a population of over a billion people, (2) huge consumer market for U.S to sell finished goods; (3) natural rival to geo-politically balance a meteorically rising China; (4) safeguarding the Indian Ocean's trade and communication lanes and; (5) a partner to share the burden of regulating the global norms and values on which current international political and economic order rests.<sup>33</sup> To quote Ashley Tellis,

“India, the larger and more strategically important country, was incontestably a success story that now manifested itself as a rising global power, whereas Pakistan, the weaker and less significant state, appeared to be a troubled country teetering repeatedly on the brink of failure.”<sup>34</sup>

Hence, while India has been portrayed as a 'rising global power', simultaneously Pakistan has been illustrated as a 'weaker' state which raises connotations of prejudice and power disparity. This notion of power disparity was strengthened and prejudice manifested when United States; (1) in 2008, signed civil nuclear deal with India<sup>35</sup>; (2) in 2010, actively backed India's bid for a permanent seat in UNSC; (3) in 2016, elevated India's status to major defence partner-a status no other country enjoys and; (4) lobbied for India's entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group which ironically, was established as an export control regime after India's atomic tests in 1974.<sup>36</sup>

The policy of de-hyphenation, rooted in U.S perception of India's greater relativistic importance (which ultimately translates into power), has adversely impacted the process of conflict resolution in several ways. First, while earlier the international community in general and U.S in particular, perceived India-Pakistan relations in conjunction and, as a problem, due to protracted nature of Kashmir conflict (especially after the demonstrated nuclear capability of both states), their focus has now shifted from immediate conflict resolution and has become interest oriented owing to geo-strategic and economic lucrative India has to offer. In an article published prior to the materialization of the de-hyphenation policy, Condoleezza Rice remarked that,

"There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one."<sup>37</sup>

In other words, had Pakistan been in a similar position to offer such benefits, focus in Washington would have remained fixated on conflict resolution. In the absence of interest or willingness on part of international community to resolve the protracted conflicts between Pakistan and India, prospects of conflict resolution seem to be dim.

The second effect of de-hyphenation, along with the accompanied prejudiced developments mentioned above, has been on India's perception of its own self, that of Pakistan and of the protracted conflicts the two states are engaged in. This dangerous over-confidence coupled with an underestimation of Pakistan's capabilities has translated into policies that have further aggravated the conflict. One such policy was that of conducting surgical air strikes against Pakistan first in 2016 and then in 2019 against alleged terror camps.<sup>38</sup> Although Pakistan rubbished the Indian claims of surgical strikes in 2016, it retaliated and downed two Indian jets along with capturing an Indian pilot in response to the 2019

surgical strikes which brought the two countries dangerously close to the brink of a nuclear war.<sup>39</sup> This is not the only instance in recent times when India's belligerent stance has caused confrontation with its neighbours and stoked conflict in the region. In June 2020, 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a border clash with China across the Line of Actual Control in Galwan Valley.<sup>40</sup> This confrontation with China, speaks volumes about India's regional and global aspirations and its perception about Pakistan as a rival.

Another policy shift has been to shun all forms of bilateral and negotiated dialogue. India rejected Pakistan's offer to resume dialogue on issues of Kashmir and terrorism<sup>41</sup> and has repeatedly turned down offers from U.S to mediate between the two countries.<sup>42</sup> One reason, to reject the offer of mediation is that the intervening third party often uses its own political influence to nudge the stronger party to give up on its hard stance or arrive at a mutually accepted solution. In that way, it inculcates a sense of symmetry in an otherwise asymmetric negotiation. India's External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar remarked in a tweet that "any discussion on Kashmir, if at all warranted, will only be with Pakistan and only bilaterally."<sup>43</sup>

Foreign Minister's above statement needs further scrutiny on another account. The phrase 'if at all warranted' is a subtle yet an unmistakable indication towards India's changing perception of the protracted conflicts with Pakistan (which was hinted earlier). This transformation of perception of the Kashmir conflict from an internationally recognized dispute, to a bilateral and now an 'internal'<sup>44</sup> one, was manifested when India revoked Article 370 and stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its special status.<sup>45</sup> Kashmir would now have to abide by Indian constitution and all Indian laws, and people from outside the state of Kashmir would be able to purchase property there.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, in anticipation of violent protests against the decision, the valley was plunged into a ten-month complete lockdown and communications blackout which persists till today.<sup>47</sup> India's decision to revoke the article is not only unconstitutional<sup>48</sup>, but also in blatant violation of international law as the UNSC resolutions 39 and 47 recognize the conflict as a bilateral dispute.<sup>49</sup> India has rejected offers of mediation by UNSG and U.S which has further exacerbated the conflict between the nuclear states with no prospects of resolution in sight.<sup>50</sup> This utter disregard for international norms and humanitarian values, suppressing the legitimate basic human needs of population ruthlessly and warmongering displays a megalomaniac mindset of the nationalist regime in New Delhi which is inimical to process of conflict resolution.

Lastly, with international community wooing India and U.S considerable tilt towards it owing to its economic potential and geo-strategic

significance, the strategic stability of a fragile and turbulent South Asian region has been disturbed.<sup>51</sup> The resultant megalomania, translated into an aggressive and uncooperative policy stance by India can; (1) push Pakistan to the wall in which case it would pursue its security needs more vehemently engaging in a spiralling arms race (both conventional and nuclear) with India; (2) disillusion Pakistan to forsake its interest in dialogue, instead looking for 'other options' to fulfil its basic needs (refer to case 3 of Rubin and Prutt model) or; (3) create trust-deficit and a highly volatile environment in which even a small terror incident can initiate a full blown military conflict between the two nuclear rivals. In the last few months, Prime Minister Imran Khan has stated number of times India's mala fide intentions to conduct a false flag operation against Pakistan.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, Indian Army Chief in a statement cautioned the state against an imminent terrorist infiltration into Kashmir from Pakistan.<sup>53</sup> All of these possibilities, paint a grim picture of an alarming conflict escalation rather than resolution.

## **Conclusion**

BHN theory places the suppression of basic human needs at the heart of all protracted social conflicts. According to John Burton, these needs, though suppressed for the time being, cannot be eliminated altogether. When seen in context of Pakistan and India, the protracted nature of all conflicts, especially Kashmir, demonstrates this fact. Refusal to assuage Pakistan's concerns related to security and denying the recognition of identity and basic rights of the ethnic population in Kashmir has exacerbated the conflict. India's increasing power asymmetry vis-à-vis Pakistan has hindered the process of conflict resolution. The de-hyphenation policy of United States along with its prejudiced behaviour towards India, owing to the latter's huge market potential as a final destination for U.S products and its geo-strategic significance to deter China, has disturbed the balance of power in South Asia. India's hegemonic perception of itself has altered the way how it looks towards relations with Pakistan and the bilateral conflicts resulting in policies that have further deteriorated the relations between the two states and adversely impacted the prospect of conflict resolution.

## Rise of China: A Transition in the World Order

Alina Malik\*, Dr. Saima A Kayani\*\* & Fatima Riffat\*\*\*

### Abstract

*China is rising alongside other emerging powers with an aim to transform the decades old world order. Emerging powers such as China, India, Russia and Brazil are of the view that the world order of the past is not compatible with the current challenges faced by the international system. As these rising states embark on their journeys towards development, they are causing a shift from unipolarity to multipolarity. Of all these states China is taking a lead role. Being the second largest economic and military power, China has assumed a leadership role that is second to none. How China transforms the world order will be evident from its policies with regards to BRICS states and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These two organisations will play a key role in building a multipolar world order.*

**Keywords: Multipolarity, Unipolarity, Balance of Power, Security Dilemma**

### Introduction

Henry Kissinger defines the term world order as the concept held by a region or civilization about the nature of just arrangements and distribution of power relevant to the entire world. In his book titled “World Order”, he outlines two components of world order: a set of commonly accepted rules and the balance of power that imposes restraint when all rules break down.<sup>1</sup> World order traces its roots back to 17th century, where the “thirty-year war” was fought during 1618-1648. At that time there was no concept of order, sovereignty, rules, and limitations of war. All the nations involved fought a chaotic war with no boundaries drawn. This led to the need of setting up an order to govern the affairs of all nations. Leaders of the warring governments gathered in Westphalia and formulated the Treaty of Westphalia or Peace of Westphalia.<sup>2</sup>

The Westphalian system was formed on the basis of a state-based global order spanning multiple regions and civilizations.<sup>3</sup> Westphalian principles of sovereign statehood, national independence, national interest, and non-interference formed the basis of modern state system. The liberal world order was formed on the basis of two primary factors: democracy as

a form of governance and capitalism as a form of economic governance. The post-1945 international order often called Pax Americana is being challenged in the contemporary world.<sup>4</sup> The unipolar world order has been dominated by America for over seven decades. The U.S has used its overwhelming economic and military power to shape future of the world. America reigned world politics for decades, acting as a singular powerhouse of the world. The U.S derived its hegemonic model of realpolitik from the basic Westphalian principles of sovereignty, political independence and modern state system.<sup>5</sup> However, as the world enters twenty first century, American dominance is in relative decline.

Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" argument stated that history has come to its logical conclusion because humans have found a harmonious world order based on liberal democracy. <sup>6</sup> He believed that democracy as a form of government would outright all other governments because nations desire peace and stability which sets them on a path to progress. Critics in the contemporary world argue that twenty-five years after this, the link between capitalism, liberalism and democracy, on which Fukuyama's argument depended has been broken.<sup>7</sup> The defenders of liberal democracy need to review their policies as liberalism in the contemporary world is not so popular as it used to be.<sup>8</sup> The rise of emerging powers such as the BRICS states is causing a shift in the power center from West to East. The old order established by events of World War I, Great Depression and World War II is fading from the scene. American supremacy cannot entirely diminish as they have maintained the world order for the past seven decades, but it will see a relative decline in influence over international politics.<sup>9</sup>

### **Decline of American Power**

The liberal international order that emerged after Second World War was a loose array of multilateral institutions established and governed by America. USA became a world superpower with the end of World War II and its status reached new heights after the victory in cold war. No one predicted the fall of Soviet's empire, which paved way for American monopoly over world affairs. Such convenient sidestep of Thucydides trap\* between USA and Russia provided impetus to the idea of a unipolar world.

During cold war when countries proved too weak to fend for themselves, U.S came up with Truman doctrine that provided substantial aid to other countries and deployed U.S forces abroad. Washington invested heavily in European recovery with Marshall Plan in 1948 and created NATO in 1949. George Kennan, an American diplomat believed that in the post-world war era, there are five areas of industrial strength: USA, UK, Soviet

Union, Continental Europe and North-East Asia.<sup>10</sup> To prevent a third world war, Washington chose to isolate the Soviet Union and bind itself to the rest of three. U.S grand strategy also categorizes Asia and Europe as areas of vital importance. However, with the passage of time American monopoly in these two regions is being undermined by the rise of new powers.

America has rigorously used its resources abroad in the name of self-defense and national interest. The key regions identified by George Kennan are also a part of U.S grand strategy. Wars in these regions as such Iraq war and Afghanistan war has drained the resources of America.<sup>11</sup> Keeping this in view the new U.S administration under Donald Trump has called for isolationism and protectionism. This has eventually resulted in decline of American influence around the world. The western domination of world politics is coming to an end. Several events proceeding the end of Cold War added to America's decline.

The 9/11 attacks gave a blow to American politics. As USA tried to cope up with the terrorist threat it became vulnerable to exaggerated security threats. America's threat perception led to its invasion of Iraq in 2003 in the name of preemptive strikes. This marked the beginning of America's declining influence on world politics. Subsequent invasion in Libya and protracted war in Afghanistan further added to its decreasing influence around the world. The U.S has mostly relied on use of hard power to resolve disputes. American pursuit of a forceful settlement of disputes like in Iraq war, Afghan war and now in Syria has questioned America's role as a global leader.<sup>12</sup> American's consider force as an ultimate source of power.

One of the major goals of American foreign policy has been exporting democracy abroad. Policy makers in the U.S see this as a tool to expand their influence. In doing so, they didn't realize that democracy as a form of government does not work for every other country. In reality, their efforts have consciously or unconsciously turned many state and non-state actors against them. U.S regime change policies in the Middle East are a proof of it. Though Washington had a general preference for democracy, they have also supported authoritarian regimes. A prominent example of this is the U.S support for Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdul Aziz. U.S opposes Iran in the same region and supports Saudi Arabia though both have authoritarian regimes. Hence, America seeks cooperation based on its national interest.

The unipolar world order driven by America has started losing its sphere of influence. The twenty-first century era faces a broader range of issues such as climate change, refugee crisis, etc. These growing problems would

have been more tractable if the U.S was willing to provide practical solutions to them. America's national interest lies in securing state's power and prestige rather than focusing on human security issues. This is evident after the U.S withdrawal from Paris Climate Change Agreement in 2017 gave a blow to international efforts combating climate change.<sup>13</sup> The Paris agreement was to bind international community to cooperate and combat rising temperature of the world. U.S withdrawal from the agreement depicted their lack of interest to resolve the issue. American humiliation, in the wake of 135 votes against their actions of recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in the UN General Assembly proved to be a major setback. Moreover, President Trump's "America-First" slogans have made the world realize the self-centric U.S approach towards global issues.<sup>14</sup> Putting America's interests above the common interests of international community has been criticized by many nations including its own allies.<sup>15</sup>

There has been a decline in U.S soft power in the recent years. According to a poll by Gallup in 2017, only 30% of people in 134 countries held a favorable view of the United States under Trump's leadership. This is a drop of around 20 points since Obama's presidency.<sup>16</sup> This depicts that U.S cannot unilaterally confront new threats such as terrorism without the cooperation of other countries. Though states do cooperate out of self-interest, the extent of other government's cooperation depends on the attractiveness of U.S. The influence of American values, ideology and political system have been affected in the 21st century. America's most striking failure has been the lack of priority to promote soft power and limited resources it has devoted to this cause.<sup>17</sup> U.S policies since decades has prioritized hard power over soft power as a favorable way to confront issues. This is where China came in to play and assumed the role of an alternative power Centre, appealing the world with its soft power.<sup>18</sup>

A shift in wealth and power to Asia and the rise of Chinese authoritarian capitalism has questioned the credibility of U.S led world order in the contemporary world. China's flagship projects such as One Belt One Road initiative will allow them to explore new markets and expand their economy. OBOR is aiming to facilitate China's oil imports from Middle East, exports to Africa and trade with EU. These three regions are the key areas where Chinese intervention is causing a decline in American influence. Unlike America, China is favoring peaceful expansion designs by creating an economic win-win situation for states. China has benefitted from American contracted sphere of influence in major parts of the world. Not only did China subjugate this situation by intensifying its mandate but also presented itself as an emerging leader of a multipolar world order. Modern theorists were expecting a rigorous Thucydides trap, but China managed to avert any direct confrontation with U.S. American inability to

exercise its influence is testimony to the fact that China is all set to determine the course of a multipolar world order.

Though the American led liberal world order has been put under stress by the policies of Trump administration and increasing concerns about the U.S role in Asia and in relation to rising China, the post-Cold War order hasn't been replaced yet.<sup>19</sup> The future of world order depends on the relationship between U.S and China and how they evolve within the current world order.<sup>20</sup> Whether both the states would cooperate or go against each other is what would determine the likelihood of future world order.

### **The Advent of a Multipolar World Order**

The current international system is shifting towards a new system of order conceptualized as a multipolar world order.<sup>21</sup> The liberal international order established after World War II is in perils as old powers try to reassert themselves.<sup>22</sup> Many scholars agree that global power dynamics are changing due to the rise of emerging power such as China. There is a significant change in political structures, demographics, economies and environment, which further questions the existing order.

A substantial amount of scholarly literature suggests that current international relations are witnessing a return to the balance of power politics that came in to play during the multipolar system of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>23</sup> The rise of Asian economies has reduced the dependency of the world on superpowers like America. This was evident when U.S president Barack Obama announced his policy of "pivot to Asia" which involved coordinated efforts to boost U.S. defense, diplomatic, and economic ties with the Asian Pacific states. United States is likely to stick to this policy despite president Donald Trump's nationalistic slogans. The power vacuum created by Trump's America First policies has allowed emerging powers to take charge. With the rise of new powers on the global stage, the world is set to become multipolar.

### **Rise of BRICS**

Formed in 2006, BRICS comprises of five countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.) With the rise of this new group of powers, there is a shift in power calculus in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. BRICS has emerged as a group of states with shared interests and common objectives. Since its inception in 2009, the group has stressed on forming a multipolar world. BRICS is characterized by its engagements at bilateral, group level and global level cooperation among member states.<sup>24</sup> These states have demonstrated the ability to engage well with the world community,

seeking sustainable solutions to the growing political and economic challenges. Initially, the group's objective was to create an alternative financial system that compliments the growing GDP rate of member countries. Eventually, the group broadened its scope to issues that were more relevant to the rising powers of global south. The 10<sup>th</sup> BRICS summit took place in July, 2018 in Johannesburg where issues related to international peace and security, global governance and trade were discussed.

The inclusion of South Africa in BRICS in 2010 depicted the group's desire to incorporate the entire world in their endeavours. Africa, a region that is less represented on the world stage, has immense potential that needs to be tapped. BRICS constitute over 40% of world population.<sup>25</sup> Their economic weight was one third of the GDP of world in 2015. BRICS has become a central source of economic growth in an emerging multipolar world. Analysts predict that in 2030 BRICS will overtake G7 countries in terms of GDP.<sup>26</sup> The failure of G7 countries in 2017 to reach an agreement on refugee crisis and climate change signaled the collapse of international cooperation.

Each BRICS nation has a distinct economic structure. Brazil has a developed economic structure, Russia's economy is commodity driven, India has a domestic driven economic structure, China is a powerhouse of exports and South Africa represents the growing African region with untapped resources. The member states strive to exploit their economic leverage for more political influence. Through BRICS forum, these countries articulate their views on restructuring and reforming international institutions such as reforms in the United Nation Security Council.<sup>27</sup>

China is by far the strongest BRICS nation. China is more relevant to the world economy than all other group members. Brazil is dependent on China for its economic growth through trade and cooperation. In May 2017, China and Brazil launched an investment fund with an initial sum of \$20 billion to increase productivity.<sup>28</sup> Russia needs China due to its long-lasting feud with the West. Russians view China as a reliable partner to counter western dominance, especially in Europe. Though India can work without China, their imports are heavily dependent on China. In 2015, about \$59 billion worth of Chinese imports flowed to India, more than U.S and Sweden combined.<sup>29</sup> The volume of bilateral trade between India and China rose to \$47.25 billion between January and July 2017.<sup>30</sup> While the total volume of trade between the two countries reached \$84.44 billion.<sup>31</sup> South Africa looks to China for its raw material. China is the biggest export market for Africa accounting for \$12 billion.<sup>32</sup> China's impressive economic growth has appealed the growing and struggling

economies of the world. The growing interdependence between China and other states leaves no room for clash between them. China's astounding economic growth has appealed several states around the globe especially in Asia.

### **The Emerging Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization**

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a regional organization encompassing states from Europe, Central Asia and South East Asia. The SCO has China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as member states and Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India as observer states. The SCO ensures cooperation military, economic, energy and cultural sectors between member states. SCO member states make up about a quarter of the total world population. Member states Russia and China along with the observers India and Pakistan enjoin four nuclear powers together. This shows the potential of this organization and what impact it can have on regional and global affairs.

SCO also provides an opportunity for Central Asian states to boost their economies by partnering with China. Under China's Belt and Road Initiative, trade routes expand to Central Asia as well. This could provide windows of economic opportunities for these states. China has focused on enhancing economic cooperation between member states of SCO by initiating free trade zones and launching a development fund. Member states of SCO such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia possess large oil reserves. This enhances the prospects of energy cooperation between member states. Russia also called for an 'energy dialogue' between member states at the SCO summit in 2006.<sup>33</sup> However, no notable progress had been made due to the diverging interests of the member states. Implementation of the organizations' policies is still in question as member states disagree on certain areas of cooperation. Nonetheless, being a new organization, the SCO has integrated important players in the international system also adding nuclear states to its panel.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization aims to create peace and stability in the Eurasian region. A historic summit of SCO took place in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2017. An important outcome of the summit was granting full membership to India and Pakistan.<sup>34</sup> Adding these two nuclear states would ensure the credibility of peace and security as treasured by SCO. The accession of these influential South Asian states would expand the opportunities for other members states to engage in productive measures to counter security threats. The European and Asian regions are two of the most important areas in terms of security cooperation. Most of the nuclear armed states lie in this region. Hence, the stability of these two regions will be a key factor in attaining global peace and security. The SCO plays

an important role in ensuring peace in these two regions. China being an economic giant in Asia has assumed the leadership role for this region. Using its influence China aims to strengthen partnership between these two regions.

### **Sino-Russian Relationship**

The close relationship between Russia and China in the post-cold war era is notable especially with declining American supremacy around the world. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, while delivering a speech in 1986 at Pacific port city of Vladivostok signaled that he wants to create an atmosphere of 'good neighborliness' with China.<sup>35</sup> The two countries signed a 'Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation' in 2001. The treaty entailed five principles to govern ties between the two countries: respect for state sovereignty, peaceful co-existence, mutual benefits, non-interference in internal affairs and non-aggression.<sup>36</sup> This treaty eased off decades old Sino-Soviet border tensions that had resulted in an undeclared military conflict in 1969. The border dispute over Zhenbao island led to armed clashes between both states. However, the dispute was eventually resolved with signing of border agreement in 1991. Over time bilateral relations between China and Russia have improved dramatically. Nevertheless, for Russia relations with the west and former Soviet neighbors have been more important than China. While China focuses on U.S as a major source of economic prosperity.<sup>37</sup>

The events of 2014 initiated a new era of the great power relationship between Beijing and Moscow. Ukraine crisis was a watershed moment for Russia's foreign policy. This crisis made Russian policy makers realize that China is their only viable strategic option. Though Ukraine crisis is not that important for China, but they have managed to seize upon opportunities that the situation presents. However, China has been mindful of Russian interests during the crisis and has refrained from taken advantage of their strong position. Also, China does not intend to make Russia the centre of its foreign policy.

Russia's pivot to Asia had started before the imposition of economic sanctions by U.S, EU and Canada in 2014 considering the Ukraine crisis. Russia's major concern at the time was to recompense the loss of western investment in their country. Russians were eager to find new sources for growth of its economy. They were expecting that the Chinese would be able to compensate for their losses in 2014. Moscow even relaxed limitation on Beijing's involvement in their economy. China gave a positive response by helping in vital areas such as energy sector. Western sanctions had targeted Russia's upstream oil and gas industry.<sup>38</sup> China became a key financier of Russia's oil and gas projects via direct

investments and loans. In 2015, state-owned China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation was granted approval to purchase a 10% stake in the Russian petrochemical company Sibur.

Since 2014, many of Russia's hydrocarbon companies have secured financial deals from Chinese state-owned banks. In April 2015, China Development Bank agreed to provide loans of €9.34bn and 9.76bn renminbi to finance Novatek's Yamal LNG project located in northern Russia.<sup>39</sup> These loans were significant as they involved euros and renminbi rather than U.S dollars. This also reduced importance of dollar to bilateral economic transactions between China and Russia. However, Chinese foreign direct investment in Russia has mired in years following Ukraine crisis.<sup>40</sup> While Beijing's share of global direct investment has increased with time. China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI) would provide an impetus for Chinese investments in Russia's transport and logistics sector. BRI will allow Chinese investors to find more investment opportunities in Russia.

Emerging cooperation between China's Belt and Road Initiative and Russia's Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) is also indicative of their growing relationship. Eurasian Economic Union was founded in 2015 by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan later joined EEU in 2014 and 2015 respectively. This organization saw a setback as the Ukraine crisis began. Member states of EEU refused to support Russia's economic countermeasure against Ukraine and the west during the conflict. BRI played a crucial role assimilating EEU during this time. In a joint statement in May 2015, Russia and China agreed to join up BRI and EEU.<sup>41</sup> Russia and China have their own strategic interests as they enhance their cooperation. China seeks to expand economic cooperation to other regions such as Central Asia while also maintaining affable relations with the Russians. On the other hand, Russia believes that BRI's economic potential will help maintain economic stability in Central Asia, where economic losses have led to unrest in the past. These initiatives indicate China and Russia's support for each other.

Russia and China's cooperation at global forums such as United Nation Security Council is also notable. Both countries have vetoed six resolutions on Syria. The latest move was made on February 28, 2017 when Russia and China vetoed a resolution imposing sanctions on the entities involved in chemical attack in Syria.<sup>42</sup> Exercising their veto powers against U.S led resolution depicts that challenging U.S hegemony is China and Russia's shared goal.<sup>43</sup> They have kept an eye on regime change efforts by the U.S in Middle East and continue to support each other. Russia is also supportive of Chinese stance on South China Sea conflict. Despite persuasion from U.S to change their decision on the conflict, Russia

declined to support Permanent Court of Arbitration's decision regarding the dispute. Moscow further reiterated that they support China's stance on non-recognition of court's decision.<sup>44</sup>

Russia and China's relationship is based on cooperation in areas of mutual interest. They don't tend to pose as an anti-American axis. Instead, they continue to share interests with the west. They are wary of the fact that overt support of each other would undermine their relationship with the U.S which they can't compromise.<sup>45</sup>The Sino-Russian relationship has evolved into a strategic partnership where they have managed to avoid confrontation and exercise cooperation. Both countries are of the view that international system is making a shift from western centric order to a more balanced and multipolar order. Their relationship is crucial in determining the outcome of a balanced world order.

### **Conclusion**

A transition in world order seems inevitable with rise of new power centers across the world. American hegemony is in decline as emerging powers make their way to share the world stage. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the global power dynamics are gradually changing. This provides an impetus for new powers such as BRICS to compete in the global arena. A smooth power transition seems likely as emerging powers have strong bilateral trade relationships. Whether a conflict between these new powers is inevitable or not is yet to decided. <sup>46</sup>

The global economy has been largely governed by the G7's 'Washington Consensus' built upon neo-liberal principles. However, with the rise of BRICS in the 1990s, the role of G7 had been undermined which ceased to operate as an overseeing authority of global trade affairs. The 2018 G7 summit also ended in disarray as the U.S abandoned the joint statement and threatened to increased tariff. Since the U.S is still a predominant power but with fading leadership role especially in economic affairs, there is a need for cooperation among states to regulate global affairs. The world of the last half century is passing away, and the shape of the emerging political order is far from clear.<sup>47</sup>

China and Russia hold different concepts of international order. The leadership in both countries wants more influence abroad, don't like the international system in its current guise, and are ready to invest substantial resources in suborning it. Russia and China are acting as classic revisionist powers<sup>48</sup>. That doesn't mean that they seek to overthrow the system in its entirety. Chinese and Russian elites benefit immensely from the U.S.-led order in economic terms: they know that the prosperity it has fostered in their societies is a key for them remaining in power.

Millions have been lifted out of poverty, and middle classes have emerged in both countries. But the elites also understand that the liberal system itself, if left unchallenged, will lead to their ultimate demise.

For both countries, American strength and weakness are key variables, determining what they consider possible and impossible in terms of international behavior. Conflicts are means for them to test the West. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, keeping Assad in power after the U.S. has said that he “must go” would be a major victory in his crusade against what he perceives as an American policy of regime-change in the post-Soviet space and in the Middle East.<sup>49</sup> For Chinese President Xi Jinping, getting Chinese claims in the South China Sea broadly accepted in the international community, even against the ruling of The Hague arbitration court, would demonstrate that Beijing is now defining the rules of international order in its neighborhood.<sup>50</sup>

Some authors such as Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu believe that China will act as the ‘spoiler’ in the system and will seek to revolutionize the liberal world order. However, other authors are of the view that till today China has largely been adapting the liberal order formulated by the USA instead of challenging it. China is seen as a supporter of current world order rather than its opponent. The question remains as to what extent China intends to adapt to the liberal order or confront it in the future. Under President Xi, China is embracing the leadership role which is evident from her assertive foreign policy. President Xi made a remarkable presence at the 2017 gathering of the World Economic Forum in Davos and used the platform to advocate free trade, open markets and globalization, while Donald Trump remained at home promoting his 'America First' agenda. This highlights the reversal of roles between the two states.

The SCO connects Russia, China, and the Central Asian Republics, which as a result would join Eurasia as a possible counterweight against NATO.<sup>51</sup> The SCO is an important platform for Russia and China cooperation. It is also seen as a regional organization capable of challenging American power in the region. The decrease in American power and the ascent of Chinese material power would prompt reconsideration of how to live peacefully in the world.<sup>52</sup> The rise of organizations such as BRICS and SCO could prove to be a setback for western economic institutions.

As the Eurasian region comprises of over half the world’s population, in the future, this region could dominate global politics and undermine American supremacy. America is already under threat from Eurasia keeping in view its isolationists policies under President Trump. As America rolls back from multilateral agreements, it gives a chance for new

organizations such as SCO to prosper. Regional organizations are becoming increasingly important in the contemporary world keeping in view their role in maintaining peace and stability in the region. China's prominent role in these emerging organizations allows it to take the driving seat in reforming the world order. By integrating the rising powers, China is causing a shift in the world order, making it multipolar.

The current world order is in crisis because of various factors. One of which is the rise of emerging powers such as the BRICS states. The growing material power of these states is a concern for U.S policymakers who feel threatened by their inward and outward expansion. The key question is how the relationship between U.S and China will come in to play in the future. The future of world order is uncertain as changes taking in the international system depict the instability in the current order. The transition from Unipolarity to multipolarity is a slow but inevitable process. With declining U.S dominance around the world, a power vacuum has been created. This vacuum is being filled by the emerging power who now compete for legitimacy and dominance on the world stage. Whether these states accommodate or challenge each other is what would determine the future of global order.

## Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Efforts: Lessons Learnt

Dr. Summar Iqbal Babar\* & Syed Fraz Hussain Naqvi\*\*

### Abstract

*The war against terror has not reached a conclusive end and yet Pakistan has achieved success in consolidating the writ of the state in the tribal areas despite the complex challenges. FATA has remnants of the terrorist menace which include elements from the Hafiz Gul Buhadur Group, Molvi Nazir Group, the Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan, and the Haqqani Network/ Afghan Taliban. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was a tactical milestone which led to the destruction of IED production units and dismantling of terrorist centers that quelled the ever-notorious demand for suicide bombers. The operation did not only recover foreign currency involved in the execution but also laid bare the terrorist detention centers and their media wings that were part of the execution machinery. The Operations Khyber I-II & III were launched in the geo-strategically significant Tirah valley that had become a stronghold of the retreating menace. The tactical approaches of military reliance helped in rebuilding the security architecture that would improve overall security, provide relative economic stability and establish the larger framework for engagement. The ideological appeal of fanaticism and militant radicalism needs a thorough redressal through a concerted religious effort aimed at reinterpreting the dogmatic beliefs and effectively imparting the values of tolerance, harmony and peace through the institution of religion and with the support of pre-eminent scholars.*

**Keywords: Terrorism, Taliban, TTP, FATA, Haqqani Network, NATO, Zarb-e-Azb**

### Introduction

In post-2008 era, the US administration under President Obama strengthened its military presence at Pak-Afghan border region to intensify the counter-terrorist operations. This prompted the influx of terrorists into Pakistan in quest of safe havens. The peripheral territories of Pakistan that had stayed detached from the central political and security apparatus in the capital turned into a safe-haven for the terrorists.

<sup>1</sup> Cross-border terrorism became a critical worry as the tribal customs that related themselves to friendliness, cordiality and shelter, driven from the

'Pashtunwali Code of Conduct',<sup>2</sup> along with the related financial incentives resulted the territory to turn into a flourishing area for the terror organizations. The nearby clans were constrained to give cover on account of their customs under the "Pashtunwali Code of Conduct" and financial advantages.<sup>3</sup> The traditional practices motivated by these components prompted a passive acceptance to the presence of transnational militants and other non-state actors that would be going to challenge the writ of the state in the near future.<sup>4</sup>

The lawlessness in the tribal territories of Pakistan resulted in the deteriorating situation that has rendered the central authority ineffectual. Hence, the necessity arose to re-examine the security policy in those districts and a military strategy was crafted after 2008, to free the areas from the increasing presence of transnational terrorist groups. The military strategy endured early difficulties as the regular armed force was battling against those actors that didn't bear any sign of identifiable proof according to the Hague Conventions and their strategies depended on the imperative of guerrilla warfare to cause maximum harm with minimum cost. The progressive development of Pakistan's asymmetric warfare technique and the consolidation of non-military techniques along with the reconstruction and development of the war-torn areas prompted the confidence within the disgruntled local masses into the governing authorities. By improving the military tactics along with strengthening the administrative rule i.e. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan in 2017, have branded Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism approach in a new fashion. The heightened security over the Pak-Afghan border crossing along with its fencing has become the prime theme of national security strategy of the country. Additionally, National Internal Security Policy of 2018 amalgamated the hard won-gains made throughout these years with the advancement of comprehensive developmental goals to reinvigorate state-client relationship which gained the central focus of the new security approach.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) that had started in 2001 through the US military intervention in Afghanistan didn't finished after the overthrow of Taliban regime, instead, the Taliban insurgency persisted to create havoc with the creation of many splinter groups like that of Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as well. Pakistan's status in the US alliance as the frontline state costed the former a considerable loss of both lives and economic. Pakistan needed to militarily take part in the north-western frontier regions to eradicate TTP and their associates. In the context of the changing security environment, the article investigates a cluster of related issues. In the beginning, the article investigates the idea of the security design and the resultant grid as a side-effect of the resurgent danger. In a

later part, the article assesses the patterns in Pakistan's counter-terrorism endeavours with the prime focus on Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Eventually, the last part investigates the possible pre-requisites to ensure the success of Operation Rad ul Fassad. Hence, the article combines both the conventional and non-conventional methodologies to answer the security question of Pakistan.

### **The Strategic Matrix**

Pakistan has a complex relationship with militancy and terrorism vis-à-vis the three drivers that define and shape Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy. Firstly, the strategic culture appears to be heavily geared for a threat perception of imminent and immediate danger of Indian aggression and its designs to strategically encircle Pakistan. Secondly, the resilient nature of the state with its basis in the notion of 'conscription' and 'people in arms' leads to a domestic factor of affinity for military and combat readiness through religious and ideological basis. Thirdly, the regional paradigm of reliance on proxy groups and non-state actors to propagate fifth generation warfare deep inside Pakistan's borders mean that Pakistan is forced to seek relevant options to complement its strategy of maintaining regional influence and preventing offensive encirclement.

Pakistan's strategic location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean make it highly contested and create a complex array of foreign power interests and interventions. The strategic position of Pakistan at the intersection of diverse geographic and cultural zones has often urged a delicate balance between the various powers competing for influence.

The domestic variable is of extreme internal pressures arising from massive population growth and a demographic diversity that has experienced sectarian and ethnic conflicts. Structural issues of poverty, corruption and weak governance warrant an inflow of external aid and support to substantiate its military expenditure and reduce the fiscal deficits. Internal power struggles at the local political levels give rise to a host of secessionist and ethnic movements which sometimes do not share the 'national interest' purview of the federal government. Pakistan has experienced a range of issues including terrorist militancy, political violence, ethnic separatism and proxy actors employed by foreign powers. The conflicts with India in east, the quagmire of instability in Afghanistan on the western and northern front and the south-western region of Baluchistan with Iran have created a complex geographic and human terrain. The southern border with oceanic outreach provides access to Middle East and opens Pakistan to the possibility of influence in the regional rivalry between KSA and Iran. Pakistan has had to carefully

balance its role in the region to avoid sectarian ramifications at home and was in play when Pakistan refused to join the Saudi war against rebels in Yemen (2015) and showed concern about the appointment of ex-army chief General Raheel Sharif, as the head of 'Islamic military Alliance' (2017) to dispel the notion that it was a part of any bloc which aimed at containing Shiite Iran.<sup>5</sup> The oceanic access allows Pakistan to function as a transit route for trade with the landlocked Central Asian states and Xinjiang province of China.<sup>6</sup>

Balochistan is a strategically important and resource-rich region in Pakistan's southwest. The province borders Iran and Afghanistan. The geographic makeup is largely desert and the demographic makeup constitutes 80% ethnic Baloch and Pashtun. The Baloch society is organized along tribal and feudal lines and the tribal elders retain enforcement groups which are ethnic in nature for advantage in local politics and tribal competition for resources. Baloch ethnic identity and culture is shared across the border in neighboring Iran (Sistan) and some parts of Afghanistan. Militant groups within Balochistan lie in the spectrum of nationalist (Baluch Republican Army and Baluch Liberation Army) and Islamist jihadists.<sup>7</sup> The separatist groups are smaller and are supported by India to destabilize Pakistan as has been exposed by the arrest of Indian spy, Kulbushan Jadhav from Balochistan in 2016. Iran perceives a similar threat from Baloch separatism and Islamic jihad which has an anti-Shiite connotation. However, Pakistan cooperates with Iran in arresting and disrupting militants along their joint border.

The inflow of the neighboring instability and the spillover effect of foreign policies in the neighborhood has added to the complexity in the security understanding of Pakistan where it aims to maintain a balance between countering groups which challenge the writ of the state and sustaining its policy of regional influence. A region which lacks a normal functioning democracy or a sufficient degree of governance and security control in the neighborhood sufficiently narrows down possible options for extended approach since economic integration as proposed by 'functional integrationists' remains a distant possibility. In the scenario of an escalation, the limited integration that exists serves to function more as a reminder of the futility of integration than otherwise. India desires a peaceful Pakistan but one which makes 'peace with its preeminent' position in the region as a 'regional policeman'. US has lent some weight to the same notion of a 'global role' for India to counter the growing Chinese influence. However, none appear to be factoring in the position that Pakistan occupies in this complex conundrum which pours instability in to Pakistan's borders and forces it to spend resources that it can barely spare.

The Afghan jihad created a covert internationally-sponsored jihadism that was abruptly abandoned in 1989 after the soviet withdrawal. The subsequent growth of jihadism in the region led to military intervention by Pakistan in FATA (2004) to root out Al-Qaeda forces that had taken refuge in the Waziristan region. By 2008, several terrorist organizations including AQ and IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) had banded together to form the TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) which had Pakistan as its major target. The group under the leadership of Bait Ullah Mehsud had several objectives: liberate Afghanistan of foreign presence and create an organization to effectively defeat the Pakistani armed forces to facilitate the licit and illicit economy of Af-Pak borderlands. At the time of its emergence, the TTP had approximately 40,000 to 50,000 men at its command in the seven FATA agencies.<sup>8</sup> TTP established control in large parts of FATA and organized an effective command and control network for regrouping and planning. Operation Zarb-I-Azb was aimed at destroying the command and control centers and forced these groups out of Pakistan in to adjacent Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup> After the death of Mullah Fazlullah<sup>10</sup> in a drone strike (2018), Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud was appointed the new TTP chief. <sup>11</sup> Despite massive damage to the groups operational capabilities it does retain some ability to launch attacks in Pakistan from across the Afghanistan border.

Early 2018, saw a rethinking of the post 9/11 alliance between Pakistan and the US over mutual concerns on the effects of their respective counter-terrorism operations in the Af-Pak region. Trump tweets on New Year's Day 2018 stated a resentment that the USA had 'foolishly' spent over \$33 billion in aid in Pakistan in the last 15 years and had received only 'lies & deceit' in return .<sup>12</sup>The US President also signaled an end of approximately \$1 billion security aid to Pakistan until its kinetic approach against terrorism became more transparent. <sup>13</sup> In a joint statement in September 2017, the BRICS countries at the 9<sup>th</sup> BRICS Summit expressed concern over Pakistani-linked terrorist groups which were seen to pose a threat to regional security.<sup>14</sup>

### **Defining Counter Terrorism**

Terrorism is a byproduct of extremism which occurs at individual, organizational and environmental variable with varying levels of motivating factors at each level of analysis. A terrorist may be motivated by vengeance and religious fundamentalism however, a terrorist organization employs terrorism as a tactic since it is more effective than penetrating the society through democratic struggle. Similarly, the societal understanding of the extremists' worldview may be entirely different. Therefore, multi-causality and multi-level understanding offers

a better chance at dissecting the root causes and providing specific recommendations.<sup>15</sup>

Counter-terrorism strategies have two-components namely hard CT and soft CT. Hard CT is a kinetic approach which relies on identifying, killing and capturing terrorists. However, soft CT relies on identifying, preventing and pre-empting violent extremism through non-coercive means. According to research, an effective CT strategy is 20% military and 80% political.<sup>16</sup>

### **Counter- Narrative**

Counter-narrative refers to any effort by the counter-terrorist that relies on a deconstruction of the militants' ideology to effectively challenge it and create an environment that counteracts the militants' narrative. Counter narrative is integral to soft CT and works on the basis of multi-level approach. The first level includes the collective narratives which are non-institutionalized, anonymous and common-sense stories known to everyone.<sup>17</sup> The second level includes the ontological narratives which are also known as stories told by ordinary people and having widespread acceptability. Ontological narratives qualify as collective narratives when they become standard explanations.<sup>18</sup> The third level is the public narrative, and deals specifically with the 'stories' constructed, published and disseminated by actors in the public sphere such as the government, intellectuals, media, clergy and political organizations.<sup>19</sup> Public narratives are ideally built on collective narratives for widespread acceptance.

In the wake of the APS attack (December, 2014) the public narrative was revised to condemning the extremist ideology which was damaging Islam and was responsible for the suffering of Muslims.

### **Contesting Radicalism through Multidimensional Strategy**

Despite the fact that "Operation Zarb e Azb" was to a great extent a triumph yet it had a few restrictions. The dynamic element of that action was to free the north-western zones of Pakistan to reassure the law and order. Pakistan's Military was effective in accomplishing that, notwithstanding, the issue with respect to the presence of militants' supporters elsewhere in the country was still prevalent. Another worry was the presence of "sleep cells" of the terrorist groups along with their financial associates.<sup>20</sup> This worry chiefly stimulates by the way that the majority of the militants figured out the escape route to Afghanistan to look for sanctuary and from that point, they articulated their movements inside Pakistan. Subsequently, because of the dread of reprisal, Pakistan needed to adopt such a technique that could reduce such dangers.

Besides, however, the base of extremism was wrecked overall, still, the fanatic thought was still predominant. It was imperative for the state to eradicate, or reform, such institutions which were the breeding grounds of extremist ideologies. It's an obvious fact that the vast majority of the conscripted members of militant organizations are from the modest backgrounds which are influenced by the Madrassah schooling. The contemplations on which their subjectivities were based involved the prejudice against other religious factions, fanaticism, and the zeal to fight to uphold the Sharia System in an un-Islamic society.<sup>21</sup> This provided the arena to the possibility of Jihad among the youth which would guarantee them the honor in the hereafter. As the majority of the volunteers were hailed from the underdeveloped zones having miserable financial situations, the ravenousness for the spiritual superiority and the economic compensation for their families inclined them towards fanaticism. Thus, it was additionally significant for the state to counter such philosophy so that, the reappearance of such unyielding phenomenon with new recruits could be discouraged.

This denoted the change in the conventional thinking of the military and civilian establishment of Pakistan. This is to state that the attention on non-traditional strategies was featured with the emphasis on two pivotal approaches which are discussed in detail underneath.

**(i) Commencement of Operation *Rad ul Fasad***

The operation *Rad ul Fasad*, which began in 2017 highlighted a multilateral framework and represented the amplification of Operation *Zarb e Azb*. The observable contrast between the two operations lies in their maneuvering. The latter was focused on military activity generally in the FATA district while the other parts of country, especially the urban centers, were to a great extent remained unaffected by it. On the contrary, Operation *Rad ul Fasad* focused into the pioneer task of Pakistan's Military which incorporated every corner of the society through the utilization of intelligence-based operations.<sup>22</sup> Resultantly, following were the inevitable outcomes of this strategy.

**a) Destruction of Sleep Cells of the Terrorist Organizations**

In spite of the fact that the militants were neutralized and contained in FATA yet their broad networking channel had established the interconnectivity elsewhere in the country as well. Regardless of whether the terrorists from the FATA area were killed, the new enrolment could happen again attributable to their financiers, supporters, and associates. Likewise, the retaliation by the militants after Operation *Zarb e Azb* created the insecure environment in other parts of the country.<sup>23</sup> Since,

those zones were completely incorporated into the mainstream metropolitans and were urbanized, a large-scale counterstrike as that of FATA couldn't be conceivable. To devise the planning, Pakistan Military directed intelligence-based tasks with the end goal of halting the fanatic and radical acts that were linked with the terror activities. Through such strategies, the security organizations became enable in recuperating the militants camouflaged as common citizens in neighborhoods while also imposing the restriction over the propagation of disdain discourse and speeches. The last is of more criticalness since it represented an interior challenge of sectarianism. Consequently, this methodology not just prompted the capture of assailants at the enormous scope but also managed in constraining the sectarian outfits while limiting their movements.

**b) Enhancing the Capabilities of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies**

Security action at the metropolitan territories, in particular at the domestic neighborhoods, requires meticulous data on their features, structures and residents along with the swift mobility. Military in this sense isn't prepared to direct strikes in such topography. For that, civilian agencies like rangers and police are handed over the task. Operation Rad ul Fasaad empowered the coordinated effort between the military and the law enforcement security agencies and accordingly, ended up being indispensable in the up-gradation of police in the country. Not just this, the foundation of new subunits like Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) likewise carried the necessary capacities with itself to engage in the dreadful combats locally. The sharing of the burden, ultimately, brought about the viability of the operation and effectiveness in curbing the despicable elements. Furthermore, it additionally assisted the police in nurturing its operational abilities through reinvigorating its tactical approaches which were generally deemed as inadequate and reductant. It additionally provided the police with the advanced weaponry, thus, strengthening its capability.

**(ii) Reforms for Religious Seminaries (Madrassahs)**

Madrassahs have persisted to be the significant institutions from which the fanatic ideas have been engendered. While initially established to counter the Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan, the Saudi-CIA sponsored foundations assumed a definitive part in battling the Soviets through their Jihadi Ideology.<sup>24</sup> Notwithstanding, this thinking backfired as the Madrassahs were generally left all alone with no obstruction of the public authority in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Resultantly, the substance created by the Madrassahs stayed unchecked

and gave them the space to draw into the general public,<sup>25</sup> hence, propagating their militant ideology. Because of their solid binds with the general public, they figured out how to dodge any obstruction made in order to bring them under the state's supervision. Besides, the state was additionally oblivious in handling such components as the subjects of Madrassahs were the common citizens, mostly malnourished, hence, the prime targets of religious manipulation. To counter such dangers, Madrassah changes were unavoidable. Despite the fact that they are yet to be executed so far still such changes are essential in the following manners.

**a) Revising and Modernizing the Literature**

By pressing upon Madrassah changes, the state of Pakistan would have the opportunity to partake in the administrative and supervisory activities of Madrassah. Through this, the objectionable literature would be revised. Such a measure would be helpful in modernizing the Madrassahs with the ultimate objective of benefitting the students and could empower them in communicating with the general public and participating in the communal affairs by and large.<sup>26</sup> The correspondence would be their acknowledgment inside the mainstream societal culture and would assist in alleviating the sense of alienation. This two way approach would be useful in lessening numerous false impressions. The bias against different belief systems could be limited which would in the long run prepare towards a pluralistic society.

**b) Madrassahs Education – Assimilation into Nationwide Education System**

For the previously mentioned strategy to be fruitful, it is significant that the prospectus should be provided by the state. The mainstreaming of the Madrassahs with the more extensive and instructive arrangement of the state would give the space of remodeling the discourse. Consequently, an appropriate procedure could be carried out which would help in improving the admittance criteria and assessments conducted and regularized by the state. The establishment of a board which could execute such strategy holds importance in this regard. Second would be the financing by the state. Like other educational boards, if Madrassah Board would be the beneficiary of State's subsidizing as well, it will allow the state to manage the Madrassahs in an adequate manner and raise their standards through the inclusive mechanism. This will likewise assist the state with taking solid measures against the unregistered Madrassahs and to eradicate the chance of the engendering of fanatic belief systems.

**c) Check and Balance on Foreign Funds**

The unchecked endowments of the Madrassahs have become the significant factor for the breeding ground of fanatic thinking inside the Madrassahs.<sup>27</sup> This has transformed Madrassahs into the fifth-columns for regional forces which is the significant reason for the radicalization within the society. As the local clerics and seminary students generally come from the retrogressive districts, the support provided by the proxy groups where satisfy their monetary requirements, in turn, makes them the instruments of the foreign states. Subsequently, if the state could ensure the monetary necessities of the Madrassahs by determining the financial plan for the proposed Madrassah Board, this will bring about the investigating of the assets, and along these lines, the unchecked sponsorship can be halted. This will likewise help the security organizations in investigating those components which fill in as the intermediary between the foreign powers and the Madrassahs and would upgrade the intelligence-based activities in countering the terrorism in both urban and rural districts.

**Conclusion**

Through analysing the previously mentioned factors and conditions, it is reasoned that the terror activities have been contained and controlled viably however, the post-operation features are also required to be adequately addressed. Above all else, there is an essential issue of relationship of extremism with sectarianism. It has to do with the issue of the scripts and hate speeches. Sectarianism is regularly intermingled with the terrorism despite having the different characteristics. Sectarianism is a social prodigy while the terrorism is a political reality having an end goal, either in the form of insurgency or the takeover of the state. To evaluate the terror activities in a comprehensive manner, it is essential to comprehend constantly these political thought processes behind such violent acts.

Also, Pakistan's danger perspicacity has moved from Eastern border towards the Western boundary. Pakistan and Afghanistan relations are vital in preventing the movement of dogmatic groups from across the border. Since Pakistan's creation, there has been an underlying issue of border dispute between the two nations. Durand Line issue has effectively been the source of friction which has been sabotaged by India through its influence inside Afghanistan. Border management is the prerequisite to improve Pak-Afghan relations which would be effective in containing the cross-border terrorism, since many terrorists found sanctuary inside Afghanistan. Further, the distorted relations between the civilian and military establishments and the extending rupture between the two sides

has made Pakistan internally fragile. Instead of creating the balance between the two sides, there has been consistent tussle of domination between the two organizations in security domain. There is a critical need of specifying the settlement based elaborative system and structure to counter the security threats. The policing should be left with the civilian government and it is compulsory for it to conceive a broader strategy in consensus with the security agencies.

In the time of hybrid warfare, the new grounds of fighting are being probed which incorporate the utilization of social media and cyber-space. On the internet, the endorsing tactic is dynamic as the hostile elements employ the anti-state tools through various platforms. Besides, the utilization of proxy groups to sabotage the internal environment of the country is the harsh reality. The apprehension of the Indian Spy, Kalboshan Jadhav, from Baluchistan redirects the consideration towards this reality that the adversarial forces are operating within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan by evolving their relations with the alienated communities. Nonetheless, the security situation is always sabotaged by exploiting the grievances of local disgruntled masses. The practical illustrations of it are the feelings of abhorrence shared by the people of FATA and Baluchistan.

Under such conditions, the disposal of violent elements or and to curb down their militancy are just the initial steps. The more intricate stage begins with the restoration and the development of the war-torn territory which could provide the prospects of better living to the effected communities. The financial hardship is the central reason for the violent conduct which can be countered by connecting the underdeveloped areas with the urbanized centres. The amalgamation of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was the practical move towards it while the economic activities generated by the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) must be aimed at improving the economic situation of Baluchistan on the priority basis. The security of Baluchistan cannot be stabilized without the incorporation of economic incentives along with the military hardware

Conclusively, it is evident that the current wave of extremism traces its linkages with the strategic miscalculations committed in the past. Today, in the ever-changing geopolitical situation, there is a dire need for Pakistan to determine its foreign aspirations in a cautious way. Pakistan's obsession to align itself with US has backfired tremendously. The goals of the US are determined in a global fashion to reinstate its image of the hegemon. On the contrary, being a regional power having a crippling economy, Pakistan must focus in developing its strategic ties with the friendly neighbouring states. The shift of Pakistan from US to China has triumphant. As the geostrategic significance of Pakistan is projected to

increase through the operationalization of the Gawadar Port, Pakistan must also focus on strengthening its relations with Russia as well. Ultimately, by re-examining its strategy both internally and externally, and formulating a strategic matrix, Pakistan is expected to gain the positive outcomes from its extensive campaign against the terrorism.

## Footnotes

### Political Insights of Mawlana Mawdudi, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, and Javed Ghamidi and their Relevance amid Current Political Crisis: A Comparative Study

\*Dr. Tauseef Ahmed Parray is Assistant Professor Islamic Studies, Government Degree College for Women Pulwama—192301, (*Higher Education Department*), Jammu & Kashmir, INDIA.

<sup>1</sup> Martin Kramer, ed., *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997); Peter R. Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006); Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance* (Cambridge, UK & Malden, USA: Polity Press, 2012); Tauseef Ahmad Parray, “Recent Scholarship on ‘Islamism’ Discourse: An Evaluation and Assessment”, *Analisa: Journal of Social Science & Religion* 1, no. 1 (2016): 1-17; Mehdi Mozaffari, *Islamism: A New Totalitarianism* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2017)

<sup>2</sup> Maidul Islam, *Limits of Islamism Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 2-3

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 6

<sup>4</sup> Peter Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed. (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2020 [2014]), i

<sup>5</sup> John L. Espoito, *Islam—The Straight Path*, 5<sup>th</sup> Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 194

<sup>6</sup> Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, i, 86

<sup>7</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, “The Paradox of Political Islam”, in *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*, ed., Shahram Akbarzadeh (New York: Routledge, 2012): 1-8, 1

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 8

<sup>9</sup> Tauseef Ahmad Parray, “Insights from Mawdudi, Ghannouchi, and Ghamidi: On Building a Theodemocratic, Reconciliatory ‘Counter Narrative’ to Political ‘crISIS’”, *Greater Kashmir*, February 3, 2019, 9; Idem., “Ghannouchi’s Reconciliatory Approach”, *Greater Kashmir*, February 14, 2019, 7; Idem., “And Finally Ghamidi”, *Greater Kashmir*, February 21, 2019, 7

<sup>10</sup> Mahmood Ur Rashid, “Emerging crISIS in Kashmir”, *Greater Kashmir*, July 14, 2018, 9; Idem., “In defence of ISIS”, *Greater Kashmir*, January 5, 2019, 6

<sup>11</sup> Rashid, “In defence of ISIS”, 6

<sup>12</sup> Rozzane L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4

<sup>13</sup> Roxxane Euben, “Fundamentalism”, in *Islamic Political Thought: An Introduction*, ed., Gerhard Bowering (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015): 48-67, 55

<sup>14</sup> Kamran Bokhari and Farid Sensai, *Political Islam in the Age of Democratization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 19

<sup>15</sup> Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 22

<sup>16</sup> Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 193

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, xi

<sup>18</sup> Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 74

<sup>19</sup> Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, 45

<sup>20</sup> Bassam Tibi, “Religious Extremism or Religionization of Politics? The Ideological Foundations of Political Islam”, in *Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses*, eds., Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar (Oxon, New York, and Canada: Routledge, 2008): 11-37, 12, 14, 30

<sup>21</sup> Islam, *Limits of Islamism*, 2-3

<sup>22</sup> Euben and Zaman, *Princeton Readings*, 4, fn. 2

<sup>23</sup> Bokhari and Sensai, *Political Islam*, 20-22

- <sup>24</sup> Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, xi
- <sup>25</sup> Tibi, "Religious Extremism or Religionization of Politics", 24
- <sup>26</sup> Bokhari and Senzai, *Political Islam*, 19
- <sup>27</sup> Strindberg and Wärn, *Islamism*, 205-6
- <sup>28</sup> Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism*, xxii, xxv
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., 89, 177, 180, 181
- <sup>30</sup> Matthew Cleary and Rebecca Glazier, "Contemporary Islamism: Trajectory of a Master Frame", *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* [now *American Journal of Islam and Society*] 24, no. 2 (2007): 1-21, 2-3
- <sup>31</sup> Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed., John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 99-133; Masudul Hasan, *Sayyid Abul A'ala Mawdudi and His Thought*, 2 vols. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984); Khurshid Ahmad, ed., *Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Sayyid Abul A'ala Mawdudi* (Leicestershire: Islamic Foundation, 1979); Idem., ed., *Mawdudi: An Introduction to His Life and Thought* (Leicestershire: Islamic Foundation, 1979); Seyyed Vali Raza Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Idem., *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Idem., "Mawdudi, Sayyid Abu Al-Ala", in *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Islam and Politics*, 2 vols., ed., Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014): II: 43-47; Roy Jackson, *Fifty key Figures in Islam* (London: Routledge, 2006); Idem., *Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic State* (Oxon, New York, and Canada: Routledge, 2011)
- <sup>32</sup> Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", 99
- <sup>33</sup> Jackson, *Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam*, 2
- <sup>34</sup> Joshua T. White and Niloufer Siddiqui, "Mawlana Mawdudi", in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, eds., John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 144-155, 144
- <sup>35</sup> Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991); Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (trans.) Carol Volk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); John L. Esposito, ed., *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Akbarzadeh, ed., *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*
- <sup>36</sup> Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State": 99-133; Nasr, *The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution*; Idem., *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*; Zeenat Kausar, "Mawdudi on Democracy: A Critical Appreciation", *The Islamic Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 301-33; Jackson, *Fifty key Figures in Islam*; Idem., *Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam*; Asma Afsaruddin, "Mawdudi's 'Theo-Democracy': How Islamic Is It Really?", *Oriente Moderno* 87, no. 2 (2007): 301-325; Idem., "Theologizing about Democracy: A Critical Appraisal of Mawdudi's Thought", in *Islam, the State, and the Political Authority: Medieval Issues and Modern Concerns*, ed., Asma Afsaruddin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 131-154; Irfan Ahmad, *Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of the Jamaat-e-Islami in India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Idem., "Islam and Politics in South Asia", in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, eds., John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 324-39; White and Siddiqui, "Mawlana Mawdudi", 144-155; Jan-Peter Hartung, *A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam* (London: Hurst and Co. 2020 [2013])
- <sup>37</sup> Nadeem F. Paracha, "Abul Ala Mawdudi: An Existentialist history", *Dawn*, January 1, 2015, [www.dawn.com/news/1154419](http://www.dawn.com/news/1154419)
- <sup>38</sup> Syed Abu Ala Mawdudi, *Islamic Way of Life*, (trans.) Khurshid Ahmad (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1967), 40
- <sup>39</sup> Syed Abu Ala Mawdudi, "Political Theory in Islam", in *Islam: Its Meaning and Message*, ed., Khurshid Ahmad (New Delhi, Ambika publications, on behalf of Islamic Council of Europe, London, 1976): 147-171, 159-60
- <sup>40</sup> Syed Abu Ala Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, (trans. and ed.,) Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1960); Idem., *Islami Riyasat* [Islamic State] (New Delhi: Islamic Book Foundation, 1991)
- <sup>41</sup> Mawdudi, "Political Theory in Islam"; Idem., *Islami Riyasat*
- <sup>42</sup> Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, 139-40; Idem., *Islami Riyasat*, 129-30
- <sup>43</sup> John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 156

- Munawar Haque, "Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi's Views on Ijtihad and their Relevance to the Contemporary Muslim Society", *Journal of Islam in Asia* 6, no. 2 (2010): 123-151; Dr Israr Ahmad, "The Constitutional and Legislative Framework of the System of Khilafah in Modern Times", in *Khilafah in Pakistan: What, Why and How*, compiled by Shoba Samo Basr (Lahore, Pakistan: Markazi Anjuman Khuddam-ul-Qur'an, 2006 [2001])
- <sup>44</sup> Mawdudi, *Islamic Way of Life*, 42-43
- <sup>45</sup> John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26
- <sup>46</sup> Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", 118; Afsaruddin, "Mawdudi's 'Theo-Democracy'", 302; Jackson, *Fifty Key Figures*, 195; Idem., *Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam*, 4; Hartung, *A System of Life*, 109
- <sup>47</sup> John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): Chapter 9, "Rashid al-Ghannouchi: Activist in Exile", 91-117, 117
- <sup>48</sup> Azzam Tamimi, *Rachid al-Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Mohammad Dawood Sofi, *Rashid al-Ghannouchi: A Key Muslim Thinker of the 21st Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018)
- <sup>49</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, 91-117
- <sup>50</sup> Azzam Tamimi, "Rashid al-Ghannouchi", in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, eds., John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 212-221
- <sup>51</sup> Sofi, *Rashid al-Ghannouchi*, 82
- <sup>52</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, 113
- <sup>53</sup> Tamimi, *Rachid al-Ghannouchi*, vi
- <sup>54</sup> Rashid Al-Ghannouchi, *Al-Hurriyya al-Amma Al-Hurriyya al-Amma fi al-Dawla al-Islamiyyah [Civil Liberties in Islamic State]* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahdah al-'Arabiyyah, 1993), 77; Sofi, *Rashid al-Ghannouchi*, 77
- <sup>55</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, 113-14
- <sup>56</sup> Tamimi, *Rachid al-Ghannouchi*, 99; Azzam Tamimi, "Islam and Democracy from Tahtawi to Ghannouchi", *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 2 (2007): 39-58
- <sup>57</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, 114
- <sup>58</sup> Ghannouchi, *Al-Hurriyya*, 108; Sofi, *Rashid al-Ghannouchi*, 85
- <sup>59</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, 114
- <sup>60</sup> Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, 114
- <sup>61</sup> Rashid al-Ghannouchi, "Islam and Freedom Can Be Friends", *The Observer* (London), January 19, 1992, 18; Tamimi, *Rachid al-Ghannouchi*, 89-90
- Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, 114
- <sup>62</sup> Robin B. Wright, "Two Visions of Reformation", in *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East*, eds., Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003): 220-31, 230
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 229
- <sup>64</sup> Rashid al-Ghannouchi, "Self-Criticism and Reconsideration", *Palestine Times*, Issue 94, 1999; Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, 61; Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, 114
- <sup>65</sup> Uriya Shavit, "Is Shura a Muslim Form of Democracy? Roots and Systemization of a Polemic", *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 3 (2010): 349-74, 356
- <sup>66</sup> Tamimi, *Rachid al-Ghannouchi*, 200
- <sup>67</sup> Sofi, *Rashid al-Ghannouchi*, 110
- <sup>68</sup> Sofi, *Rashid al-Ghannouchi*, 110
- <sup>69</sup> Tamimi, "Rashid al-Ghannouchi", 220
- <sup>70</sup> Mumtaz Ahmad, "Media-Based Preachers and the Creation of New Muslim Publics in Pakistan", in *Who Speaks for Islam? Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia*, eds., Mumtaz Ahmad et al., NBR Special Report No. 22 (Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010): 1-27, 4; Samina Yasmeen, "Democracy for Muslims: Javed Ahmed Ghamidi", in *Muslim Secular Democracy: Voices from Within*, ed., Lily Zubaidah Rahim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 93-112, 93

- <sup>71</sup> Ahmad, “Media-Based Preachers”; Riffat Hassan, “Islamic Modernist and Reformist Discourse in South Asia” in *Reformist Voices of Islam—Mediating Islam and Modernity*, ed., Shireen T. Hunter (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009): 159-186; Ammar Anwer, “From Mawdudi to Ghamidi: The legacy of Political Islam”, *The Express Tribune*, December 20, 2020, [www.tribune.com/pk/article/97234/from-mawdudi-to-ghamidi-the-legacy-of-political-islam](http://www.tribune.com/pk/article/97234/from-mawdudi-to-ghamidi-the-legacy-of-political-islam)
- <sup>72</sup> Husnul Amin, “Post-Islamist Intellectual Trends in Pakistan: Javed Ahmad Ghamidi and His Discourse on Islam and Democracy”, *Islamic Studies* 51, no. 2 (2012): 169-92
- <sup>73</sup> Yasmeen, “Democracy for Muslims”, 104
- <sup>74</sup> Ahmad, “Media-Based Preachers”
- <sup>75</sup> Amin, “Post-Islamist Intellectual Trends in Pakistan”, 186
- <sup>76</sup> Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, “Islam and the Taliban”, (trans.) Asif Iftikhar, *Renaissance—A Monthly Islamic Journal* 19, 6 (June 2009), <http://www.monthly-renaissance.com/issue/content.aspx?id=1158>
- <sup>77</sup> Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, *Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction*. English rendering of *Meezan* by Shehzad Saleem, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (Lahore: Al-Mawrid Foundation of Islamic Research and Education, 2009); Idem., *Burhan* (Lahore: Al-Mawrid, 2009); Idem., “Their System is based on their Consultation”, in *Selected Essays of Javed Ahmad Ghamidi*, ed., Dr Shehzad Saleem (Lahore: Al-Mawrid, 2015): 183-212; Idem., “The Political Shari’ah of Islam”, (trans.) Shehzad Saleem, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Lahore: Al-Mawrid Foundation of Islamic Research and Education, 2009): 483-497; Idem., *Al-Bayan—An Annotated Qur’an Translation*, 5 vols. (trans.) Dr Shehzad Saleem (Lahore: Al-Mawrid, 2017)
- <sup>78</sup> Ghamidi, “Islam and the Taliban”
- <sup>79</sup> Ghamidi, “The Political Shari’ah of Islam”, 462
- <sup>80</sup> Syed Abu Ala Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding the Qur’an* (trans.) Zafar Ishaq Ansari and A. R. Kidwai (New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers, 2003), IV: 509-10
- <sup>81</sup> Amin, “Post-Islamist Intellectual Trends in Pakistan”, 188
- <sup>82</sup> Dr Shehzad Saleem, “The Political System of Pakistan: Points to Ponder” [Adapted from Ghamidi’s ‘*Burhan*’], *Renaissance*, <http://www.monthly-renaissance.com/issue/content.aspx?id=467>; Amin, “Post-Islamist Intellectual Trends in Pakistan”, 188
- <sup>83</sup> Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, “Islam and the Political System in Our Society”, *Studying-Islam*, December 16, 2002, <http://www.studying-islam.org/articletext.aspx?id=692>
- <sup>84</sup> Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, “Is Democracy Compatible with Islam?”, (transcribed and translated by Shakil Ahmad), [www.ghamidi.tv/article/is-democracy-compatible-with-islam-448](http://www.ghamidi.tv/article/is-democracy-compatible-with-islam-448)
- <sup>85</sup> Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, “Ghamidi—Nizam e Jamhooriyat (democracy)”, video, 02:25, 23 December, 2008, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZmAY\\_fq7m8c](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZmAY_fq7m8c); Ghamidi, “Is Democracy Compatible with Islam?”
- <sup>86</sup> Saleem, “The Political System of Pakistan”, 2
- <sup>87</sup> Anwer, “From Mawdudi to Ghamidi”
- <sup>88</sup> Muhammad Asad, *Principles of State and Government in Islam* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), 18-19, 21
- <sup>89</sup> Zeenat Kausar, “Mawdudi on Democracy”, 324
- <sup>90</sup> Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religions Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan/ Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986 [1934]); Aziz Ahmad, *An Intellectual History of Islam in India* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969); John L. Esposito, “Muhammad Iqbal and the Islamic State”, in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed., John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983): 175-190; Tauseef Ahmad Parray, *Mediating Islam and Modernity: Sir Sayyid, Iqbal, and Azad* (New Delhi: Viva Books Pvt. Ltd., 2019), 44-80
- <sup>91</sup> Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, *Islami Jamhuriyah* [Islamic Democracy] (Lahore: Al Hilal Book Agency, 1956); Ahmad, *An Intellectual History*; Parray, *Mediating Islam and Modernity*, 81-104

## Emergence of Bengali Nationalist Opposition to West Pakistan, 1947-1954: An Appraisal

\*Muhammad Nisar is Lecturer at Army Bruns Hall College Abbotabad, Pakistan.

<sup>1</sup>Here the term ruling elite refers to the Muslim League and its governments and its dominant agencies both at the Centre and East Bengal.

<sup>2</sup>In this article the word “Bengali” refers in relation to East Bengal.

<sup>3</sup>Abul Mansur Ahmad’s speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 16 January 1956, in *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, 1816.

<sup>4</sup>Lawrence Ziring, *Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad: an Interpretive Study* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 4.

<sup>5</sup>Ataur Rahman Khan’s speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 19 March, 1956, in, *The Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates*, 214.

<sup>6</sup>G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1974), 5.

<sup>7</sup>Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968), 276.

<sup>8</sup>Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, 7.

<sup>9</sup>K.B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 67.

<sup>10</sup>Ziring, *Bangladesh*, 2.

<sup>11</sup>Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 20.

<sup>12</sup>Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, 5.

<sup>13</sup>Cited in, Shaikh Mujibur Rahman, *The Unfinished Memoirs* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 144.

<sup>14</sup>Rahman, *The Unfinished Memoirs*, 144. See also, Talukdar, ed., *Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy*, 40.

<sup>15</sup>Talukdar, ed., *Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy*, 40.

<sup>16</sup>Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958, Vol. I*, 63-64.

<sup>17</sup>After the creation of Pakistan, elections were held for the leadership of East Bengal Muslim League in which Khawaja Nazimuddin group who had support from the centre emerged as the dominant group and he himself became the chief minister of East Bengal, while Suhrawardy group was side-lined.

<sup>18</sup>Talukdar, ed., *Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy*, 35.

<sup>19</sup>Talukdar, ed., *Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy*, 36.

<sup>20</sup>Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan*, 66. According to Mujib Due to its popularity in the masses, and its role in the united independent Bengal scheme, Suhrawardy group earned highly sceptic reputation in the lines of ML, which led to his exclusion from its council. Rahman, *The Unfinished Memoirs*, 96-97.

<sup>21</sup>Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958, Vol. I*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), 126.

<sup>22</sup>Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 2000), 79.

<sup>23</sup>K. K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), 15.

<sup>24</sup>Badruddin Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh: Class Struggle in East Pakistan (1947-1958)* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 93-98. See also. M. Bhaskaran Nair, *Politics in Bangladesh: A Study of Awami League, 1949- 1958* (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1990), 57.

<sup>25</sup>Hasan Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 17.

<sup>26</sup>Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, *Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1982), 23.

<sup>27</sup>Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 7.

<sup>28</sup>Dhirendra Nath Dutta’s speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on, 25 February 1948, in the *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 2, 16.

<sup>29</sup>Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 21.

- <sup>30</sup>Dhirendra Nath Dutta's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on February 25 1948, in the *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 2, 15.
- <sup>31</sup>Dhirendra Nath Dutta's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on February 25 1948, in the *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 2, 16.
- <sup>32</sup>Prem Hari Barma's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on February 25, 1948, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 2, 16.
- <sup>33</sup>Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan India and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 9
- <sup>34</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 25 February 1948, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 2, 17.
- <sup>35</sup>Bhupendra Kumar Dutta's objection to Liaquat Ali Khan remarks in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 25 February 1948, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 2, 18.
- <sup>36</sup>Begum Ikramullah's Maiden Speech and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan's Reply, 24<sup>th</sup> February 1948, Appendix 1, in Shista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, *From Purdah to Parliament* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 228. See also, Raj Kumar Chakraverty's speech in the Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan, 24 February 1948, in *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, No. 2, 5-6.
- <sup>37</sup>*Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates*, 229-230.
- <sup>38</sup>Dil and Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 82.
- <sup>39</sup>Memorandum on the Political Scene in East Bengal, written by Charles H. Derry American Consul-General in Pakistan to George Marshall the Secretary of State of US, in Roedad Khan, *The British Papers: Secret and Confidential India, Pakistan, Bangladesh Documents 1958-1969* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 224.
- <sup>40</sup>Sufia. M. Uddin, *Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity and Language in an Islamic Nation* (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 2006), 120-1.
- <sup>41</sup>Uddin, *Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity and Language in an Islamic Nation*, 119.
- <sup>42</sup>It is interesting to know that Bengali political leaders usually referred all the West Pakistani as Punjabis. One of the reasons was that Punjabi were in majority in West Pakistan and were in dominant position. In this way whenever Bengali leaders strived for mobilizing public opinion, they presented Punjabis as symbol of exploitation.
- <sup>43</sup>Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 26.
- <sup>44</sup>Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 27.
- <sup>45</sup>Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 26.
- <sup>46</sup>Draft of the Address by M. A. Jinnah to the Convocation at Dacca University on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1948, in Zaidi (ed.), *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 274.
- <sup>47</sup>Farooq Ahmad Dar, *Jinnah's Pakistan: Formation and Challenges of a State* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 213. According to Mujibur Rahman who was present at the Race Course ground Convocation Centre, Jinnah had to face opposition from some of the students. In the words of Mujib "some four or five hundred students sitting in one corner....Many of us (students) raised our hands in protest and shouted No No No". Rahman, *The Unfinished Memoirs*, 104.
- <sup>48</sup>Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, 32-33.
- <sup>49</sup>Rahman, *The Unfinished Memoirs*, 93.
- <sup>50</sup>Draft of the Address by M. A. Jinnah to the Convocation at Dacca University, 24 March 1948, in Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 274.
- <sup>51</sup>When in 1948, Jinnah visited East Bengal he received a letter from Syed Karimuddin, the principle of Sirajganj College. In letter Karimuddin wrote that the students, who were demonstrating and observing protest for Bengali Language, actually were being exploited by the separatist forces for their nefarious designs. He made some useful suggestion to Jinnah regarding the political situation of the province. Syed Karimuddin to M. A. Jinnah, 20<sup>th</sup> March 1948, in Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 218.
- <sup>52</sup>Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 218.
- <sup>53</sup>Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 219.
- <sup>54</sup>Memorandum by Joint State Language Committee of Action to Jinnah, 24<sup>th</sup> March 1948, Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 277.
- <sup>55</sup>Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 278. See also, Rahman, *The Unfinished Memoirs*, 167.
- <sup>56</sup>Badruddin Ahmad's Booklet entitled *East Bengal's Immediate Danger* to Jinnah, in Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 209.
- <sup>57</sup>Jinnah's speech at a public meeting at Dacca, 21 March 1948, in Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 235.

<sup>58</sup>Zaidi ed., *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. VII, 232-233.

<sup>59</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 2 March 1948, in *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, Vol. I, No, 8, 141.

<sup>60</sup>Liaquat Ali Khan's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 6 March 1948, in *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, Vol. I, No, 8, 129.

<sup>61</sup>Jahan, *Pakistan*, 41.

<sup>62</sup>Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 21.

<sup>63</sup>Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan* 25.

<sup>64</sup>Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, 31-32.

<sup>65</sup>Zaring, *Bangladesh*, 15.

<sup>66</sup>Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Internal Strife and External Intervention* (Lahore: Progressive publishers, 1981), 77. The exponent of Urdu in West Pakistan labelled Bengali as being saturated with the Hindu culture and unsuitable for national language in Pakistan. G. W. Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan* (London: Longman, 1969), 125.

<sup>67</sup>Uddin, *Constructing Bangladesh*, 125, see also. Dil and Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 85.

<sup>68</sup>Salahuddin Ahmed, *Bangladesh: Past and present* (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, 2004), 136.

<sup>69</sup>Dil and Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 82,

<sup>70</sup>Jahan, *Pakistan*, 43.

<sup>71</sup>Nair, *Politics in Bangladesh*, 56.

<sup>72</sup>Rahman, *The Unfinished Memoirs*, 103-104.

<sup>73</sup>Dil and Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 95.

---

## China's Public Diplomacy towards Pakistan in Post CPEC Era

\* Maryam Zohra is a Researcher pursuing her degree in M Phil International Relations at School of Politics & IR , Quaid I Azam University Islamabad.

<sup>1</sup> J. Cull, Nicholas. "Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past." *USC Center on the Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School University of Southern California*, 2009, 12-14.

<sup>2</sup> Gregory, Bruce. "Public Diplomacy and National Security: Lessons from U.S. Experience." *Public Diplomacy Alumni Association*, August 15, 2008.

<sup>3</sup> J. Cull, Nicholas. "'Public Diplomacy' Before Gullion: The evolution of a phrase." *USC University of South California*, April 18, 2006.

<sup>4</sup> J. Cull, Nicholas. "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 616, March 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Tago, Atsushi. "Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, July 2017.

<sup>6</sup> Kitano, Mitsuru. "China's Foreign Strategy." *Asia Pacific Review* 18, no.2 (Jan 01, 2011): 41-45.

<sup>7</sup> Brown, Kerry. *What does China want? China's World*. London: IB Tauris, 2017.

<sup>8</sup> Hudda, Nabil. "Interpreting the Rise of China: Realist and Liberalist Perspectives." *E-International Relations*, April 2015.

<sup>9</sup> "SIPRI Yearbook 2013." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, [www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013](http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013).

<sup>10</sup> Devoss, David. "Ping Pong Diplomacy." *Smithsonian Magazine*, April 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Pacher, Andreas. "China's Panda Diplomacy." *The Diplomat*, November 02, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinas-panda-diplomacy/>

<sup>12</sup> Xiaoqing He, Rowena. "China continues to deny Tiananmen, but we won't let the world forget." *The Guardian*, June 3, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/03/china-deny-tiananmen-square>.

<sup>13</sup> Tao, Xie. "China's Soft Power Obsession." *The Diplomat*, April 14, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-soft-power-obsession/>

<sup>14</sup> Andani, Ali Salman. "Under the guise of friendship, China is looting Pakistan," *Modern Diplomacy*, October 25, 2018, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/10/25/under-the-guise-of-friendship-china-is-looting-pakistan/>.

<sup>15</sup> Engin, Furkan. "Public Diplomacy of People's republic of China." *Istanbul Kultur University*, 2014.

<sup>16</sup> Hashmi, Syeda Dhanak. "The nature of contemporary Sino-Pakistani relations." *Modern Diplomacy*, December 18, 2018, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/12/18/the-nature-of-contemporary-sino-pakistani-relations/>.

<sup>17</sup> Malik, Mansoor. "Bureaucratic inefficiency troubles Pakistani students in China." *Dawn news*, March 02, 2017.

<sup>18</sup> Bacha, Umar. "[More students in Pakistan are learning Chinese today than ever before.](#)" *Dawn News*, May 22, 2017.

### **Politics of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan; A Comparative Study of Jamat-e-Islami and Pakistan-Tehreek-e-Insaaf**

**\*Mohisn Shahid is a Researcher with M Phil degree in American Studies.**

<sup>1</sup> Madiha Afzal, 'On Pakistani Anti-Americanism,' *Express Tribune*, November 14, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Nadeem F. Paracha, 'Anti Americanism in Pakistan; A brief history,' *Dawn*, November 14, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Nye, 'The decline of America's Soft Power,' *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Fouad Ajami. 'The Falseness of Anti-Americanism,' *Foreign Policy*, October 30, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Lisa Blaydes, Drew A Linzer, "Elite Competition, Religiosity and Anti-Americanism in Islamic World," *American Political Science Review Journal*, (2012): 1-19.

<sup>6</sup> Richard Crockatt refers to Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis 'It is my hypothesis,' he wrote, 'that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.'

<sup>7</sup> John L. Esposito, 'It's the Policy, Stupid,' *Harvard International Review*. May 2, 2007

<sup>8</sup> Saeed, Ahsan, 'Twitter Landscape of Pakistan – First Edition,' *Twittistaan*, September 12 2013.

<sup>9</sup> Lisa Blaydes, Drew A. "Linzer, Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World".

<sup>10</sup> Waqt News, July 15, 2015

<sup>11</sup> Aaj News, November 3, 2012.

<sup>12</sup> 'Lahore shooting case: Jamaat leader wants American hanged' *The Nation*, February 3, 2011.

<sup>13</sup> 'JI Chief charges Government for Conspiracy against its Citizens', *Express Tribune*, March 19, 2011.

<sup>14</sup> Radio Free Europe, May 4, 2011

<sup>15</sup> The Constitution of PTI also pledges to pursue an independent foreign policy promoting national interest with particular emphasis on relations with the regional countries and the Muslim Ummah. (See details on Insaaf.com.pk)

<sup>16</sup> 'Americans join Imran Khan's march against US drone warfare in Pakistan'. *The Guardian*, October 6, 2012.

<sup>17</sup> 'PTI sit-in against drone attack today', *The Express Tribune*, April 21, 2011.

<sup>18</sup> ibid

<sup>19</sup> ibid

<sup>20</sup> Domestic electronic media extensively covered the protests throughout Pakistan. The mushroomed growth of domestic TV channels have now make it easy for state agencies, religious organizations and political parties to disseminate the public sentiment within a short span of time.

<sup>21</sup> 'Imran Khan Warns Government over Ramond Davis', *Express Tribune*, February 15, 2011.

<sup>22</sup> Peter Osborne, 'Imran Khan says Pakistan was 'humiliated' over Osama bin Laden, and his killing was 'cold-blooded murder' *Guardian*, May 8, 2011

<sup>23</sup> Peter Osborne, 'Imran Khan says Pakistan was 'humiliated' over Osama bin Laden, and his killing was 'cold-blooded murder'

<sup>24</sup> 'PTI demands resignation of PM and President', *Express Tribune*, May 8, 2011.

<sup>25</sup> Farhan Bukhari, 'Pakistan blasts "unprovoked" NATO attacks', *CBS News*, November 26, 2011.

<sup>26</sup> 'PTI Women Wing Protests against Salala Incident', *Pakistan Today*, November 28, 2011.

<sup>27</sup> The social media campaign ask the users to change their facebook pictures with E-Rally image and upload recorded messages with the title E-Protest against NATO attack.

<sup>28</sup> Fareeha Khalid, 'Imran Khan condemns NATO attack on Pakistan check post', *The News Tribe*, November 26, 2011.

<sup>29</sup> Amir Latif, 'Pakistan moves to reopen NATO supply lines, but US ties remain frayed', *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 16, 2012

<sup>30</sup> Stuart Jeffries, 'Imran Khan: America is destroying Pakistan. We're using our army to kill our people with their money', *The Guardian*, September 18, 2011.

<sup>31</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)

<sup>32</sup> The PML-N government, like every new government in Pakistan, could not afford a harsh stance against the U.S. as the governments depend on the IMF, World Bank and American Aid to make the budget.

<sup>33</sup> Simon Robinson, 'Religious defeat in Pakistan's election', *Time*, February 29, 2008.

<sup>34</sup> The data is collected from the official website of National Assembly of Pakistan.

<sup>35</sup> Issam Ahmad, 'How Pakistan's Imran Khan taps Anti-Americanism to fuel political rise', *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 28, 2011.

<sup>36</sup> Madiha Afzal, 'On Pakistani anti-Americanism', *Brookings Institute*, November 19, 2013.

<sup>37</sup> Lisa Blaydes, Drew. A. Linzer "Elite competition, religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in Islamic World."

## **Impact of Power Asymmetry on India-Pakistan Conflict Resolution: Critical Appraisal of India's policies under Modi's Tenure**

**\*Saifullah Malik is a Researcher pursuing his M Phil degree at School of Politics & IR, Quaid I Azam University Islamabad.**

<sup>1</sup> Military conflicts in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Moonis Ahmer, "The unfinished agenda," *DAWN*, Aug.14,2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1499346>, accessed July 9, 2020.

<sup>3</sup> Lahore Declaration 1999, Composite Dialogue 2003-2008.

<sup>4</sup> Dipanjan Chaudhry, "India, US are natural partners on a range of issues: Trump administration," *The Economic Times*, July 12, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-are-natural-partners-on-a-range-of-issues-trump-administration/articleshow/59810606.cms?from=mdr>, accessed July 9, 2020.

<sup>5</sup> John Burton, "Theory of Conflict Resolution", *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 9, no. 3, 1986, pp 125-130.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review*, 50, 1954, 370-396.

<sup>8</sup> Kevin Avruch and Christopher Mitchell, ed., *Conflict Resolution and Human Needs Linking Theory and Practice* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 23.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.,41.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.,44.

<sup>11</sup> Burton, "Theory of Conflict Resolution", 125-130.

<sup>12</sup> Avruch and Mitchell, ed., *Conflict Resolution and Human Needs Linking Theory and Practice*, 50.

<sup>13</sup>Edward Azar, "Protracted international conflicts: Ten propositions," *Conflict: Readings in management and resolution* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 145.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.,146

<sup>15</sup> Avruch and Mitchell, ed., *Conflict Resolution and Human Needs Linking Theory and Practice*, 50.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.,51

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.,51

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.,53

<sup>19</sup> Jacob Bercovitch, I. William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk, ed., *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (London: Sage Publications, 2009), 323-324.

<sup>20</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "The concept of power," *Behavioral science* 2, no. 3 (1957): 201-215.

<sup>21</sup> Thomas Hobbs, *Leviathan: Or, The Matter, Form and Power of Commonwealth: Ecclesiastical and Civil* (University Press, 1904).

<sup>22</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Knopf, 1967), pp 80-109.

<sup>23</sup> Frank Pfetsch and Alice Landau, "Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Negotiations," *International Negotiation*, 5, 2000, 28.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Hard power alludes to tangible aspects of power like military strength, whereas soft power refers to the esteem in which an actor is held, its ability to influence the cultural perceptions of others and international clout.

<sup>26</sup> Comparison of a few important economic and military indicators between Pakistan and India is given in Annex A.

<sup>27</sup> For example, Daniel Twomey talks about two social power properties that are commonly witnessed in social interactions; (1) dependency of party A on party B, which creates accepted influence on part A and; (2) availability of alternatives (A/A) whereby a higher value of A/A for party B increases its coercive influence on party A. Based on the combination of these two variables taken in congruence, Twomey has presented a model of Conflict Resolution that speaks of 'behavioural states' that actors in an organization depict. The model, if applied to transactional relationship between states (U.S and Pakistan, for instance) would postulate that in case of a conflict, owing to Pakistan's high dependency on U.S for military hardware, economic aid etc. and low A/A (the vice-versa holds true for U.S), it would be highly docile or submissive, whereas the U.S would be 'rebellious' or highly coercive willing to break off the transactional relationship at any time. In case of India and Pakistan, however, model is of little to no use.

Daniel Twomey, "The Effects of Power Properties on Conflict Resolution", *The Academy of Management Review* 3, no. 1, 1978, pp-144-150.

<sup>28</sup> For instance, McAuley, McGlynn and Tonge while assessing the conflict resolution in asymmetric situations taking Northern Ireland as a case study, have pointed towards causes like differential access to material resources, access to legal structures of the state and identifiable differences in resources available to parties as sources of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, in this case, governments of United Kingdom and Ireland played role of mediators.

James W. McAuley, Catherine McGlynn & Jon Tonge (2008), "Conflict resolution in asymmetric and symmetric situations: Northern Ireland as a case study," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways toward terrorism and genocide*, 1:1, 88-102.

<sup>29</sup> Christopher R. Mitchell, "Classifying conflicts: Asymmetry and resolution," *The annals of the American academy of political and social science* 518, no. 1 (1991): 23-38.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 23,24.

<sup>31</sup> Pruitt, G. D., and S. Z. Rubin, *Social Conflict Escalation and Settlement* (New York: Randow House ,1986).

<sup>32</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, "The merits of de-hyphenation: explaining US success in engaging India and Pakistan," *Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (2008): 21-42.

<sup>33</sup> Musawar Sandhu, "De-hyphenation; Dilemma of the U.S in dealing with Pakistan and India," *South Asian Journal*, May 15, 2019, <http://southasiajournal.net/de-hyphenation-dilemma-of-the-u-s-in-dealing-with-pakistan-and-india/>, accessed on July 4<sup>th</sup>, 2020.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>35</sup> Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, "The U.S-India Nuclear Deal," *Council on Foreign Relations*, Nov. 5, 2010, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-nuclear-deal>, accessed July 4, 2020.

<sup>36</sup> "U.S-India Relations 1947-2020", Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-india-relations>, accessed July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2020.

<sup>37</sup> Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.1, Jan-Feb 2000, pp 56.

<sup>38</sup> News Desk, "Indian aircraft violate LoC, scramble back after PAF's timely response," *The Dawn*, Feb 26, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1466038> (accessed July 15, 2019).

<sup>39</sup> News Desk, "Footage appears to show downed Indian jet," *BBC News*, Feb. 27, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-47384021/india-pakistan-footage-appears-to-show-downed-indian-jet> (accessed July 15, 2019).

<sup>40</sup> News Desk, "India-China clash: 20 troops killed in Ladakh fighting," *BBC News*, June 16,2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476>, accessed July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2020.

<sup>41</sup> Danish Hussain, "PM Imran reacts angrily to 'arrogant' Indian response to dialogue offer," *The Express Tribune*, Sept.22, 2018, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1809070/1-pm-imran-reacts-angrily-arrogant-indian-response-dialogue-offer>, accessed July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2020.

<sup>42</sup> News Desk, "Indian FM denies Modi asked Trump for U.S mediation on Kashmir," Aljazeera, July 23, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/indian-fm-denies-modi-asked-trump-mediation-kashmir-190723143616609.html>, accessed on July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2020.

<sup>43</sup> Dipandan Chaudhary, "Talks on Kashmir to be only with Pakistan: S Jaishankar to Mike Pompeo," *The Economic Times*, Aug.03,2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/any-discussion-on-kashmir-will-only-be-with-pakistan-india-on-trumps-mediation-offer/articleshow/70492495.cms?from=mdr>, accessed July 7,2020.

<sup>44</sup> News Desk, "Kashmir, Article 370 India's internal matter: Prasad," *The Economic Times*, Oct. 12, 2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/kashmir-a-370-indias-internal-matter-prasad/articleshow/71556582.cms>, accessed July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2020.

<sup>45</sup> News Desk, "Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters," *BBC News*, Aug. 6, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708>, accessed July 7, 2020.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "*Indian occupied Jammu & Kashmir remains under continuous inhuman lockdown for 10 months*," Islamabad, June 5, 2020, <http://mofa.gov.pk/indian-occupied-jammu-kashmir-remains-under-continuous-inhuman-lockdown-for-10-months/> accessed July 7, 2020.

<sup>48</sup> Akshay Deshmane, "Kashmir: Scrapping Article 370 "Unconstitutional", "Deceitful" Says Legal Expert A.G. Noorani," *Huffington Post*, Aug.5,2019, [https://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/kashmir-article-370-scrapping-constitutional-expert-reacts-noorani\\_in\\_5d47e58de4boaca341206135](https://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/kashmir-article-370-scrapping-constitutional-expert-reacts-noorani_in_5d47e58de4boaca341206135), accessed July 7, 2020.

<sup>49</sup> "Resolution of 21 April 1948", United Nations Security Council, S/726, April 21,1948, Open document, accessed on July 7, 2020.

<sup>50</sup> News Desk, "UN, US call for Pak-India dialogue to reduce tensions," DAWN, Oct 26, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1512971>, accessed July 7, 2020.

<sup>51</sup> Dr. Zafar Jaspal, "CD Agenda in 2011: Critical Appraisal", *South Asian Strategic Stability Institute*, February 2011.

<sup>52</sup> News Desk, "False flag operation by India imminent: Imran," DAWN, May 21, 2020, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1558659>, accessed July 09, 2020.

<sup>53</sup> Sudhi Ranjan Sen, "500 terrorists waiting at border, security agencies ready to retaliate: Army," *Hindustan Times*, July 3, 2020, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indian-security-agencies-on-full-alert-after-intel-warning-of-major-terror-strike/story-JY7iuhOsNsHWxdlSPid9XO.html>, accessed July 7,2020.

## Rise of China: A Transition in the World Order

\*Author 1: Alina Malik is a postgraduate Researcher at the University of Birmingham.

\*\*Author 2: Dr. Saima Kayani is Chairperson at Department of Defence & Diplomatic Studies, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi.

\*\*\*Author 3: Fatima Riffat is Lecturer at Department of History, Government College University Lahore.

<sup>1</sup> Henry Kissinger. "World order,". Penguin Books, 2015.

<sup>2</sup> Wolfgang Ischinger, "The World According to Kissinger." *Foreign Affairs*. April 19, 2018. Accessed April 19, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/2015-03-01/world-according-kissinger>.

<sup>3</sup> Darrell Castle, " The Peace Of Westphalia And The New World Order," *Constitution part*, n.d, <https://www.constitutionparty.com/the-peace-of-westphalia-and-the-new-world-order/>.(Accessed April 12,2018).

<sup>4</sup> Fareed Zakaria, "The decline of U.S. influence is the great global story of our age," *Washington Post*, December 28,2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-decline-of-us-influence-is-the-great-global-story-of-our-times/2017/12/28/>, (Accessed April 14,2018).

<sup>5</sup> Sasha Safonova, "Relevance of the Westphalian System to the Modern World," *Article Myriad*, January 15,2012, <http://www.articlemyriad.com/relevance-westphalian-system-modern-world-sasha-safonova/>, (Accessed April 17,2018).

<sup>6</sup> Christopher Layne, "The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana." *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (2018): 89-111.

- <sup>7</sup> Timothy Stanley And Alexander Lee, "It's Still Not the End of History," *The Atlantic*, September 01,2014, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/its-still-not-the-end-of-history-francis-fukuyama/379394/>, (Accessed April 20,2018).
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid
- <sup>9</sup> Lorenzo Marsili, "It's high time for a new, multipolar world order," *AL Jazeera*, June 16, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/high-time-multipolar-world-order-170614092938223.html>, (Accessed April 19,2018).
- \*A term coined by Graham Allison, is a notion that when a rising power challenges the established leader of the international order conflict often ensues.
- <sup>10</sup> Joseph S. Nye, "Will the Liberal Order Survive?" *Foreign Affairs*. April 19, 2018. Accessed April 19, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive>.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid
- <sup>12</sup> Nathan Gardels. "The Rise and Fall of America's Soft Power." *New Perspectives Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (2005): 6-19.
- <sup>13</sup> "US submits official withdrawal from Paris climate pact," *Al Jazeera*, August 05,2017. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/submits-official-withdrawal-paris-climate-pact-170804220428029.html>. (Accessed April 14,2018).
- <sup>14</sup> James M. Dorsey, "Towards A New World Order In Eurasia: The 21st Century's Great Game," *Huffington Post*, April 08,2017, [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/towards-a-new-world-order-in-eurasia-the-21st-centurys-us\\_58e87d34e4b00dd8e016ec20](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/towards-a-new-world-order-in-eurasia-the-21st-centurys-us_58e87d34e4b00dd8e016ec20), (Accessed April 18,2018).
- <sup>15</sup> Harry Cockburn, "China condemns Donald Trump's 'selfish isolationism,'" *The Independent*, December 20,2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/china-donald-trump-isolationism-xi-jinping-a8121166.html>, (Accessed April 14,2018).
- <sup>16</sup> Joseph S. Nye, "Donald Trump and the decline of US soft power," *Australian strategic policy institute*, February 12,2018, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/donald-trump-decline-us-soft-power/>, (Accessed April 27,2018).
- <sup>17</sup> Christopher Layne, "Is the United States in Decline?" *The American Conservative*, August 08,2017, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/is-the-united-states-in-decline/>, (Accessed April 10,2018).
- <sup>18</sup> Joseph S Nye, "The decline of America's soft power." In *Paradoxes of Power*, pp. 39-44. Routledge, 2015.
- <sup>19</sup> Cf. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, "The rise and fall of the Great Powers in the twenty-first century: China's rise and the fate of America's global position," *International Security* 40: 3, 2016, pp. 7–53.
- <sup>20</sup> Martin Jacques, "When China rules the world: the end of the western world and the birth of a new global order," New York: Penguin, 2012.
- <sup>21</sup> Alexander Whyte, "Interpreting the Rise of China," *E-International Relations Students*, February 13,2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/13/interpreting-the-rise-of-china/>, (Accessed April 27,2018).
- <sup>22</sup> Trine Flockhart, "The coming multi-order world." *Contemporary Security Policy* 37, no. 1 (2016): 3-30.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid
- <sup>24</sup> Dorothy-Grace Guerrero, "The Rise of China and Brics: A multipolar world in the making." *Focus on the Global South*. Recuperado el 13 (2013).
- <sup>25</sup> "Role of BRICS in world economy and International development," *New Development Bank Report*.2017
- <sup>26</sup> "The BRICS forum: The Evolving ole Of the BRICS in a changing world," *Global Diplomatic Forum*, April 20,2015, <http://www.gdforum.org/balkanssecurity-2-2/>, (Accessed April 19,2018).
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid.,4.
- <sup>28</sup> Kenneth Repose , "Brazil's Spending Power Now Lower Than China's," *Forbes*, August 28,2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/08/28/brazilians-spending-power-now-lower-than-the-chinese/#5eda03824615>, (Accessed April 18,2018).
- <sup>29</sup> Kenneth Rapoza , "Face It, China Totally Owns The BRICS," *Forbes*, September 1,2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/09/01/china-owns-the-brics/#3a0f86c178fo>, (Accessed April 19,2018)
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid
- <sup>31</sup> "India-China bilateral trade hits historic high of \$84.44 billion in 2017," *Times of India*, March 07,2018, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-china-bilateral-trade-hits-historic-high-of-84-44-billion-in-2017/articleshow/63202401.cms>, (Accessed April 27,2018).
- <sup>32</sup> Figures from The Observatory of Economic Complexity, International trade data, 2015.

- <sup>33</sup> Eleanor Albert. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization." Council on Foreign Relations, 14, (2015).
- <sup>34</sup> Rashid Alimov. "The role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in counteracting threats to peace and security." UN Chronicle 54, no. 3 (2017): 34-37.
- <sup>35</sup> 'Excerpts from Gorbachev's Speech', New York Times, 28 June 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/29/world/excerpts-from-gorbachev-speech.html>.
- <sup>36</sup> 'Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation', 24 July 2001, [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/2649\\_665393/t15771.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15771.shtml).
- <sup>37</sup> Thomas Ambrosio, "The architecture of alignment: The Russia–China relationship and international agreements." *Europe-Asia Studies* 69, no. 1 (2017): 110-156.
- <sup>38</sup> Tom Roseth, "Russia's energy relations with China: passing the strategic threshold?" *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 58, no. 1 (2017): 23-55.
- <sup>39</sup> "Strategic Survey, 2017: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics," *International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*, Routledge, 2017.
- <sup>40</sup> Dmitry Kulikov and Natalia Porokhova, "China No Longer Invests in Raw Materials – China's Foreign Direct Investment Analysis" *Analytical Credit Research Agency (ACRA)*, August 09, 2016, <https://www.acra-ratings.com/documents/56>, (Accessed April 26, 2018).
- <sup>41</sup> Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Combining the Construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Economic Belt of the Silk Road, May 08, 2015, <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/4971>, (Accessed April 26, 2018).
- <sup>42</sup> Euan McKirdy, "8 times Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution on Syria," *CNN*, April 13, 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/13/middleeast/russia-unsc-syria-resolutions/index.html>, (Accessed April 26, 2018).
- <sup>43</sup> Emma Graham-Harrison, Alec Luhn, Shaun Walker, Ami Sedghi and Mark Rice-Oxley "China and Russia: the world's new superpower axis?" *The Guardian*, July 07, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/07/china-russia-superpower-axis>, (Accessed April 27, 2018).
- <sup>44</sup> "Russia Supports China's Stance on South China Sea," *Sputnik*, September 05, 2016, <https://sputniknews.com/world/201609051044988523-russia-china-putin/> (Accessed April 27, 2018).
- <sup>45</sup> "Russia's Path Not Suitable for China", *Global Times*, March 22, 2014, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/850019.shtml>. (Accessed April 27, 2018)
- <sup>46</sup> Yves Heng Lim. "How (Dis)Satisfied is China? A power transition theory perspective." *Journal of Contemporary China*. Volume 24, (2014).
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid., 4.
- <sup>48</sup> Ulrich Speck, "The Crisis of Liberal Order," *The American Interest*, September 12, 2016, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/12/the-crisis-of-liberal-order/>, (Accessed June 04, 2018).
- <sup>49</sup> Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Naná de Graaff, "American grand strategy and corporate elite networks: the open door since the end of the Cold War," (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 116–17.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid
- <sup>51</sup> Robert W Cox "Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory." *Millennium* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-155.
- <sup>52</sup> Robert W. Cox with Michael G. Schechter, "The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization" London, Routledge, 2002.

---

## Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Efforts: Lessons Learnt

\*Author 1: Dr. Summar Iqbal Babar is Assistant Professor at School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid I Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan.

\*\*Author 2: Syed Fraz Hussain Naqvi is a Researcher pursuing his M Phil degree at National Defence University Islamabad, Pakistan.

- <sup>1</sup> Seth G. Jones, and C. Christine Fair “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan” *Rand*, 2010. Retrieved from <https://bit.ly/2NG83QB>, p 26.
- <sup>2</sup> Zahid, Farhan, “Understanding Taliban Through The Prism Of Pashtunwali Code” *Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement*. November 30, 2013. Retrieved from <https://bit.ly/2NikVpA>.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid
- <sup>4</sup> Szrom, Charlie. (August 6, 2009). “The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis”. Retrieved from <https://bit.ly/2m6jvEu>.
- <sup>5</sup> Al Aribya English. (2017, March 27). Pakistan opposition fury over ex-army chief role in Saudi-led military alliance. Al Aribya English. Retrieved from <https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/03/27/Pakistan-to-draw-opposition-s-fury-over-Sharif-s-new-role-in-Saudi-led-military-alliance-.html>
- <sup>6</sup> Julian Droogan (2018) The perennial problem of terrorism and political violence in Pakistan, *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 13:2, 202-215, DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2018.1473631
- <sup>7</sup> Dorsey, J. (2018, January 9). Pakistani politics risk aggravating problems and heightening regional tension. *The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer*. Retrieved from <https://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com.au/2017/02/whither-muslim-worlds-nato.html>
- <sup>8</sup> Amir Mir, "The swelling force of extremism," *The News*. March 22, 2009. Retrieved from <https://bit.ly/2zuOQGO>.
- <sup>9</sup> Kamran Yousaf, “Pakistan seeks extradition of TTP supremo Mullah Fazalullah from Afghanistan”. *Tribune Com* June 20, 2014 Retrieved from <https://bit.ly/1plddhT>.
- <sup>10</sup> William Branigin and Sayed Salahuddin, “Pakistani Taliban leader Mullah Fazalullah killed in U.S. airstrike in Afghanistan” *Washington Post*, June 15, 2018. Retrieved from <https://wapo.st/2NhhSDp>.
- <sup>11</sup> Ben Farmer and Anum Mirza, “New head of Pakistan Taliban appointed as movement finally admits Mullah Fazalullah was killed” *Telegraph UK*, June 24, 2018. Retrieved from <https://bit.ly/2Lg6GGM>.
- <sup>12</sup> Gannon, K. (2018, January 2). Pakistan fires back after ‘Incomprehensible’ trump tweet. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from [www.washingtonpost.com/world/the\\_americas/pakistansummons-us-envoy-to-protest-trump-tweet/2018/01/02/](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/pakistansummons-us-envoy-to-protest-trump-tweet/2018/01/02/)
- <sup>13</sup> Iqbal, A. (2018, 5 January). America suspends entire security aid to Pakistan. *Dawn*. Retrieved from [https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=05\\_01\\_2018\\_001\\_005](https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=05_01_2018_001_005)
- <sup>14</sup> Xinhua. (2017, September 5). Full text of Xiamen declaration of BRICS leaders. *China Daily*. Retrieved from [www.chinadailyasia.com/articles/44/150/109/1504582539856.html](http://www.chinadailyasia.com/articles/44/150/109/1504582539856.html)
- <sup>15</sup> Iqbal, K. (2016). *The making of Pakistani human bombs*. United States: Lexington Books. Retrieved from [http://scholar.google.com/scholar\\_lookup?hl=en&publication\\_year=2016&author=K.+Iqbal&title=The+making+of+Pakistani+human+bombs](http://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?hl=en&publication_year=2016&author=K.+Iqbal&title=The+making+of+Pakistani+human+bombs)
- <sup>16</sup> Galula, D. (1964). *Counter-insurgency warfare: Theory and practice*. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger. [Google Scholar], p. 66).
- <sup>17</sup> (Steinmetz, 1992 Steinmetz, G. (1992). Reflections on the role of social narratives in working-class formation: Narrative theory in the social sciences. *Social Science History*, 16(03), 489–516. (p. 490). doi: 10.1017/S014555320001659X [Crossref], [Google Scholar], p. 409).
- <sup>18</sup> (Hsu, 2001 Hsu, C. L. (2001). Political narratives and the production of legitimacy: The case of corruption in post-Mao China. *Qualitative Sociology*, 24(1), 25–54. doi: 10.1023/A:1026691329912 [Crossref], [Google Scholar]).
- <sup>19</sup> (Hsu, 2001 Hsu, C. L. (2001). Political narratives and the production of legitimacy: The case of corruption in post-Mao China. *Qualitative Sociology*, 24(1), 25–54. doi: 10.1023/A:1026691329912 [Crossref], [Google Scholar];
- <sup>20</sup> Hannah Johnsrud and Frederick W. Kagan, “Pakistan’s Counter-Militant Offensive: Operation Raddul Fasaad”, *Critical Threats*, August 25, 2017. <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/pakistans-counter-militant-offensive-operation-raddul-fasaad>
- <sup>21</sup> Ali Riaz, “Global Jihad, Sectarianism and the Madrassahs in Pakistan”, *Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies*, Singapore, (August 2005), 3-4.
- <sup>22</sup> Asad Ullah Khan, “Gains of Radd ul Fasad”, *Issue Brief*, *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, August 18, 2017.
- <sup>23</sup> Saman Zulfiqar, “An Overview of Pakistan’s Security Situation after Operation Zarb-e-Azb”, *Journal of Current Affairs* Vol. 2, No. 1 (2017), 116-136.

---

<sup>24</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy, “AFGHANISTAN AND THE GENESIS OF GLOBAL JIHAD”, *Peace Research* Vol. 37, No. 1 (May 2005), 15-30.

<sup>25</sup> Peter W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad”, Brookings Institution, November 1, 2001.  
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/pakistans-madrassahs-ensuring-a-system-of-education-not-jihad/>

<sup>26</sup> Fazal Rabbi and Shahid Habib, “Discourse on Madrassa Education Reform in Pakistan: Challenges to State Narrative and its Implications”, *Al Baṣīrah* Vol: 8, No.1 (June 2019), 1-18.

<sup>27</sup> Paul M. P. Bell, “PAKISTAN’S MADRASSAS – WEAPONS OF MASS INSTRUCTION?”, Naval Post Graduate School (March 2007), 16-17.